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ABSTRACT 
 
Matthew R. Hotham: Seeing God with Both Eyes: Asceticism, Ascension and Poetry in the 
Makhzan al-asrar of Nizami Ganjavi (D. 1209) 
(Under the direction of Carl Ernst) 
 
 
This dissertation investigates the role of the body in medieval Sufism through an analysis of 
the portrayals of human, animal and prophetic bodies in the first of Nizami Ganjavi’s Masnavi poems, 
the Makhzan al-asrar. Though the nature of Nizami as poet, mystic, ethicist, and scientist has been a 
topic of debate for several decades, barely discussed in this ongoing conversation is the first poem in 
his Quintet, the Treasury of Mysteries. A mystico-ethical text, it was emulated in both meter and 
structure by a vast number of Persian poets after him. In spite of its immense popularity and 
importance, this poem, especially its long introductory sections, are often overlooked in contemporary 
scholarship. This is in part because they challenge long-held but problematic definitions of Sufism as 
an antinomian tendency within Islam that is primarily interested in human love as a metaphor for divine 
proximity. This dissertation argues that these texts can, as Scott Kugle and Shahzad Bashir have 
pointed out, become sources for learning about medieval Sufi habitus—as sedimented sources of 
religious mores, bodily comportments, social relations, history, science, and meaning. As such, this 
dissertation will challenge previous characterizations of medieval Sufism by investigating the 
importance of bodily practice in a significant medieval poem.  
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
 
 
Transliteration is a complex phenomenon. Often those who can best make use of diacritics 
are also conversant in the languages in question, and so do not need them. For those who do 
not know the languages in question, diacritics are of little use and may hinder readability. For 
this reason I have opted for a simplified version of the IJMES transliteration convention, 
marking only the ‘ayn and ’hamza. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 2004, Martin Lings published a brief collection of translations titled Sufi Poems. The 
volume includes a small sampling of verse from thirteen poets, all written in Arabic, living 
from the ninth through thirteenth centuries. Lings provides a brief preface and conclusion, 
discussing the origins of the translations and the contours of mystical union in Islam, but 
nowhere does he define what makes something a “Sufi poem.” This is not meant as a critique 
of Lings. Lings had no intention of presenting an exhaustive definition or treatment of Sufi 
poetry. The exclusion of Persian poets in and of itself precludes that. Rather, I use his book to 
draw attention to the broader issues at stake in this dissertation. For Lings, the publisher, and 
the potential audience of his book, there was no need to define a Sufi poem. The definition 
seems self-evident. As with other apparently self-evident categories (say, for example, “Islam” 
or “religion”), the term begins to wobble when looked at too closely. Perhaps this is why Carl 
Ernst notes that “defining Sufi poetry is not easy to do…and despite the massive presence of 
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poetry in Sufi circles, there is surprisingly little discussion of this question in modern studies 
of Sufism.”1  
Though Lings is not explicit in the preface of Sufi Poems, the book nevertheless implicitly 
outlines the characteristics of a Sufi poem. We can discern these implicit assumptions based on 
Lings’ selection of poems, his choice of poets, and what he feels is most critical to recount in 
each poet’s brief biography. For Lings, certain poetic forms and topoi mark a poem as “Sufi,” 
alongside the poet’s own religious background. A few examples should suffice to highlight this 
implicit definition.  
For Lings, the mystical poem is first and foremost a “spontaneous…means of relief” from 
the agony of “the sense of separation from God and the return to the intrusive imperfections 
of this lower world.”2 Since they are spontaneous outbursts in the face of the loss of contact 
with the divine, mystical poems necessarily must occur in short bursts. Lings prefers to 
present brief poems, the longest by far is Ibn al-Farid’s “Wine Song,” at 39 lines. This is an 
extreme outlier, since the average poem length in the volume is about 4 lines. The poems are 
generally in the qita or rubiyat form. The brevity and formal simplicity of the poems selected 
                                                            
1 Carl W. Ernst, “What Is Early Arabic Sufi Poetry? Prolegomenon to a Translation of the Poetry of Al-Hallaj” (Duke 
Arabic Halqa, Duke University, 2014), http://www.unc.edu/~cernst/pdf/sufipoetry.pdf. 
2 Martin Lings, Sufi Poems: A Mediaeval Anthology (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2005), viii. 
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supports Lings’ notion that these poems were spontaneous outbursts in response to attaining 
and then returning from a direct encounter with God.3  
In terms of topic, Lings' highlights the plaintive nature of the poems, which are all in the 
first-person. Most are odes, declaring the poet’s love for God, often addressed directly to God, 
such as in this quatrain from Rabi’a al-Adawiya: 
Through me my spirit through and through 
Hast penetrated: even so 
A thorough friend must thorough be. 
So, when I speak, I speak of Thee; 
When silent, then I long for Thee.4 
As should be expected from this early selection of poems, most lack the technical vocabulary 
and layer upon layer of metaphor that becomes the hallmark of Persian poetry. Nevertheless, 
we do see references to romantic human love as a metaphor for divine/human love, with 
several references to the Layla and Majnun, the quintessential star-crossed lovers. A key trope 
in many of the poems is that love allows one to rend or pierce the veils between lover and 
beloved, or God and creation, such as when Dhun Nun says: 
The Beloved’s welcome is the abode wherein they dwell 
                                                            
3 Elsewhere, Lings argues that the Sufi is one who is “conscious of being, like other men, a prisoner in the world of 
forms, but unlike them is also conscious of being free.” This consciousness of this past experience of freedom is 
what produces the longing expressed in the poems, which is distinct from ecstatic outbursts, which occur because 
the Sufi has “two centers of consciousness, one human and one Divine, and he may speak now from one and now 
from the other.” Ibid., 14. 
4 Ibid., 5. 
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Most penetrant their resolve; by it they have travelled 
By it their thoughts pierce to what is hidden by Veils.5 
Love is metaphorized as a fire which consumes the lover with longing for consummation. This 
longing is often framed as a thirst, though only in Ibn al-Farid’s poems do we see this thirst 
explicitly framed as thirst for wine, and passionate love compared with drunkenness. In some 
of the poems, the author frames him or herself as one who longs, but who shows patience or 
restraint in waiting for (re)union with God. Separation from the world is a key, if understated 
aspect of most of these poems, such as in this verse by Abu al-Abbad Al-Sayari: 
Patiently pleasures I shunned till they shunned me 
I made my soul forsake them; steadfast she stood. 
The soul’s for man to make her as he would: 
If fed, she seeks more; else, resigned she’ll be.6 
There is a tendency in the selection of poems to, as Homerin noted, frame “this poetry as verse 
accounts of Sufi doctrine reflecting a mystic's endeavors to describe an experience of great 
profundity and overwhelming emotion. Yet, too often, such explanations are based on 
romantic notions of poetry that focus on an individual's lonely self struggle.”7 Homerin warns 
that such a view of mystical poetry threatens to “isolate this poetry from its larger social, 
                                                            
5 Ibid., 10. 
6 Ibid., 48. 
7 Emil Homerin, Passion Before Me, My Fate Behind: Ibn Al-Farid and the Poetry of Recollection (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2011), vii., as quoted in Ernst, “Sufi Poetry.” 
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religious, and literary context.”8 One way Lings attempts to attend to the poet’s social and 
religious context is via biography, specifically through attending to each poet’s spiritual 
lineage.  
 For each of the thirteen poets in the collection, Lings provides a brief 1-2 paragraph 
introduction. Each biography contains information about the poet’s locations and dates, their 
key spiritual teachings, and, often, information on their institutional Sufi credentials.9 For 
early figures, such as Rabia al-Adawiya, the poet’s interactions with other important early 
mystics is sufficient. For later poets, detailing their investiture is a key aspect of the biography, 
such as in the case of Ibn al-Farid.10 In the case where a historical connection to institutional 
Sufism cannot be affirmatively made, Lings uses the poem’s content to argue for such a 
connection, such as with Abd al-Aziz Al-Tunisi: “it gives us the certitude that it could only have 
been written by a man who had found a Sufi Shaykh and had been initiated into one of the 
orders of Sufism.”11 
                                                            
8 Ibid. 
9 Yashartar notes a link between Persian Sufi poetry and institutional orders, saying: “the Sufi brotherhoods and 
their hospices also became instruments for cultivating Persian poetry…” Ehsan Yarshater, “The Development of 
Iranian Literatures,” in Persian Literature, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1988), 14. 
10 Lings, Sufi Poems, 67. 
11 Ibid., 51. 
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 Thus, we see that for Lings and his readership, a Sufi poem is most easily defined as a 
brief, plaintive cry of longing for God written after a mystical experience by someone who is 
connected to institutional Sufism and its teachings. In the conclusion, however, Lings offers 
another way a poem can be counted as “Sufi”: a poem which is “not in origin a Sufi poem” can 
be “annexed into Sufism.”12 By this he means that a poem not addressed to God, and not 
written by someone attached to a mystical order, can be later put to use by Sufis—even 
misattributed to great historical Sufis—and thus become a “Sufi poem.”  
Lings book provides a helpful corrective to the study of Sufism and poetry, which has 
tended to eschew Arabic poetry in favor of Persian works. Ernst, in his forthcoming 
introduction to a collection of poetry on Hallaj, notes the scant attention given to Arabic Sufi 
poetry in the West, linking it to early modern racial attitudes.13  Ernst, however, eschews Lings’ 
implicit definition of a Sufi poem, arguing that neither aesthetic nor authorial intent suitable 
encompass the range of poems and poets we might wish to mark as “Sufi.” He argues that “the 
problem is that the poetry circulating in Sufi circles in many ways could not be distinguished, 
in textual terms, from other forms of poetry found in early Arab culture. In other words, Sufi 
poetry cannot be defined necessarily as the composition of particular authors, nor even as a 
                                                            
12 Ibid., 91. 
13 Ernst, “Sufi Poetry.” 
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definite style or literary genre. It is instead the reception and interpretation of this poetry that 
connects it to Sufism. Sufi poetry may then be defined as poems that are listened to and 
understood through the hermeneutics of Sufism, regardless of their origin or authorship.”14  
Defining a poem as “Sufi” based on authorial intent or metaphorical content becomes all 
the more complex in Persian poetry.  A host of commenters have argued that Persian poetry 
becomes formally fixed by the early 14th century, relying on a fixed set of images and 
metaphors. Jan Rypka, for example, asserts that during the Timurid period, Persian poetry 
becomes dominated by an increase in formalism to conceal “lack of originality and poverty of 
thought.”15 This formalism is inflected with allegory and an empty mysticism which he claims 
are “not bold Sufi conceptions but pantheistic ideas.”16 The question of whether Persian poets 
of this period were “actually” Sufis, or merely using Sufi imagery out of convention, comes to a 
head in discussions of the poet Hafiz. Hafiz describes passionate human love, lauds 
drunkenness, and critiques the Sufi as a hypocrite in his poems. In spite of this, his works are 
extremely popular in Sufi circles who read them metaphorically and plumb them for mystical 
insights. This tension between a literal reading of the content of the poem and its later 
                                                            
14 Ibid. 
15 Jan Rypka, “History of Persian Literature up to the Beginning of the 20th Century,” in History of Iranian Literature, 
ed. Jan Rypka (D. Reidel, 1968), 283. 
16 Ibid. 
 
 
8 
interpretation is perhaps most clearly summed up by Ehsan Yahsharter, who is highly 
skeptical of mystical readings of Hafiz:  
Attempts at finding a mystical interpretation for Hafiz’s praise of wine and 
drunkenness are not supported by his Divan. Many lovers of Hafiz have sought to find 
clues in his poetry to his mysticism or confirmation of his religious beliefs. As Sufi 
centers (khanaqahs) multiplied and Sufi orders found more and more affiliates, a 
mystical view of life and the universe and the attainment of Truth by love rather than 
reason became prevalent and profoundly influenced the Persian world view. It was only 
natural that a Sufistic interpretation should be applied to the poems of Hafiz, ignoring 
in the process many indications to the contrary. Some commentators and even some 
Western translators of Hafiz, notably Wilberforce Clarke, a translator of the Divān 
(London, 1974), satisfied themselves, to the point of utter absurdity, that every single 
word written by Hafiz had a mystical meaning and no line of Hafez actually meant what 
it said. The reading of Hafiz as codified poetry implying an esoteric meaning for each 
line or word propounded the view that his ghazals can be read at two levels, one 
apparent, the other hidden—the latter representing the intended meaning. 
Deciphering Hafiz’s underlying meaning grew into an esoteric art, not dissimilar to the 
explanations offered by the addicts of “conspiracy theories” (q.v.) in political affairs.17 
  
 In contrast to Lings’ implicit definition and Yarsharter’s explicit one, Ernst’s definition of 
a Sufi poem bypasses these long-standing debates over the nature of the works of poets such as 
Hafiz. This dissertation picks up Ernst’s expanded definition of Sufi poetry, and does so in 
order to investigate a poet often left out of the canon of Sufi poets, and a poem most often 
derided for having little mystical insight. This investigation will reveal the contours of 
                                                            
17 Ehsan Yasharter, “Hafez I. An Overview,” Encyclopedia Iranica, accessed June 10, 2016, 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hafez-i. 
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contemporary definitions of Sufism, to help explain why Nizami and his first masnavi poem, 
the Makhzan al-asrar, get marked as non-Sufi. It will also explore the ways in which Nizami’s 
poem nevertheless engages with familiar Sufi tropes, and has been engaged with by Sufis 
throughout history.  
 This dissertations investigates the boundaries of our definitions of Sufism, and it's place 
in our broader understanding of Islam, through examining an understudied and under-
appreciated work of a central literary figure, Nizami Ganjavi. The analysis will show how issues 
of the body, the role of poetry, and the figure of Muhammad, play critical roles in framing our 
understanding of Sufism. Nizami, and the Makhzan al-asrar, have been overlooked in 
discussions of Sufi poetry for two somewhat contradictory reasons: one which holds a negative 
view of Sufism and seeks to preserve Nizami from Sufism, and another with a positive 
valuation of Sufism which argues that Nizami is insufficiently or improperly Sufi. In the first 
case, there has been a long tradition both within Iranian and Western literary criticism to 
devalue Sufism and its effects on poetic aesthetics. For some of these critics, Nizami’s poetic 
craft precludes labeling him a Sufi. Others point to the psychological complexity of his 
characters, particularly in his romances, and wish to avoid reducing them to simple metaphors 
for a mystical encounter with God. Still others seem to wish to mark Nizami as an astute 
cultural critic, implicitly arguing that to read his works with a Sufi lens might defang his 
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political insights. For these scholars, the Makhzan al-asrar is to be ignored because it is 
aesthetically inferior to his other works, containing none of the character-building or subtle 
social commentary of a Shirin o Khosrow or Layli o Majnun. It’s religious didacticism makes it 
particularly dull to these readers, and E.G. Browne in particular finds its meter grating.18 
 The second critique of Nizami comes from those with a generally positive valuation of 
Sufism. For these writers, it is either the content of Nizami’s poetry, the poet’s own biography, 
or sometimes both, which mark him as beyond the bounds of a Sufi poet. In the former case, 
Nizami’s poetry lacks the depth of spiritual insight of a Jalal al-Din Rumi or Farid al-Din Attar. 
In part this is because it lacks some of the formal aspects inherent in the implicit definition of 
Sufi poetry discussed in relation to Lings’ book above. If, for example, Sufi poetry is marked by 
introspection and a interiorization, the Persian poetry of Nizami’s literary period is marked by 
“the virtual absence of the private, personal voice.”19 Beyond this, however, is a critique of the 
quality and quantity of Nizami’s mystical insights. This critique is particularly leveled at the 
Makhzan al-asrar, about which Peter Chelkowski, for example, notes that the mystical elements 
are mostly confined to the introductory sections.20  
                                                            
18 Edward G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia: Four Volume Set (Ibex Pub, 1997), 403. 
19 Jerome W Clinton, “Court Poetry at the Beginning of the Classical Period,” in Persian Literature, ed. Ehsan 
Yarshater (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1988), 92. 
20 "the mysticism with its symbolism is apparent only in the introduction, which is infused with the essence of 
Sufi thought. In the main body of the book one can detect scattered mystical overtones, but it is up to the reader 
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 For this second set of critics, the Makhzan al-asrar is best viewed as a form of ascetic 
poetry (zuhdiyya). The call for worldly renunciation was not a specifically Sufi one, and was 
frequently adopted by court poets. Indeed, the line between court poetry and zuhdiyya was at 
times hard to draw. As Bruijn notes, poets who wrote of the importance of renunciation often 
lived lives that were far from austere and were imbricated in politics and governance, making 
defining the genre all the more difficult.21 In terms of generic distinctions, such ascetic poetry 
was often explicitly contrasted with the poetry of courtly love and wine-songs which supplied 
much of the imagery of later Sufi poetry: “One precedent was a tradition of ascetic poetry 
(zuhdiyya)…This kind of poetry was characterized by a moralizing stance critical of the 
enticements of the world, and it was probably seen as a counterbalance to the secular poetry of 
love and wine that was so dominant in the courtly culture of the early caliphate.”22 Nizami 
himself explicitly calls the Makhzan a “new poetry” which is freed from the tavern and wine 
imagery.23  
                                                            
to arrive at the final interpretation.” Peter J Chelkowski, “Nizami Gandjawi,” ed. P. Bearman et al., Encyclopedia of 
Islam, Second Edition (University of North Carolina: Brill Online), accessed April 22, 2012, 
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nizami-gandjawi-
SIM_5948?s.num=1&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=majnun. 
21 J. T. P. de Bruijn, Persian Sufi Poetry: An Introduction to the Mystical Use of Classical Persian Poems (Richmond, Surrey: 
Curzon, 1997), 47, http://search.lib.unc.edu?R=UNCb3106919. 
22 Ernst, “Sufi Poetry.” 
23 Nizami Ganjavi, Makhzan al-asrar, ed. Bihruz Sarvatiyan (Tehran: Tus, 1984), 44–45. 
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 This distinction between mystical poetry and ascetic poetry seems more important to 
contemporary literary critics than it does to medieval readers of Nizami’s work, however. 
Some Sufi writers point to Nizami’s eschewal of courtly life as evidence that his calls for 
renunciation were earnest and not merely poetic convention. Indeed, the fact that he spent his 
life in his hometown of Ganja, as well as his practice of 40-day seclusions are cited as reasons 
for his inclusion in Sufi tabaqat literature, such as Jami’s Nafahat al-uns. As Ernst and Annemarie 
Schimmel note in Eternal Garden, contemporary Chishti Sufis also cite Nizami’s work, using it to 
support their advice and demonstrate knowledge of the Sufi literary tradition24. Nizami’s 
poetry is also shown to have spiritual efficacy for one Chishti shaykh: “Burhan al-Din Gharib 
related that once when he was sick, he stayed home and read Nizami’s great epic poem Majnun 
Layli. Nizam al-Din25 visited him and presented him with a hat.”26  
 These brief evocations show the contours of the issues at stake in categorizing and 
examining Nizami’s poetry, particulalry the Makhzan al-asrar. Before I proceed with discussing 
                                                            
24 In one case, a shaykh advises a disciple to undertake a difficult project, citing a line from Khosrow o Shirin: 
“Freshen me with the hear of David, and make my psalms cry aloud.” As cited in Carl W. Ernst and Annemarie 
Schimmel, Eternal Garden: Mysticism, History, and Politics at a South Asian Sufi Center, 2nd edition (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1992), 72. 
25 Nizam al-Din Awliya (d. 1325), a prominent Chishti saint. 
26 Ernst and Schimmel, Eternal Garden, 132. 
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the poem at hand, however, it will be useful to delve into the variety of definitions of Sufism 
and how this has become a contested category in contemporary scholarship on Islam. 
 
What is Sufism? 
“Today Sufism is a name without a reality, but formerly it was a reality without a name.”27  
 
In his 2015 book What Is Islam? Shahab Ahmed poses six questions that challenge researchers 
and writers attempting to grapple with “Islam” as both an analytical category and an historical 
phenomena. The vast array of people, cultures, traditions, ideas, practices, and material objects 
captured by the term “Islamic” threatens to make the word virtually meaningless. Does it make 
sense, he asks, to label the writings of a Jewish philosopher and theologian who wrote in Arabic 
under the patronage of Muslim political authorities “Islamic Philosophy”? While the 
confessional identity of philosophers poses a minor hiccup for definitions of Islamic Philosophy, 
Ahmed wonders if the term itself might be an oxymoron. Can a tradition based on an exclusivist 
revelation coherently incorporate an intellectual tradition with conflicting claims about the 
nature of God, existence, and human access to truth? Ahmed poses this problem of the 
                                                            
27 ʻAlī ibn ʻUsm̲ān Hujvīrī and Reynold Alleyne Nicholson, Kashf Al-Maḥjūb of Al-Hujwīrī : The Revelation of the Veiled : 
An Early Persian Treatise on Sufism, New ed. reprinted with corrections. (Wiltshire: Aris & Phillips, 2000), 44. As cited 
in Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Univ of North Carolina Press, 1975), 22. 
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relationship between philosophy and Islam as the first of six question one must answer when 
defining “Islam.”  The second question he poses regards Sufism. This ordering is not 
coincidental.28 
For Ahmed, the challenge Sufism poses to our definitions of Islam are akin to the ones 
philosophy poses — focusing on the primacy and/or singularity of the Qur’anic revelation. 
Though he discusses Sufi bodily practices and institutional structures, he does so in order to 
quickly pivot to the crux of the matter: philosophical articulations of Sufism found in the 
writings of Ibn Arabi and supported by a convincing quote from Jalal al-Din Rumi. Although Ibn 
Arabi and Maulana Rumi disagreed on several issues, perhaps most importantly the role of 
Muhammad’s model to Sufi practice, Ahmed frames them as unified in their articulation of 
Sufism—and their articulation of Sufism is at odds with a coherent definition of “Islam.”29  
Ahmed, and others before him, have frequently framed Sufism as beyond the bounds of Islam 
proper. This is done in one of two ways. The first, and most common in both historical and 
contemporary discourse, is to focus on problematic Sufi practices. Sufis have been accused of 
                                                            
28 Shahab Ahmed, What Is Islam?: The Importance of Being Islamic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 
19. 
29 Omid Safi, ““Did the Two Oceans Meet? Historical Connections and Disconnections between Ibn ‘Arabi and 
Rumi”,’” Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ’Arabi Society XXVI (1999): 55–88. Safi notes that the story of Rumi meeting 
Shams al-Din Tabrizi, which involves a debate about the relative spiritual worth of Bayazid Bistami versus the 
Prophet Muhammad, is in fact a litmus test of where each man stands on the question of the uniqueness and 
primacy of Muhammad. 
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engaging in illicit activities ranging from public drunkenness to pederasty. These 
characterizations are not without basis. Sufi writings were often full of metaphors drawn from 
courtly love poetry and the wine-songs of Abu Nuwas, who wrote graphically about week-long 
binges and seducing, and even raping young boys.30 Theological and poetic writings arguing that 
pre-pubescent boys were the image of God on earth led to a practice known as shahid bazi, gaze-
play: the practice of contemplating God through meditation on the physical form of beardless 
youths. This practice became so common it was known as “the sickness of the Shaykhs” and was 
said to lead to more than just gazing.31 Sufi practices such as dhikr and sema have been widely 
caricatured and misrepresented, framed as all-night caffeine fueled orgies.  At times, Sufi use of 
music, not-yet-commonplace psychoactive substances (coffee), and dance left them open to 
public ridicule and sanction. One Khorasani movement, later incorporated into the Sufi 
networks, advocated for hiding one’s piety from others during this lifetime. If one became 
                                                            
30 “…by the eleventh century, it became possible to excuse wine in verse as a purely symbolic figure of mystical 
expression…If Abu Nuwas was a mystic he kept the matter remarkably well hidden from his contemporaries and 
immediate entourage.”Philip F. Kennedy, Abu Nuwas: A Genius of Poetry (Oneworld, 2007), 57. He may not have been 
a mystic, but it’s unclear if Abu Nuwas was quite as notorious as his poetic persona would lead us to believe. 
Though many authors, both pre-modern and contemporary, argue that Abu Nuwas’ poems are biographical, 
Philip Kennedy argues that his work demonstrates an aptitude for playing with poetic conventions and topoi that 
should steer the careful reader away from reading his body of work as literal biography. Of course, his prison 
record certainly seems to indicate that he enjoyed, and was known for, carousing around Baghdad. Ibid., 12. 
31 Cyrus Zargar reads Ibn Arabi and Iraqi with a focus upon their notions of beauty, arguing that, for them, beauty 
finds its apex in the human form, and specifically the youthful male human form, as the most perfect 
representation of the divine within creation. Cyrus Ali Zargar, Sufi Aesthetics: Beauty, Love, and the Human Form in 
the Writings of Ibn ’Arabi and ’Iraqi (University of South Carolina Press, 2011), 5. 
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known as particularly pious, an act of ostentatious public impiety was in order, lest one accrue 
the rewards for piety in this life instead of the afterlife.32  In the medieval period, wandering 
ascetics engaged in celibacy, body mortification, and dressed and groomed themselves in ways 
to mark themselves as socially deviant. These practices were both a protest against mainstream 
piety and the increasing institutionalization of Sufism under the tariqa system.33  
While the most radical edges of the Sufi movement have often ostentatiously rejected social 
norms and mainstream piety, this can hardly describe the whole of a movement which, at one 
point, could count nearly every adult Muslim male as a member.34 During the modern period, 
critiques of Sufism have tended to focus on either its irrationality (in contrast to modernist 
reconstructions of Islam as logical, rational, and scientific)35 or the central role of saint36 
                                                            
32 Ahmet T. Karamustafa, Sufism: The Formative Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).This practice 
is perhaps most famously depicted in Sufi literature in the “Story of Shaykh Sam’an” in Farid Attar, The Conference 
of the Birds (Penguin Books Ltd, 2005), 57–75. 
33 Ahmet T. Karamustafa, God’s Unruly Friends: Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later Middle Period, 1200-1550 (Oneworld, 
2006), 13. 
34 Green, Nile. Sufism: A Global History. London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. 
35 See, for example, Muhammad Abduh, “Theology of Unity” in Charles Kurzman, ed., Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A 
Sourcebook (Oxford University Press, USA, 2002), 54–60. 
36 Saint is a problematic term given its Catholic valences, especially since it carries the notion that sainthood is 
recognized and sanctioned by a central authority. The terms most often applied to these holy figures in Arabic 
and Persian is Wali (plural: Awliya), which is best translated as “friend.” Thus rather than a saint, who has been 
officially recognized and sanctioned, the awliya are God’s intimate friends. Their status is confirmed not by any 
central authority, but by their ability to draw devotees through their teachings, network of charities, and spiritual 
powers. 
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veneration to the Sufi tradition. Questions of intercession and anxieties over idolatry have a 
long history in Islamic theology and Muslim political discourse.37 Shrines of saints and relatives 
of the Prophet continue to act as sites of contestation amongst Muslims in places such as Saudi 
Arabia38 and Pakistan.39 The Sufi movement incorporated pre-existing practices of the 
commemoration and veneration of holy men, with some shrines even changing religious 
affiliation along with the shifting religious identity of the local population.40 These saints, due 
to the proximity with God attained during mystical encounter(s), are said to carry baraka, a 
transferable non-material power, which they could impart to followers and devotees even after 
death. Some saints became known to provide particular benefits or assistance with specific 
problems.41 In other cases the saint’s power is said to be generally apotropaic. Traveling to 
                                                            
37 See, for example, concerns over proper veneration of the Prophet Muhammad’s image in Jamal J. Elias, Aisha’s 
Cushion: Religious Art, Perception, and Practice in Islam (Harvard University Press, 2012). 
38 Vincent J. Cornell, Voices of Islam: Voices of the Spirit (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007), 84. 
39 See, for example, Jamal J. Elias, On Wings of Diesel: Trucks, Identity and Culture in Pakistan (Oxford: Oneworld 
Publications, 2011). 
40 Valerie Ramseyer, The Transformation of a Religious Landscape: Medieval Southern Italy, 850-1150 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 2006). Ramseyer notes that Jewish, Christian and Muslim saintly hagiographies were often 
indistinguishable in content: they all were peripatetic, battled demons or jinn, healed the sick, and 
served/challenged the wealthy. To show how fluid religious boundaries were during this period, Ramseyer notes 
one case of excommunicated Catholics appealing to the Abbasid Caliph to be reinstated and regain access to a 
Jewish saint’s shrine. Valerie Ramseyer, “Sharing Religious Space: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Communities in 
Early Medieval Southern Italy and Sicily” (104 Murphey Hall, UNC-Chapel Hill, April 11, 2011). 
41 When heading to the shrine of Nizam al-Din Awliya in Delhi, multiple Indians, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, 
asked me to wish for financial success on their behalf while at the shrine - indicating that Nizam al-Din was 
particularly adept at making these wishes come true. 
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proximate saints shrines can also act as a form of pilgrimage, especially for those who otherwise 
could not complete their religious obligation to perform the Hajj, such as women, the elderly, 
and the impoverished. This was especially true in the pre-modern period, when the Hajj was a 
significantly larger financial hardship, time commitment, and physical strain than it is today. 
The existence of and people’s attendance at saint’s shrines are not the only concern of some 
Muslim reformers, however. What people do in order to garner the saint’s attention and blessing 
are also open to critique. From circumambulating the saint’s tomb to performing music on the 
saints behalf to celebrating ‘urs, the anniversary of the saint’s death, when they were finally 
“wed” to God, a host of veneration practices look dangerously close to idolatry to some 
contemporary Muslims. This critique is especially potent in the South Asian context, where 
saints’ shrines can be inter-religious spaces our spaces of inter-religious tension.42 
Sufis, and those in their orbit, have not only been critiqued for their actions, they have also 
been criticized for what they do not do. In contemporary American discourse, the Sufi tradition 
is often framed as particularly pluralistic. Thirteenth century poet Jalal al-Din Rumi has become 
a popular internet sage, whose poetry is used in motivational and inspirational images. One 
popular image quotes Rumi saying “I belong to no religion. My religion is love. Every heart is my 
                                                            
42 Rachana Umashankar, “Defending Sufism, Defining Islam: Asserting Islamic Identity in India” (PhD Diss., UNC 
Chapel Hill, 2012). 
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temple.”43 Though this quote most certainly did not come from Rumi, it is perhaps only a more 
emphatic interpolation of similar statements found in his writing.44 Rumi is fond of saying that 
the important aspect of one’s devotion to God is not outward practice but inner orientation. He 
does not, however, advocate for the abandonment of bodily practice or ritual adherence. In 
contemporary American pop-multicultural discourse, however, this statement comes to be 
interpreted as advocating a Protestantized Islam, free of ritual practice and doctrinal 
distinctiveness. Though seen in a positive light by contemporary spiritual seekers, the 
perception of Sufis as an antinomian tradition has a longer lineage in Muslim discourse, and 
often made Sufis the target of criticism. In Rumi’s Mathnawi-e Manawi he tells a story of Moses 
and a shepherd. The shepherd is praising God in problematically anthropomorphized terms:  
Where are You?-- so I can become Your servant, and mend  
Your sandals and comb Your head.  
 
"(So) I can wash Your robe, kill Your lice, (and) bring  
milk in front of You, O Great (Lord).  
 
"(So) I can kiss Your small hand, massage Your small  
foot, and sweep Your little (dwelling) place (when) the  
                                                            
43 Eleanor Finnegan, “‘I Belong to No Religion. My Religion Is Love’: Sufism, Religious Studies, and Love,” Studying 
Religion in Culture, March 22, 2016, http://religion.ua.edu/blog/2016/03/i-belong-to-no-religion-my-religion-is-
love-sufism-religious-studies-and-love/. 
44 A blogger at Harvard has attempted to track down the original Persian sources for many of the popular Rumi 
quotes online. This particular quote had no provenance in Rumi’s extant writings: “The Religion of Love | نﺎﻤﯿﻠﺳ 
ﻦﺑا ﺲﻳّﺪﻗ,” accessed March 9, 2016, http://blogs.harvard.edu/sulaymanibnqiddees/2014/05/30/the-religion-of-
love/. 
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time for sleep comes.45  
Moses scolds the shepherd for his heresy, causing the shepherd to run off into the desert in 
grief over offending God. Then a voice from heaven chastises Moses, saying, among other 
things, “Inside the Ka`ba, there is no rule for (determining) the prayer direction.”46 The 
implication here is that for one who is inflamed with love for God, like the shepherd, proper 
ritual performance or adherence to theological doctrines is beside the point. Muslims and non-
Muslims alike have taken this to mean that ritual practice is unimportant: but note that in this 
metaphor, one must first make it to the center of Mecca before one can disregard the direction 
of prayer. In Jamal al-Din Aflaki’s Feats of the Knowers of God, Rumi is questioned by his disciples 
about the supposed high mystical state of a drunken homeless man who never attends mosque. 
Rumi’s response is that only God knows an individual’s spiritual status, but if one seeks to 
garner the attention of God, it is best to hang out where he often looks.47 Rumi is aware that, 
even should one have a high spiritual state, there is risk of being misunderstood by the masses, 
or persecuted by religious authorities. In one tale, jurists have decided to challenge Rumi’s 
teachings by objecting to anything he says during his weekly khutba. He gets word of this plot 
                                                            
45 “Moses and the Shepherd (part One),” accessed August 1, 2016, http://www.dar-al-masnavi.org/n.a-II-
1720.html#1.12/14/16 10:38:00 AM 
46 Ibid.  
47 Shams al-Din Ahmad Aflaki, The Feats of the Knowers of God: Manaqeb Al- Arefin (Boston: Brill, 2002), 
http://search.lib.unc.edu?R=UNCb4154850. 
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and decides to say only “There is no god but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God!”48  
In another, Rumi’s beloved spiritual teacher, Shams, speaks with a disciple who is persecuted 
for altering this fixed testament of faith, greeting him in the marketplace saying “”There is no 
god but God and Shams al-Din is the messenger of God.” Shams advocates for equivocation in 
this case, saying “did you not know that my first name is Muhammad? You should have said 
‘and Muhammad is the messenger of God’” since “people don’t recognize gold that’s not in the 
form of minted coins.”49 In each of these cases, the question of the primacy of proper ritual 
performance and doctrinal adherence is under debate. Rumi and his circle do not reject ritual 
or doctrine, but recognize that eventually one develops a relationship with God where formal 
religious strictures may get in the way. At the same time, they seem to recognize that the 
general public and religious authorities are bound to misunderstand these occasions, and so 
must guard their words and actions carefully lest they mislead the uninitiated or invite legal 
trouble. 
But what is “Sufism”? On the first page of a number of introductory textbooks, authors are 
quick to gloss the term “Sufism” as being equivalent to and coextensive with “Islamic 
                                                            
48 Ibid., 260. 
49 Ibid., 435. 
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Mysticism.”50 The problems with this definition are manifold. The term mysticism itself, as 
Michel de Certeau has helpfully pointed out, is derived from a particular branch of medieval 
Christian theology.51 In its scholastic formulation, it involved rituals of praise and devotion, 
private reflection and contemplation, as well as techniques of bodily control and ascetic denial. 
But as the word developed within both Western scholarly and popular discourse through the 
18th and 19th centuries, it came to be purged of the external, embodied aspects of medieval 
practice. Leigh Eric Schmidt traces this development through European and American 
intellectuals, focusing particularly on William James and Unitarian Universalism as vectors for 
the interiorization of mystical “experience.”52 Thus, the term mysticism in its contemporary 
configuration excludes a large number of practices, objects, and historical phenomena that 
might otherwise be captured by the word “Sufism.” Furthermore, this exclusion works in the 
reverse direction. If we take for granted our inherited definition of mysticism as a form of 
individual contemplation of and search for proximity with the divine, associating this 
                                                            
50 See, for example, A. J. Arberry, Sufism: An Account of the Mystics of Islam (Mineola, N.Y: Dover Publications, 2001); 
Julian Baldick, Mystical Islam : An Introduction to Sufism (New York: New York University Press, 1989), 
http://search.lib.unc.edu?R=UNCb2309068; William C. Chittick, Sufism: A Beginner’s Guide (Oneworld, 2007); Martin 
Lings, What Is Sufism?, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1999); Huston Smith, Essential Sufism, ed. 
Robert Frager and James Fadiman, 1 Reprint edition (San Francisco: HarperOne, 1999). 
51 Michel De Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” in Heterologies: Discourse on the Other (U of Minnesota Press, 1986), 80–100. 
52 Leigh Eric Schmidt, “The Making of Modern ‘Mysticism,’” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 71 (2003): 
273–302. 
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exclusively with Sufism in the Islamic tradition excludes a number of practices and communities 
that might otherwise count—such as Shi‘i notions of ‘irfan or Muslim minority communities, like 
the Syrian Alawites. Finally, such a stark definition of Sufism as interiority within Islam concedes 
ground to those who wish to mark the Sunni legal tradition as historically orthodox in its 
normative prescriptions for structuring human relations and embodied practice. Accounts, such 
as Marshall Hodgson’s, which give the medieval Muslim body to the Sunni qadi, leaving the care 
of the soul to the shaykh, fail to leave space for Sufi challenges to legalistic claims on the proper 
configuration of body and society.53 
 If one is seeking an approach to Sufism that moves beyond seeing it as “Islamic 
Mysticism”—accounts of personal experience of the divine transmitted through texts which 
can be distilled into their theological meanings—there are several places to turn. Most 
obviously, as Vasquez notes54, contemporary ethnographic work is a primary site for studying 
the body in Islam. Examples abound in the broader fields of Islamic Studies, from Saba 
Mahmood55 to Lara Deeb.56 But what of pre-modern Sufism? A few studies have avoided the 
                                                            
53Marshall G. S Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1974). 
54 Manuel A. Vasquez, More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion (Oxford University Press, USA, 2010). 
55 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, With a New preface by the author 
edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
56Lara Deeb, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi’i Lebanon (Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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pitfalls of abstracting Sufism as “inner experience” by focusing on the institutional structures 
and formations of Sufi orders. Spencer Trimmingham’s exhaustive catalogue of Sufi orders57 or 
Ohlander’s book on the foundation of the Suhrawardiyya58, for example.  
 Contrary to other introductory texts on Sufism, Carl Ernst’s Sufism begins by rejecting 
the easy affiliation between Sufism and mysticism.59 Rather he wants to use Sufism as a term to 
capture a number of historical phenomena, including texts, practices, music, movement, and 
institutional lineages. Ernst delves into the relationship Sufis have with the sacred sources of 
Islam, but rather than staying there, he moves on to explore the poetic tradition, the 
development of Sufi orders, music, dance, and contemporary challenges. This pattern of 
exploration is familiar to Ernst. In his work on Ruzbihan Baqli, he accomplishes this task by 
analyzing the textual strategies and rhetorical moves utilized by the saint and his followers to 
build spiritual authority. Rather than reading Ruzbihan’s writings as transparent accounts of 
spiritual feats and ecstatic encounters, he instead situates these boasts within a social and 
political context in which they do work for and upon the consumers and producers of such 
                                                            
57 J. Spencer (John Spencer) Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
58 Erik S. Ohlander, Sufism in an Age of Transition :  aUmar Al-Suhrawardƒ´ and the Rise of the Islamic Mystical Brotherhoods 
(Leiden ;Boston: Brill, 2008). 
59 Carl Ernst, Sufism (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 2011). 
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tales.60 A similar approach undergirds his Words of Ecstasy in Sufism. The story of al-Hallaj’s 
execution is well-known and oft-repeated, but through a close analysis of the trial, Hallaj’s own 
writings, and the regulations constraining ecstatic speech, Ernst shows how this familiar story 
of mystic persecution by obtuse legalists is actually an historical and political construction. 
61Omid Safi deploys a similar approach, situating Sufi lives within their social and political 
context. He charts the ways in which Sufi masters exchanged spiritual authority for political 
legitimacy with the Seljuqs. Such an analysis makes stories, such as that of Baba Tahir’s 
encounter with Tugril Beg, readable as interactions between authorities whose power rested 
on different but momentarily intersecting planes, rather than as critique of political authority 
and worldly concerns delivered by a transcendent ascetic.62 
 
Nizami: Poet & Mystic? 
Walk in to any bookstore in Iran, and you can find a copy of Nizami Ganjavi’s poetry for 
sale. More often than not, this will be a lavishly bound compendium of his five epic poems, 
                                                            
60 Carl W. Ernst, Rūzbihān Baqlī : Mysticism and the Rhetoric of Sainthood in Persian Sufism (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon 
Press, 1996). 
61Carl W. Ernst, Words of Ecstasy in Sufism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985). 
62 See both Omid Safi, “Bargaining with Baraka: Persian Sufism, ‘Mysticism,’ and Pre‐modern Politics,” The Muslim 
World 90, no. 3‐4 (September 1, 2000): 259–88; Omid Safi, The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam : Negotiating 
Ideology and Religious Inquiry (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). 
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known collectively as the Khamsa. Perhaps only Firdowsi’s Shahname, Hafez's Divan, and Jalal al-
Din Rumi’s Masnavi are more ubiquitous. If one should want to purchase one of these five 
poems individually, the most common finds are Layla & Majnun, Haft Paykar, and the Makhzan al-
asrar. English-language scholarship on Nizami has tended to emphasize his narrative 
romances, Layla & Majnun, though Khosrow & Shirin and Haft Paykar also receive scholarly 
attention. In contrast, the Makhzan al-asrar remains neglected. The Encyclopedia Iranica, for 
example, contains an individual entry on each of the other four poems of the Khamsa, 
neglecting only the Makhzan.   
As with other Persian poets, nationalist claims swirl around Nizami’s legacy. In the Holy 
Defense Museum in Tehran, which commemorates the Iran-Iraq war, Nizami’s work is featured 
several locations. Most tellingly, Iran is associated with Layla, who has been sexually violated 
by Iraq’s penetration into her boundaries.63 Though Nizami wrote in Persian, his place of 
residence, Ganja, is now located in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has actively claimed Nizami’s 
                                                            
63 One plaque notes that the first military outpost occupied by Iraqi forces was called “Khan-Leyli,” and frames the 
incident as such: “Entering the Leila’s home, the uninvited guests partook the meal and made forays into the 
blood of thousands of enamored Majnoons…” 
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mantle, sponsoring a statue in Slovenia,64 endowing a center for Azerbaijani studies at Oxford 
University in Nizami’s name,65 and naming a medal for scientific achievement after the poet.66  
 Nizami is the penname of Jamāl al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad Ilyās Ibn Yūsuf Ibn Zakī 
Mu’ayyad, a poet born in the first half of the 12th century (despite some dispute over his exact 
birthdate, UNESCO has set it as 535/1141, for the purpose of celebrating his 850th birthday in 
1991). Relatively little biographical information is known about Nizami compared to his 
contemporaries, for although his major collections of poetry were all commissioned by royal 
patrons, Nizami eschewed life at the court.67 His selected penname, Nizami, associates him with 
the stringing of pearls—a common metaphor for versifying in Persian literature. Indeed he is 
one of the towering figures of Persian poetry.  
During Nizami’s lifetime, Ganja was located in a culturally vibrant region during a period of 
political turmoil. His home town, Ganja [red], was known as an incubator of poetic talent, and 
                                                            
64 AzerNews, “Statue of Nizami Ganjavi Unveiled in Slovenia,” AzerNews, accessed June 10, 2016, 
http://www.azernews.az/culture/97075.html. 
65 “Head of Nizami Ganjavi Scientific Centre at University of Oxford Nargiz Pashayeva Meets New Chief of the 
University`s Oriental Institute Mark Smith,” accessed June 10, 2016, 
http://azertag.az/en/xeber/Head_of_Nizami_Ganjavi_Scientific_Centre_at_University_of_Oxford_Nargiz_Pashaye
va_meets_new_chief_of_the_universitys_Oriental_Institute_Mark_Smith-900767. 
66 “News.Az - Gold Medal Named after Nizami Ganjavi Established in Azerbaijan,” accessed June 10, 2016, 
http://news.az/articles/official/89828. 
67 Chelkowski, “Nizami Gandjawi.” 
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control over the town was a sign of one’s cultural bona fides, so it changed hands often. The 
political rulers were descended from Turkic tribesmen who swept down from the Steppes and 
conquered the settled peoples in Muslim majority territories. These invasions happened in 
successive waves, often occurring roughly every three generations, according to the 
observations and theorizations of Muslim historian Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406). In fact, Nizami died 
just 10 years before Chengis Khan initiated his war against Khwarzmshah, eventually subduing 
Ganja, along with the rest of the region. This pattern of invasion lead to cultural and religious 
differences between rulers and those they ruled. To gain political and religious legitimacy, 
these new rulers would provide patronage to poets and saints, who would then sanction them 
as properly Muslim and Persianate leaders. 
 Nizami’s patrons included the Seljuks, in their Eastern capital of Hamdan, the Eldiguzids, 
based in Barda, who pledged fealty to the Seljuks in exchange for being regents to the Seljuk 
crown prince, and became an independent kingdom after the Seljuk’s fall, the Shirvanshahs, 
based in Baku, who spent most of their 700 year existence as a vassal state, but briefly became 
an independent kingdom in the 12th century, and the Ahmadillis, whose brief rule over 
Marageh roughly coincided with Nizami’s own lifespan.  
Nizami is most well known for his five epic mathnawī poems, known collectively as the 
Khamsa (Quintet). These poems were collected and transmitted in an omnibus manuscript, so that 
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it was rare to read one of Nizami’s epics without the other four. With this quintet, he set the 
standard for poetic compositions in the centuries that followed. Numerous poets attempted to 
emulate his feat, sometimes writing on the same topics, using the same meters as Nizami. Most 
succeeded in only completing one or two works in this style, never achieving the full set. The 
most imitated works from the Khamsa are Makhzan al-asrār (The Treasury of Mysteries) and Leyli o 
Manjnūn (Layla and Majnun).68 The first of these works is either an ethical or a philosophical-
mystical text, depending on how one chooses to interpret it.  
Previous research on the Makhzan al-asrar in English is limited. There is no full-length 
monograph on the work itself. An English translation of the work was completed in 1945 and is 
accompanied by an 87-page introduction, discussing Nizami’s biography and the context of his 
work, more than the work itself.69 The translation comes with no foot or endnotes, and was 
translated without reference to the best edited version of the work available at that time 
(Dastgirdi, 1934). A more recent edited version of the work, by Dr. Bihruz Sarvatiyan, was 
completed in 1984. Sarvatiyan has completed a number of monographs and articles on 
                                                            
68 Bruijn, J.T.P. de. " K̲h̲amsa." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. 
Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online , 2012. Reference. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
22 April 2012 <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-
2/khamsa-SIM_4182> 
69 Nizami Ganjavī and Gholam Hossein Darab Khan, Makhzanol Asrār = The treasury of mysteries (London: A. 
Probsthain, 1945). 
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Nizami’s poetry, life, and mystical metaphors, including a concordance to the Makhzan al-asrar, 
published in Tehran in 1991. Thus far little of this work has been incorporated in English- or 
European-language analysis of Nizami’s writings.70  
Those authors who do work on Nizami in English have tended to focus on the three 
middle epics of his five poem ouvre. The Makhzan al-asrar is often neglected for its difficult 
language and terse, proscriptive ethics. The Iskandar-name, a massive, two-part tome about the 
life and works of Alexander the Great is usually ignored entirely, perhaps because of its length 
and its historical, rather than mystical content. The other three works, Khosrow wa Shirin, Layli o 
Majnun, and Haft Paykar are all moderately sized love stories, often glossed with a mystical 
interpretation. The first two focus on a single, central love story—Khosrow and Shirin, a Persian 
king and his wife, and Layla and Majnun, two Arab school companions from good families who 
fall in love. 
The main scholarship on Nizami’s writing is carried out within comparative literature, 
area studies, and religious studies. Such scholarship is often concerned with whether or not 
Nizami was himself a mystic, and if it is proper to read his writings as mystical. These debates 
                                                            
70 A very brief article on the Miʿraj in Nizami’s writings appears in a 2001 volume, but is primarily interested in 
tracing the provenance of the content of Nizami’s various ascension accounts. The author also spends more time 
on the Miʿraj account from Haft Paykar than the one in the Makhzan al-asrar.  C.H. De Fouchecour, “The Story of the 
Ascension (Miʿraj) In Nizami’s Work,” in The Poetry of Nizami Ganjavi: Knowledge, Love, and Rhetoric, ed by. Kamran 
Talattof and Jerome W. Clinton, trans by. Kamran Talattof and Arjang Talattof (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). 
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occur around two foci: 1) authorial intent—i.e. is there anything in Nizami’s biography or 
explicitly stated in his introductory remarks that indicate he intended for these texts to be read 
in a mystical manner?; 2) historical context—i.e. were the tropes and metaphors Nizami used in 
his poems firmly established in their mystical meanings during Nizami’s lifetime, or are these 
interpretations something later generations of readers imposed upon the text themselves?  
Julie Scott Meisami, a premier scholar of Persian literature, along with Nizami expert 
Kamran Talatoff and a handful of other writers, argue that there is little evidence to make a case 
for Nizami as a mystical writer.71 In Meisami’s case, she uses evidence internal to the text of Layli 
o Majnun to argue against a mystical interpretation of the work. More important to her 
argument, however, is the question of when the trope of courtly love gained a mystical gloss. 
Using historical and textual evidence she asserts that Nizami wrote his love epics as a critique 
of the court and the trope of courtly love. In her reading of Layli o Majnun, Majnun is not a 
mystical hero to be revered, but a selfish boy who indulges in his fantasy ideal of love to such a 
degree that it thwarts a real relationship with Layla and leads to both of their deaths.72 This 
                                                            
71 See: Julie Scott Meisami, “Kings and Lovers: Ethical Dimensions of Medieval Persian Romance,” Edebiyāt n.s. 1, 
no. 1 (1987): 1–27; Julie Scott Meisami, Medieval Persian Court Poetry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1987); Kamran Talattof, “Nizami’s Unlikely Heroines: A Study of the Characterizations of Women in Classical 
Persian Literature,” in The Poetry of Nizami Ganjavi: Knowledge, Love, and Rhetoric, ed. Jerome W Clinton and Kamran 
Talattof (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 51–81. 
72 Meisami, Medieval Persian Court Poetry, 171. 
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reading, which puts Majnun in the good company of other tragic figures such as Romeo and 
Goethe’s Werther, has few parallels within the Persian and Arabic reception history of the tale.  
In contrast to Meisami’s reading of Nizami’s work, scholars such as A.A. Seyed-Gohrab and 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr argue for a thoroughly mystical reading.73 Nasr especially makes pains to 
connect Nizami to a long theosophical lineage, showing how his use of astronomy connects 
him to important philosophical figures, from Suhrawardi al-Maqtul back to the Neoplatonists, 
and with mystical figures such as Ayn al-Qudat and Ahmad al-Ghazali. More compelling than 
Nasr’s attempt to show historical connections between these far-flung individuals is Seyed-
Gohrab’s evidence that mystical understandings of the trope of courtly love, images of the 
pearl and shell, and certain aspects of astronomy, were already in circulation at this time. No 
doubt, asking questions about the contents and context of Nizami’s poems is a helpful 
scholarly contribution. And discerning authorial intent may be critical when compiling 
manuscripts into an edited volume or determining the best translation for ambiguous words or 
metaphors. But when such information is used to argue for pre-set fixed limits on the 
                                                            
73S.H. Nasr, “The World View and Philosophical Perspective of Hakim Nizāmi Ganjawi,” The Muslim World 82, no. 3 
(1992): 191–200; A. A. Seyed-Gohrab, Metaphor and Imagery in Persian Poetry (Leiden ;Boston: Brill, 2012); A. A. Seyed-
Gohrab, Layli and Majnun: Love, Madness, and Mystic Longing in Niẓāmī’s Epic Romance (Leiden: Brill, 2003); A. A. Seyed-
Gohrab, “Leyli O Majnun,” Encyclopedia Iranica, July 15, 2009, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/leyli-o-
majnun-narrative-poem; A. A. Seyed-Gohrab, “A Mystical Reading of Nizāmī’s Use of Nature,” in A Key to the 
Treasure of the Hakīm: Artistic and Humanistic Aspects of Nizāmī Ganjavī’s Khamsa, ed. Christine van Ruymbeke and 
Johann Christoph Burgel (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2011), 181–94. 
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interpretive possibilities of a text, and especially when it is used to push back against long-
established interpretive histories, as in Meisami’s case, this method risks ignoring cogent post-
structuralist critiques of authorial intent. 
A third, more recent, approach to Nizami’s poetry has looked toward it for information 
about his historical context. Christine van Ruymbeke has mined Nizami’s ouvre as a source of 
information on medieval Persian botany and minerology.74 Chelkowski also notes that Nizami’s 
Khamsa is one of our principle sources of knowledge of Persian musical instruments and 
compositions from his time period.75 Though such investigations have provided useful 
scholarship on Nizami’s historical context, this dissertation will take a new approach to the 
study of Nizami’s writings, by situating his writings on the Miʿraj within the context of pre-
existing discourses on the ascension.  
Nizami’s Khamsa (Arabic for “Quintet,” also known by the Persian epithet Panj Ganj — 
“Five Treasures”) consists of five long epic poems in the masnavi form and represented a new 
height in literary output by a single author writing in literary Persian. For generations after, 
poets would seek to establish their credentials by penning a response to or emulation of each 
                                                            
74Christine van Ruymbeke, “Nizami’s Poetry Versus Scientific Knowledge: The Case of the Pomegranate,” in The 
Poetry of Nizami Ganjavi: Knowledge, Love, and Rhetoric, ed. Jerome W Clinton and Kamran Talattof (New York: 
Palgrave, 2000), 141–62; C. van (Christine van) Ruymbeke, Science and Poetry in Medieval Persia: The Botany of Nizami’s 
Khamsa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
75 Chelkowski, “Nizami Gandjawi.” 
 
 
34 
of Nizami’s five works.76 His most famous work, Layli o Majnun, is certainly the most emulated 
long narrative poem in Persian literature, with versions and reinventions of the tale penned in 
Arabic, Turkish, Urdu, and even Kurdish. In spite of Layli o Majnun’s popularity and acclaim, 
Nizami’s first major work, Makhzan al-asrar (The Treasury of Secrets), might have left a larger 
literary footprint. A mystico-ethical didactic treatise, in part meant to serve as a Mirror for 
Princes, it is linguistically difficult and ethically proscriptive. For this reason, Meisami and 
others claim that it was not widely popular among the general reading public. Such a claim 
might be contested, however, since the Makhzan was emulated by most major poets who 
attempted to match Nizami’s poetic output. Influenced by Sana’i’s (d. 1131) Hadiqat al-haqiqat, 
and responded to by such famed mystical poets as Amir Khosrow (d. 1325) and Jami (d. 1492), 
the Makhzan al-asrar clearly drew upon and was drawn upon by writers firmly situated within 
the Sufi tradition.  
 Furthermore, Nizami’s writings were rarely copied or distributed as separate works and 
instead were transmitted together in a single codex. His Khamsa was a widely distributed 
manuscript found in major libraries from Anatolia to North India. It was a significant enough 
work that Mughal emperors made a point of altering the colophon of the imperial Khamsa codex 
upon ascension to the throne, making it one of only a few books (including the Shahnameh) to be 
                                                            
76Annemarie Schimmel, As Through a Veil: Mystical Poetry in Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 52. 
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accorded such political significance. Timurid courts of Mawarannahr and Khurasan had large 
wall paintings and "a fifteenth-century illustration of Nizami's haft Paykar (Seven Portraits) 
shows a palace room decorated with large wall paintings of seven princesses.”77 During the 
Timurid period and beyond, several poetic texts, including the Khamsa came to "represent the 
culmination of a ruling ideology that became a critical common reference point for Timur's 
successors, defining and articulating a vision of human relations, ethics, justice, and 
kingship...Articulating what was an already firmly held ethical paradigm, the literature came to 
serve a central importance in supporting claims of the Mughals in India, where they supplied 
the dynasty with an articulate and scholarly argument which could be strategically expounded 
to make possible and to justify the rulership of South Asia within the context of a recognized 
and legitimate Sunni political discourse, without threatening their formal religious loyalties.”78 
 
A Treasury of Mysteries or Collection of “Fatuous Truisms and Pointless Anecdotes” 
 
                                                            
77 Lisa Balabanlilar, Imperial Identity in the Mughal India: Memory and Dynastic Politics in Early Modern South and Central 
Asia (London ;New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 61. 
78 Ibid., 149. 
 
 
36 
 Nizami claims that the Makhzan al-asrar was written in an attempt to surpass Sana’i’s 
Hadiqat al-haqiqat, whose work heavily influences Nizami’s own.79 Though he identifies the 
Hadiqat as his inspiration, Nizami does not use the same meter, choosing the sariʿ-i maṭwiyy-i 
mawlhuf rather than the ḵafif-e mosaddas-i makhbun-i maḥḏuf  meter of the Hadiqat. What the two 
poems do share, however, are their didacticism and organization. Both poems include 
theoretical discussions of some religious principle exemplified by a story. Unlike the Hadiqat, 
however, which is relatively loosely structured and has significant variations in content and 
organization across manuscripts, the Makhzan is clearly organized and tightly structured. It 
includes 15 introductory sections, some of which Sana’i also includes, such as sections praising 
the Prophet Muhammad, a discussion of the zodiac, and praise for the poem’s patron. Nizami 
greatly expands on these introductory sections, however, including an opening chapter on 
tawhid, two brief sections on God’s attributes, one highlighting God’s wrathful aspects and the 
other God’s forgiving ones. This is followed by six sections praising the Prophet Muhammad, 
which focus on his pre-eminence in creation, or what Ibn Arabi termed “Muhammadan 
reality.”80 Though it appears second out of six sections, the focus of his praise of the Prophet 
seems to be his section on the ascension: it is where he provides the most extended and 
                                                            
79 Heshmat Moayyad, “Lyric Poetry,” in Persian Literature, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), 133. 
80 For more on Hadiqat al-Muhammadiyya, see, for example: Annemarie Schimmel, And Muhammad Is His Messenger: 
The Veneration of the Prophet in Islamic Piety (The University of North Carolina Press, 1985). 
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complex imagery in his discussion of the Prophet and is central to Muslim understandings of 
Muhammadan Realty, especially since it marks Muhammad as ontologically unique amongst 
created beings. We will discuss this aspect of the poem further in chapter 4. 
 Following the praise of the Prophet, Nizami then includes a brief section praising the 
patron, a direct address to the patron, a discussion of the significance of the poem at hand, two 
sections praising the value of poetry for expressing religious and mystical truth. The final 
three sections of the introduction all revolve around Nizami’s own mystical experiences: the 
first which he obtains while secluded in a garden one night, and which leads him on the path 
of Sufi discipleship, according to the poem. The next two occur in more formal settings, where 
his spiritual master guides him through a 40-day seclusion. It is after these introductory 
sections, which account for roughly one quarter of the Makhzan’s total lines, that the body of 
the poem begins.  
 It is long-standing tradition when discussing and translating Persian poetry to elide the 
introductory remarks. There are a number of reasons for this, but perhaps the most frequently 
cited is that introductions were formulaic and perfunctory, and thus their content 
unremarkable. Though they may have become perfunctory for later poets, nevertheless, “this 
entire range of sections was introduced by Nizami Ganjavi. Before his time they were not 
known…Nizami of Ganja made all these things into an obligation. The treatment of the 
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ascension of the Prophet (mir’aj)….were introduced by him”81  De Bruijn elaborates on this, 
stating that “Nizami systematized technical principles which were used earlier by masnavi 
writers win a looser manner.”82 Nizami’s introduction of a mir’aj narrative, for example, was 
probably influenced by similar sections in Sana’i’s Hadiqat, but became all but obligatory for 
later poets writing in the masnavi form.83 If one, as Chelkowski does, isolates the mystical 
content to the introductory portions, and then dismisses the introduction as purfunctory, a 
great deal of Nizami’s own assertions about the inspiration for and goals of his poem are lost. 
Thus in this study, we will attend to the poem as a whole, examining how the introductory 
materials might inform Nizami’s handling of stories and material in the body of the poem. 
 The body of the poem itself is often framed as didactic poetry. The earliest Persian poetry 
was often appreciated for its ability to convey moral norms. A number of scholars attribute 
this feature of to its early origins in Pahlavi Zoroastrian texts. Arabic poetry developed a 
similar genre of advice literature, which often focused on “the uncertainties of life and the 
necessity to prepare oneself for death and the afterlife,” called zuhudiyat.84 Though the genre is 
                                                            
81 Ahmed Ali as cited in J. T. P. de Bruijn, Of Piety and Poetry: The Interaction of Religion and Literature in the Life and 
Works of Hakīm Sanāʾī of Ghazna (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 186.. 
82 Ibid., 189. 
83 Ibid., 188. 
84 Ibid., 30. 
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named after an important Sufi term, Bruijn warns us against assuming that all poems written 
in this genre are mystical.85 He prefers the term “religious” rather than Sufi or mystical to 
refer to advice literature that is not secular in nature, but not clearly grounded in Sufism.86 His 
reason for this exclusion is framed both around authorial intent and the work’s immediate 
reception history. Bruijn’s definition of Sufi poetry is perhaps even more exclusionary than 
Lings’ implicit definition. In regards to Sana’i, Bruijn, for example, argues for both the religious 
nature of his poetry and highlights his initiation into a Sufi lineage in the poet’s biography. 
Nevertheless, he argues that Sana’i is best understood as a “‘homeletic’ poet,” which is “more 
apt than that of ‘Sufi’ poet, because the former term define more precisely the environment 
where his poems originated as well as the purpose they primarily had to serve.”87 He notes that 
this terminology best reflects Sana’i’s intent in writing the poems and their immediate 
audience, regardless of their later reception and importance to Sufi poetry.  
 Nizami’s work, fitting for the poetic period in which he is situated, is marked by “lofty 
diction, dignified tone, and highly literate language.”88  Jerome Clinton notes two key 
characteristics of poetry of this period: 1) the poetry reflects the world of the court and 2) it is 
                                                            
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid., 31. 
87 Ibid., 37. 
88 Yarshater, “The Development of Iranian Literatures,” 20. 
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public and ceremonial. It is perhaps this public, formal tone that most jangles with implicit 
definitions of mystical poetry, for in contrast to other Sufi poems, in poetry from Nizami’s 
period “one is struck by the virtual absence of the private, personal voice.”89 In spite of this 
lack of a private voice, some commentators have noted Sufi elements in Nizami’s poetry, 
though they have questions its authenticity. Jan Rypka, for example, notes that poetry of the 
Azerbaijan school, including Nizami’s, was “only superficially tinged with Sufism and with Sufi 
criticism of feudal society…Although there can be no real question of a specific Sufi literature, 
it is the very Sufi mask that allows the poets to give utterance to criticism that under normal 
circumstances would be impossible.”90 On this construal, Sufi metaphors and terminology 
provide pious cover for engaging in secular social criticism and should not be taken at face 
value. 
 Some of the dismissal of the Makhzan relates to its attempt to emulate and surpass the 
Hadiqat al-haqiqat of Sanai’. As noted above, the works share some formal and thematic features 
and have attracted similar negative critiques from Western scholars and contemporary 
readers. E.G. Browne, for example, calls the Hadiqat “a moral and ethical rather than purely 
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mystical poem.”91 More sharply, he calls it “one of the dullest books in Persian, filled with 
fatuous truisms and pointless anecdotes.”92 When it comes to Nizami, who Browne esteems 
more highly as a poet than Sana’i, he is more charitable. Browne praises Nizami highly, writing 
“In a word, he may justly be described as combining lofty genius and blameless character 
unequalled by any other Persian poet whose life has been the subject of careful and critical 
study.”93 He would perhaps disagree with Rypka that Nizami’s Sufis was exclusively a mask for 
social critique, as he concurs with Sufi tabiqat authors that Nizami practiced what he preached, 
noting that “he was genuinely pious, yet singularly devoid of fanaticism and intolerance.”94 
Nevertheless, he estimates the Makhzan to be a mystical poem after the model of the Hadiqat, 
and he esteems it similarly poorly: “it appears to me inferior in quality…partly due to the fact 
that I dislike its meter.”95  
 Other scholars are less dissuaded by the poem’s metrical qualities and instead focus on 
the poem’s didacticism. De Bruin, for example, argues that: “didacticism…is not appreciated 
very much in the West, nor is the style which specifically belongs to it. This has led to a 
                                                            
91 Browne, A Literary History of Persia, 318. 
92 Browne notes that he so prefers the writing in Sana’i’s Divan over the Hadiqa, that he is tempted to attribute 
them to different authors. Ibid., 319–321. 
93 Ibid., 403. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
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discrepancy of critical standards making it difficult to make a fair and relevant evaluation of 
works based on the appreciation of the didactic style as an aesthetic value.”96  He notes that 
although contemporary Western valuation tends to overlook Sana’i (and by extension the 
Makhzan), the Hadiqat was read and emulated for generations and thus warrants study. 
Aesthetic concerns aside, neglect of the Makhzan sometimes revolves around a negative 
valuation of overly devotional some readers wish to preserve Nizami Though Rypka cites 
Sana’i as a founding figure in the development of Sufi poetry, and just a few pages earlier notes 
Sana’i’s influence on Nizami, he doesn’t include Nizami in his list of “The Great Sufis.”97 
Ostensibly this is either because he does not see Nizami as a Sufi, or he does not see him as a 
great poet. We know the latter to not be the case, since he calls Nizami “the most brilliant poet 
of the romantic epic….whose freshness and vigor have not been effaced throughout the 
centuries.”98 It would seem, given his negative opinion of Sufism, that Nizami’s lack of 
inclusion in this list is an attempt to protect his work from the negative attributes he assigns 
to Sufi poetry.99 
                                                            
96 Bruijn, Of Piety and Poetry, XIV. 
97 He lists three poets here: Sana’i, ‘Attar, and Mawlana Rumi. Rypka, “History of Persian Literature up to the 
Beginning of the 20th Century,” 236-242. This cataloguing also follows E.G. Browne’s who cites Rumi here, calling 
the triumvirate the “three arch-mystagogues.” Browne, A Literary History of Persia, 264, 317. 
98 Rypka, “History of Persian Literature up to the Beginning of the 20th Century,” 210. 
99 Though his entire evaluation of the faults of Sufism is worth a read for its strident and vociferous opinions, this 
line in particular stands out: “Belief in miracles and in the miraculous powers of saints dulls the masses, the 
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Chapter Outline 
 
 Yarsharter notes a “centrifugal tendency” in Persian poetry that involves “frequent 
peregrinations, delight in exploiting the ramifications of their subjects, and branching off into 
side alleys,” such as in the works of Nizami and Attar.100 This “centrifugal” aspect of the work 
can make them opaque to contemporary Western readers, especially in didactic works such as 
the Makhzan al-asrar. One could argue that the Makhzan is open to the same critique Yarshater 
levels at Sadi’s Golestan, that it is a collection of “detached and loosely connected moral maxims 
and ethical observations from which one can hardly deduce a coherent system of ethical 
philosophy.”101 One method of addressing the non-linear organization of these poems in recent 
vogue is ring theory.102 Though such an approach has proven fruitful for a number of works, it 
is not the method this dissertation will undertake. Instead, I will follow De Bruijn’s approach to 
studying Sana’i’s Hadiqat. De Bruijn notes that the coherence of the Hadiqat can be found 
                                                            
conception of ‘pure love’ promotes homosexuality, and the desire to attain a state of ecstasy leads to the use of 
intoxicating drugs.” Ibid., 233. 
100 Yarshater, “The Development of Iranian Literatures,” 17. 
101 Yarshater, “The Development of Iranian Literatures,” 17. 
102 See, for example, Mary Douglas, Thinking in Circles or Safavi and Weightman, Rumi’s Mystical Design. 
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through examining its major themes. He especially highlights the descent of Muhammad 
during birth through the seven spheres, and his later ascent through the heavens. He argues 
that these two complimentary sections, Sana’i “not only connect the ideal personality of 
Muhammad with the ideal of the true Islamic ruler…[but] also the circle of human existence is 
constituted if the separate fragments of the text are connected.”103 I will also argue that the 
Makhzan al-asrar can best be understood through a thematic analysis focusing on the role of the 
body to the mystical encounter, best exemplified in the introductory section on the miʿraj. As 
Annemarie Schimmel notes, mystical traditions across religions often use a metaphor of the 
path, which is often framed as a heavenly ascent.104 This dissertation will also follow the 
pattern of an ascent and return, beginning with a discussion of the human condition and 
limitations of the body, then moving on to discuss the preparations required prepare the body 
for a mystical encounter, we will then discuss Nizami’s presentation of the mystical encounter, 
before moving on to highlight the role of the Prophet Muhammad’s ascension as a paradigm 
for mystical encounters. Finally, we will end with a discussion of what one does with the 
insights gained from a direct encounter with God once one returns, through discussing the 
role of poetry as a form for articulating mystical insight.  
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In the next chapter, I will explore the nature of the human condition for Nizami within 
the broader context of the importance of the body in Religious Studies and Sufism. Before one 
can begin the path towards God, one must know what kind of resistance the body might offer 
and how one might overcome it. Related to this question, is the issue of what kind of body can 
attain contact with God. We address this in relation to the critical issue of gender in Sufism. 
Finally, in this chapter, discuss the boundaries of what makes one human and whether or not 
mystical encounters are limited to humans. While a number of Sufi authors have used animals 
as metaphors for human personality types or stages along the Sufi path, Nizami’s animal 
characters seem more complex than this. In Layla and Majnun, for example, Majnun’s proximity 
to and command over animals increases even as his connection to society dissolves. Nizami 
presents complex, nuanced animal characters who interact with humans as spiritual superiors 
or equals. Far from representing base instincts to be overcome, for Nizami animals can offer 
models and guides to proper bodily comportment and piety.  
After discussing the terms and conditions of human embodiment in relation to the 
mystical path, in Chapter 3, we will explore various definitions of asceticism in the broader 
field of Religious Studies, and their relative applicability to the study of Islam. Next we 
investigate the portrayal of asceticism in a variety of early Sufi texts, noting how renunciation 
moves from an early stage of the path to an advanced one over the course of the 12th and 13th 
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centuries. Nizami’s writing seems to run counter to this trend, by emphasizing the 
foundational importance of bodily discipline to even the Prophet Muhammad’s spiritual 
attainment.  
In chapter 4, we turn to the ascension. Ascension narratives are often used as sites for 
negotiating religious difference and asserting the primacy of one’s own religious claims. This 
chapter examines the scriptural grounding of ascension narratives and then briefly reviews 
how they have been put to use in establishing religious identity. It then turns to Nizami’s own 
ascension narrative. Focusing on his portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad’s body, this chapter 
shows how the ascension narrative in the Makhzan al-asrar acts as a microcosm for the project 
of the larger poem and a lens through which to read it. Muhammad’s body is presented as 
essential to his ascent, but also ontologically unique from other human bodies. This allows 
Nizami to thread an important theological needle, marking Muhammad as an exemplary 
ascetic and mystic whose model can and should be emulated, while also distinguishing him 
from prior prophets and later saints due to the uniqueness of his body. 
 In the chapter 5, we will investigate poetry as a site for discussing of mystical insight 
centered around proper bodily comportment. We will situate Nizami in a broader discourse 
about the relative dangers and values of poetry as a means of religious expression. Here we 
investigate Qur’anic portrayals of poetry and the Qur’an’s concern that Muhammad might be 
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mistaken for a poet. We then turn to hadith literature, which somewhat moderates the Qur’an’s 
general condemnation of poetry. Finally, we look at the Islamic philosophical tradition and its 
ambivalent relationship towards poetry, particularly in light of its proximity to prophecy. We 
will then explore how Nizami exploits this philosophical discourse to argue for the value of 
poetry and poets, particularly those properly grounded in the exoteric aspects of religion. For 
Nizami, this exoteric element is especially focused on asceticism and renunciation. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE PROBLEM OF THE BODY 
 
 Contemporary theorists on the body tend to point towards Renee Descartes as the 
godfather of modernity’s problematic mind-body dualism. The medieval period, they argue, 
serves as a repository for more complex, non-binary configurations of the human. In The Use Of 
Bodies, Georgia Agamben points us to the deep philosophical roots of Cartesian dualism. He 
notes that Plato formulates the idea that the body is an instrument of the soul in the Alcibiades: 
SOC.: A human being is different, therefore, from his own body? 
ALC.: Apparently. 
SOC.: Then whatever is man? 
ALC.: I cannot tell you. 
SOC.: But you can—at least that he is something that uses the body. 
ALC.: Yes. 
SOC.: Does anything use this other than the soul? 
… 
SOC.: Since man is neither body nor both together, what is left, I suppose, is either that 
he is nothing, or if he is something, that it turns out to be nothing other than soul.105 
 
Key to Plato’s distinction between soul and body is the notion that the body is a tool of the 
soul, much as a cutting knife is a tool to a shoemaker. Aristotle extends this insight in his 
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Politics, by likening the body/soul relationship to that between a master and slave. He is more 
emphatic about the soul’s use of the body, arguing that the primary relationship between soul 
and body is not simple use, but dominion. Agamben notes the mutually-constitutive nature of 
the body/soul binary, which Aristotle analogizes with both the master-slave and human-
animal relationship.106 Were we to add the male/female binary to the mix, it would constitute a 
complex of associations around which definitions of the human revolve.  
 This chapter will examine this gordian knot in relation to Nizami’s work. The body 
presents a problem for Nizami as it is a barrier to a direct encounter with God, but also a tool 
for attaining such an encounter. Before we can explore Nizami’s religious and ethical edicts, 
we must first examine his understanding of the human condition: what constitutes a human, 
how is the human different from the non-human, what can one do to transcend one’s 
humanness?  
The Body in Religious Studies 
Prior to seeking out a direct encounter with God, Nizami argues that one must align one’s 
body properly. Much of the focus of the rest of the Makhzan al-asrar is on precisely this topic. 
Nizami spends much of the poem laying out a proper relationship to worldly desire, which if 
                                                            
106 Giorgio Agamben, The Use of Bodies, trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016), 
3–4. 
 
 
50 
pursued earnestly can lead to a mystical experience, such as the one he has during his 40-day 
seclusions. Before we discuss the role the body plays in Nizami’s work and Sufi studies more 
broadly, it would be helpful to situate this discussion in the broader field of Religious Studies. 
 Before delving into contemporary approaches to the body in Sufi studies, let me begin 
by examining some of the resources available in the wider field of Religious Studies. An early 
collection of writing on this topic, Sheets-Johnstone’s collection Giving the Body its Due, arose 
out of a conference which brought together a number of scholars from diverse fields such as 
linguistics, philosophy, and psychology. The essays in the collection are Euro-centric in their 
concern with overcoming Cartesian dualism.107 As other critics have noted, such studies 
remain parochial in their assumption that all humans struggle with the Cartesian subject in 
the same way (or at all). Further critiques have been leveled against the mis-reading or unfair 
reading of Descartes carried out in studies on the body. Objections aside, the most interesting 
aspects of this collection investigate the bodily basis for our most cogitative ability—language. 
Gendlin’s essay posits that a number of elements that pop wisdom ascribes to the disembodied 
self actually arise out of bodily functions.108 Mary Foster expands upon this, showing how the 
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very shapes our lips make in speaking serve an analogic and mimetic function—for example, 
the m sound tends to cluster, across language families, around words associated with coming 
together or pressing against.109 One need not be a Lacanian to note the significance of this 
insight in light of the prevalence of m sounds in words for mother, for example. Perhaps the 
most problematic aspect of this collection is Sheets-Johnstone’s breezy presumption that the 
material body precedes gender, and that sex only marks difference when overlaid with cultural 
constructions of gender.110 
 Don Welton’s collection, Body and Flesh, picks up the thrown gender gauntlet. The book 
begins with an essay that argues for the biological basis of sex, the cultural basis of gender, and 
a vast chasm between the two.111 This piece is then juxtaposed with not one, but two excerpts 
from Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, refuting its assertions. Butler makes it clear that such a 
neat cleavage between body and culture is problematic at best, arguing for a co-constituitive 
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exchange between the two.112 For our purposes, however, perhaps the most interesting essay 
in the collection is Welton’s own, on Biblical conceptions of the body. Here again he takes 
Cartesian dualism to task, but locates the soul/body divide in Greek thought smuggled in to 
Christian theology by Augustine and Aquinas.113 He notes that a careful reading of biblical 
texts, especially the Book of Job, no clear division between body and soul can be found.114 
Rather they are two aspects of the same personality—one inward and one outward. The notion 
that the inner aspect is the true self and the outward one is just a disposable shell is not 
present in biblical accounting, according to Welton.115 Another helpful contribution from 
Welton’s essay is his care to distinguish between contemporary English words like “body” and 
“flesh” and the Hebrew word most often used to describe the body, basar.116  
 Insights into culturally-specific definitions of body and mind also feature prominently 
in Sarah Coakley’s collection of essays, Religion and the Body. The volume is an early foray into 
an across-the-discipline engagement with theories of the body. Unfortunately, the collection is 
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heavily reliant on accounts of the body from the study of Christianity, shunting scholars of 
other traditions off into their own subsection. While Christianity gets its own subdivision 
within the book, Hinduism, Shintoism, Buddhism and Islam each get a single chapter. Many of 
these chapters are dedicated to marking the development of notions of the body within the 
specific religious and cultural context of the author’s field of inquiry. Such an approach is 
useful, but similarly self-reflexive accounts from scholars of Christianity are lacking, limiting 
the possibility of cross-subfield engagements on this issue. Similarly, accounts of the body 
from scholars of women’s and gender studies are sorely lacking.117 
 A more recent work on the body in religious studies is Manuel Vasquez’s Beyond Belief. 
The purpose of his work, he notes, is to trace a genealogy of the study of body and religion for 
his graduate students at the University of Florida.118 In his lengthy introduction, Vasquez notes 
the historical problems with the field of Religious Studies. Coming out of Protestant thinkers 
such as Schleiermacher, religion in the Euro-American academy, he argues, is often construed 
as a form of “belief” which can only be studied through its external manifestations—texts, 
rituals and institutions119. But even when studying physical objects, the goal of scholars of 
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religion, using this approach, is to work through the imperfect material manifestations to 
unearth the core meanings and beliefs that undergird them. Vasquez rejects this approach, 
calling for a decolonization of our text-centric, meaning-focused, Protestant methodologies.120 
While he thinks materiality is a promising avenue forward, he is careful to note that he is a 
“weak” reductivist.121 Citing Edward Slingerland as a scholar Vasquez does not want to emulate, 
he notes that the problem with strong reductivism is that the arrow of explanation always 
points down.122 For Vasquez, humans and human society are more complex than quarks.  
 Vasquez’s interest in religion centers on how humans live their lives knowing angels 
exist, not how the angels are ordered in heaven.123 Such a materialist study of religion, he 
argues, must begin with first-person accounts. This makes the work of anthropologists rather 
simple, but presents a considerably greater challenge to those who study pre-modern texts 
and contexts. Though we can and should examine texts as “objectifications” of embodied 
activity arising out of specific political, social, and biological contexts, he worries about the 
suitability of our current methods to this task.124 Post-modernist and hermeneutic approaches 
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to texts, he says, over-emphasize language (in the post-modern accounts, it’s language all the 
way down…), and construe humans as meaning-making and transmitting beings. One curative 
to this tendency is to pay attention to how texts are produced and circulate. Another might be 
to focus upon particular aspects of embodied religious life as depicted in these texts—as this 
dissertation does, following the model of some of the authors below. 
 
Sight 
David Morgan’s work is central to the study of material religion and Christianity. His 
most recent book, The Embodied Eye, focuses on vision as a way of engaging with the sacred. His 
goal is to mark seeing as an embodied practice—an important contribution, since sight is so 
often affiliated with knowledge and the disembodied self.125 Morgan is interested in the senses, 
in part because he sees human biology as a departure point for cross-cultural and trans-
historical comparative work. Morgan argues that though the valuations and meaning of sight 
as a sense might change over time, the structure of the human eye remains relatively stable. 
Thus, though vision can be manipulated in a plethora of ways—yoga, narcotics, fasting—the 
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biological processes being manipulated and the way the body responds to these challenges are 
consistent.126  
 Perhaps more relevant to this dissertation is Georgia Frank’s Memory of the Eyes. Frank is 
interested in vision’s role in pilgrimage to living saints in late antique Christianity. Keeping in 
mind concerns over reading hagiographical texts as transparent historical documents, Frank 
instead approaches her texts, such as History of the Monks of Egypt, as performative engagements 
which both describe and create a pilgrim’s experience.127 Like David Morgan, she notes that 
cultural valuations of vision might change but biological processes underlying it don’t. For 
example, in late antique novels, care or disrespect for the eyes served a similar function to 
white or black Stetson hats in 20th century Westerns.128 A character’s inner disposition could be 
evaluated based on his or her outer sensory abilities. Most interestingly, however, Frank notes 
the importance of exploring the biological understandings of the senses for her authors. A 
number of other scholars note a shift in the late Antique period from vision to touch as the 
primary method of engaging with relics and shrines. For many of them, this marks a 
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perplexing and radical shift. For Frank, this development becomes clearer if one pays attention 
to theories of extravision prevalent at the time and polemic discourses against pagan forms of 
worship. She notes that vision always included an aspect of touch, because for her authors rays 
sent forth from the eyes were bringing back sensory data to them. Their eyes “read” saints’s 
bodies like fingers passing over Braille. This element of touch was important for her pilgrims 
because it physically connected them to God through the vector of Jesus’ incarnation.129 Such 
physical transmission of divine contact will be important, though in different ways, for 
Shahzad Bashir’s work on Sufism as well, as we shall discuss shortly. The shift from vision to 
touch in late Antique Christian practice, for Frank, has little to do with a change in valuation of 
the senses and more to do with the political implications of touch in a post-Constantine Roman 
Empire. No longer needing to distinguish Christian practice from state-sponsored religion, 
worship through touch, previously marked as the province of pagan sacrifice, became licit 
again. A similar transformation in Christian engagements with incense is noted by Susan 
Ashbrook Harvey in Scenting Salvation. 
 
Scent 
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 One category of historical experience neglected by contemporary scholarship is scent. 
Alain Corbain’s Foul and the Fragrant compellingly, and grotesquely, reveals the vast swaths of 
historical experience that are lost to contemporary scholars should they ignore smell. In his 
discussion of the stench of 18th century Paris, Corbin notes that vast public works projects, 
such as indoor plumbing and city sewage systems, were motivated by fears over the 
deleterious effects of stench. In part thanks to the developments of this era, we live in a world 
of enclosed sewage systems, daily bathing, frequent clothes washing, and public spaces 
pumped with designer scents. Contemporary Americans, then, are especially inured to the 
importance of scent to our daily experience. But this is not true of our premodern 
predecessors.130 
 James McHugh’s Sandalwood and Carrion extends Corbin’s insights into the South Asian 
context. Due to language constraints, he limits himself to Sanskrit texts, leaving room for 
future studies on perfumery and the scent profile brought Muslims. He notes that religious and 
political elites of the subcontinent were well-versed in the character of odors, components of 
perfumes, the uses to which certain scents were best put, and the names of particularly 
evocative concoctions.131 McHugh’s approach to scent has a couple of helpful elements that 
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make it suitable to Vasquez’s vision of the study of pre-modern texts and contexts. First, he 
notes that perfume is seen as an internal-external ornamentation—it can both alter one’s 
interaction with others but also have an effect on one’s own state.132 Such an insight may 
tentatively point toward configurations of the body that more closely align with Don Welton’s 
view of the biblical body than a Cartesian automaton steered by the soul via pineal gland. More 
importantly, however, McHugh notes that he is not interested in simply creating a catalogue of 
scents and what each scent signifies or symbolizes. Rather, he’s interested in noting how 
scents are used to constitute the self.133 Like other authors studying the body in religion and 
history, McHugh finds it important to outline biological theories prevalent at the time. And 
like Georgia Frank, McHugh notes that popular theories of scent characterized it as involving 
physical, and at times intimate, contact with the object or body being smelled.134 For his 
authors, smell was an intermediary sense, lacking the intimacy and proximity of touch, but 
less rationally directed than sight or hearing.135 Finally,  McHugh argues that ”the 'embodied 
turn' in the study of culture and religion noted earlier is not incompatible with the more 
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traditional study of texts and doctrines--far from it. This is a small but important point: to 
move beyond the exclusive study of doctrines and scriptures is not to abandon them totally.”136 
 Susan Ashbrook Harvey’s Scenting Salvation brings these insights about scent as a 
historical category to a late antique Christian context. Like Frank, she notes a shift in attitudes 
toward certain bodily practices after the conversion of Constantine and the declaration of 
Christianity as the official state religion.137 In an effort to mark Christian liturgy off from 
Roman and Jewish sacrifice, early Christians eschewed incense in favor of perfume. Sweet 
smells, especially those related to flowers, were viewed as markers of the divine presence. Bad 
smells, especially derived from illness and decay, were a sign of the devil.138 These easy 
categories were not entirely stable over time, however. Incense became prominent in 
Christian liturgy after the 4th century once it no longer was seen as a marker of non-Christian 
practice. Likewise, the growing importance of ascetics in the Syriac church brought a re-
evaluation of bad scents. These holy figures were often described textually or associated 
visually with flowers, incense holders, and other sweet smelling items. Yet their ascetic 
practice led to open, festering wounds, halitosis, not to mention the foul stench that must 
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collect on an unwashed hair shirt worn in the desert sun. These saintly bodies were viewed as 
being connected with the divine, but did not emanate the proper smells to mark such 
contact.139 New valuations of odor and fragrance had to be developed to account for such a 
disjuncture—such as the notion that the stench was a sign of their successful combat with the 
devil, or an indication of the decay of their material bodies in a quest for a celestial body.140 
Such questions of the relationship between asceticism and stench seem important and are 
mostly unexplored in the study of medieval Sufism. However, as we shall see shortly, pleasant 
scents are used by Nizami to indicate spiritual purity and contact with the heavens. 
 
Gender   
Finally, a number of the authors have brought gender to the forefront of the discussion 
of the body in religion. Grace Jantzen seeks to recapture an embodied engagement with 
Christ’s resurrection through the study of medieval women mystics.141 Contrary to William 
James’ mystification of mysticism, Jantzen wishes to reclaim its heritage in the gender and 
power politics of the medieval church. She seems especially critical of James’ four-fold 
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definition of mysticism, with its focus on temporary, individual, internal, experiential 
engagements with the divine that were, according to him, received passively by the mystic.142 
Jantzen wants to reclaim the embodied, active aspect of medieval women’s mysticism by 
focusing on embodied engagements with a sexualized and sometimes feminized Jesus as a way 
of disrupting male-dominated Church hierarchy that controlled and regulated access to a 
masculine divine. Jantzen’s insights are enriched and expanded by the writings of Caroline 
Walker Bynum. By looking at the writings of mystics such as Julian of Norwich or Mechthild of 
Magderburd, she examines the role of courtly love in their loving devotion of Christ and the 
importance of Christ’s wounds as symbolic wombs through which the devotee could be 
comforted and reborn.143 While these accounts of the body in Christian mysticism are very 
specific to the medieval Christian context, they do call us to: a) a greater awareness of the 
specific, historical, contextual nature of the phenomena under study; b) be cautious with our 
received definitions and categories; and c) pay attention to constructions of power and the 
regulation of access to the divine, especially along gendered lines, in the texts and contexts in 
which we work. These issues will be taken up in relation to women in Sufism, and Nizami’s 
treatment of women, later in the chapter.  
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Body in Sufism    
 Perhaps one of the first discussions of Sufism interested in investigating Sufi bodies as 
such was Tor Andrae’s In the Garden of Myrtles. Focusing on early Muslim and Christian 
interactions through asceticism, Andrae highlights the importance of Jesus as a role model for 
early Muslim ascetics, valued for his renunciation of worldly goods and attachments. For much 
of the 20th century, the study of early Sufi asceticism relied on this affiliation between early 
renunciates in Iraq and Syriac desert hermits.144 Ahmet Karamustafa’s work has brought 
greater depth and nuance to our understanding of asceticism and bodily discipline in early and 
medieval Sufism. In Sufism: The Formative Period, he traces the complex path through which a 
name marking a Baghdadi circle of elites came to collect and subsume a diverse range of 
practices, organizations and vocabularies focused upon enhancing, extending and enriching 
one’s religious engagements. His discussion of the Malamatiyya, Kharamiyya and Qalandar 
movements give us avenues into discussing Sufi bodily practice that go beyond simple self-
denial along the Syriac Christian model and that don’t rest on contacts with desert hermits.145 
Likewise, his work expands the bounds of what might be considered an ascetic practice. Rather 
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than focusing on things such as celibacy, fasting, and sleeplessness, his analysis allows us to 
capture such bodily practices as self-shaming (which, as David Morgan notes, is profoundly 
imbricated with our understanding of vision and sight146), piercing, public nudity, etc. His work 
also alerts us to the continued relevance of embodied practices within Sufism. The 
development of Junaydian mystical vocabulary and public respectability gained through 
political sponsorship did not put an end to Sufi asceticism and bodily discipline, we just need 
to be more nimble in recognizing and coding Sufi attitudes toward the body over time. 
 Scott Kugle’s work, Sufis & Saints Bodies is one recent attempt to do just that. Though he 
begins, on page one, by naming Sufism as “Islamic Mysticism,” his introduction quickly moves 
to problematize and complexify this characterization147. For Kugle, one must study Sufi 
characterizations of the body through poetic and hagiographic texts because they are 
reflections of popular religion. Kugle notes that legal texts would only tell us how Muslims 
should think about the body, according to educated elites. Sufi texts are a reflection of how a 
vast number of Muslims actually did think about and engage with the body. For Kugle, the most 
relevant authors for building his theoretical framework are Merleau-Ponty on the body and 
Bordieu’s modification of Mauss’ concept of habitus. By combining these two thinkers, Kugle 
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finds himself able to get at and speak about a layered, socially and historically situated body. 
More helpful still, however, to his thinking about the body, is the writing of Farid al-Zahi, a 
North African scholar who debates heatedly with Chebel on the nature of the body in Islam. Al-
Zahi, according to Kugle, argues for a four-fold nested structure of the body embedded in a 
four-quadrant system. For Kugle, this structure captures both how a sense of self arises out of 
the body, and how that self uses the body to engage with the broader world.  
 Most helpful in Kugle’s analysis of the body in Sufism is his focus on gender and 
sexuality. Applying queer theory to a case study of the writings and persecution of Shah 
Hussayn, Kugle notes the ways in which shaykh-disciple relations occur along homoerotic 
lines, utilizing poetic tropes of the lover and beloved, and requiring seduction and/or 
submission on the part of the disciple. Through this analysis, he notes the potentially 
transgressive nature of Sufi practices and male Sufi bodies within a predominantly 
cisgendered, heteronormative, patriarchal legal context. Shah Hussayn’s punishment, for 
Kugle, involves violence, humiliation and rape as a way of enforcing normative categories of 
gender and sexuality within a patriarchal context—Hussayn is meant to face the full 
implications of the loss of power his self-feminization activates within this system.148 
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 Shahzad Bashir also discusses the relationship between shaykh and disciple using the 
paradigm of courtly love. In Sufi Bodies, Bashir does not, like Kugle, deploy queer theory to 
plumb his texts for signs of heternormativity or transgression. Rather, he is interested in re-
embodying our understanding of pre-modern Sufism through an examination of the category 
of the body as a locus of blessing and site for transmission of authority. He begins his work by 
discussing the importance of the Prophet’s ascension as setting up a point of contact between 
the divine and human realms.149 Through this ascension, and a hadith in which Muhammad 
claims that anyone who shakes the hand of a man who has shook his hand, within seven links, 
will receive intercession on the day of judgment. Such physical transmission of spiritual 
blessings has a long history in Islam and Arabic culture, but is often neglected in the study of 
Sufism. Amir-Moezzi, for example, notes the etymological link between the word Baraka and a 
pre-Islamic practice of fathers spitting into the mouths of their young sons in order to transfer 
protection and symbolize the future transfer authority. 150 
 Bashir, like Kugle, finds Merleau-Ponty and Bordieu helpful for his analysis of pre-
modern texts. He sees bodies, as depicted in his primary source materials, not as symbols to be 
interpreted, but rather as sedimentations of popular notions of the body in circulation at the 
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time. His analysis tells him a few important things about bodies for medieval Sufis: 1) corporeal 
contact is highly esteemed as a marker of transmission of authority and social connection; 2) 
increasing intimacy is connected to increased physical proximity. It is here, however, that 
Bashir, like Ohlander and Trimmingham, strives to situate textual accounts of corporeal 
contact within the system of lineage and authorization of the tariqa system. This leaves us at a 
loss for what to do with early Muslims ascetics who later generations adopt into Sufi lineages—
and those who eschewed human companionship and contact as a source of threat and 
distraction rather than blessing.  
 
Nizami, Women and Mysticism 
 
If there is a common thread amongst male Sufi authors, it is the use of women as props for the 
spiritual edification of men. One can note, for example, the bawdy tales in Jalal al-Din Rumi’s 
Masnavi, which titilate on one level, and educate on another. A number of scholars on Nizami 
have debated whether he can be viewed as using women for similarly androcentric ends.151 
Discussions of this topic, as with the question of Sufi imagery in poetry discussed in Chapter 1, 
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seem to take on a binary character. Either Nizami was a radical feminist, or he was a staunch 
proponent of patriarchy. Either his women characters are fully-realized with complex 
emotional arch or they are flat metaphors for the stages of the Sufi path. Since two of Nizami’s 
most famous works involve extended love stories, much ink has been spilled over the question 
of whether or not depictions of romantic relationships between men and women are 
exclusively metaphors for union with God.152 
Several commentators have noted, however, that amongst Persian poets and Sufi 
authors, Nizami stands out for his treatment of women. Nizami wrote during a time when 
women were viewed as impaired in intellect, yet his woman characters often outwit their male 
counterparts.153 Some point to his respect for his own wife as the source of this treatment of 
women, noting that Shirin in Khosrow and Shirin is a representation of Nizami's wife, Afaq.154 
Meisami goes so far as to argue that not only is Layla and Majnun not a metaphor for divine-
human love, it is specifically a refutation of the udhri poetic tradition out of which these 
metaphors derive.155  
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In contrast to his later poems, the Makhzan al-asrar is relatively silent on the topic of 
gender. Most of the major characters are male, and if there is a recurring protagonist in the 
work it would be the Prophet Muhammad, whose body is exalted to such a degree as to almost 
become inhuman. Though strong women characters do not appear in the Makhzan al-asrar, 
Nizami also doesn’t make women a major stumbling block for his male ascetics. Women are 
neither depicted as lascivious nor chaste, duplicitous nor virtuous; they simple are not 
depicted at all. One could read this omission in a number of ways, though as we shall see in the 
next chapter, it is unlikely that Nizami is using this oversight to denigrate women. Rather than 
subdivide humans into hierarchical categories, Nizami’s commission seems to be lumping 
them together. In the next section we will explore how he not only resists dividing humans 
into separate genders based on their potential spiritual attainment, he resists dividing humans 
from animals along traditional boundaries as well. 
 
Animal Bodies 
  
 A growing field of work in philosophy, theology, history, literature, and religious 
studies seeks to make our definitions of the human explicit through exploring the way the 
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category of the human is defined over and against the non-human animal. Very few works in 
Islamic Studies have engaged with the growing field of animality studies, and those that do 
tend to focus on the Qur’an and normative discourses of law and theology. This chapter 
expands this body of work by reexamining inherited scholarly understandings of human-
animal relationships and animal metaphors in a medieval Sufi text. The chapter challenges our 
understandings of medieval Sufi cosmology as humanocentric, with an over-reliance on the 
Aristotelian Chain of Being. Through an examination of animal metaphors in Nizami Ganjavi’s 
Treasury of Mysteries, this chapter demonstrates a much more complex relationship between 
humans, animals, and God than such a linear model allows. In so doing the chapter also 
challenges Modernist constructions of Islam which emphasize the Qur’an as the only source 
out of which to construct an authentic Islam, while excluding Medieval Sufism, and in 
particular Persian literature, from their discussion of what it means to be Muslim.  
When Bruijn reviews the main topics of the Makhzan al-asrar, he notes that “Nizami 
preaches on…the supreme rank of man among the creatures of this world,” among other 
topics.156 It is easy to see why he makes such an argument, Nizami includes a chapter heading 
called “On the superiority of humans to animals.” In this section we will explore the claim that 
Nizami argues for the superiority of humans over animals and argue that Nizami’s 
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understanding of human/animal relations and animal religiosity is more complex than such a 
bald chapter heading would seem to imply. 
 
Theorizing the Animal 
 
“Man is the animal that must recognize itself as human to be human” – Carl Linnaeus157 
  
The dismissal of the role of animals in religious texts has a long pedigree. Discussion of and 
attention to non-human animals are marked as mere poetic flourish or anthropomorphism, 
which, as some thinkers have noted, can reinscribe animal subservience to humans and can 
have detrimental real-life implications.158 But as Derrida notes, this disavowal has often taken 
the form of excluding discourses on animals from the categories of philosophy and law, by 
declaring them mere poetry, with little legal or intellectual force.159 Donovan Schaeffer’s work 
on affect theory and religion, however, invites us to think of religion as a phenomena beyond 
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the legal and intellectual—one that first and foremost engages the affective.160 Following Tom 
Tweed, Schaeffer asks us to understand religion as “a repertoire of procedures for pushing 
around and evoking specific affects.”161 By locating the religious in the attempt to evoke, 
manage, and direct affects, Schaeffer and other affect theorists argue we will be able to escape 
the “linguistic fallacy [that] presupposes that language is an apparatus of command that 
effortlessly articulates with bodies.”162 As Aaron Gross notes, the contemporary field of 
religious studies is grounded on the presumption of the human-animal binary. From Durkheim 
to Eliade to J.Z. Smith, key figures in the field have defined religion as a profoundly human 
enterprise.163 By decentering or destabilizing the religious subject as a rational, speaking body, 
we open ourselves up to new definitions of religion—ones that do not presuppose the 
human/animal binary. Following Aaron Gross, this study is, in part, an attempt to “reimagine 
the subjectivities and subjects that count as religious” in light of animality studies.164  
Throughout the works of Animal Studies theorists, however, there is a problematic elision 
of traditions. Authors often lump the “Abrahamic Traditions” together, noting their shared 
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insistence on the human/animal divide. Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain traditions, these authors 
argue, have resources for drawing the human/animal division differently, even if in practice 
they rarely do.165 This grouping seems especially problematic in the case of Islam, where 
resources for thinking differently about the human/animal divide and animal religiosity are 
abundant. While recent works by a number of young scholars have sought to bring together 
Animality Studies and Islamic Studies, including a dedicated panel at the American Academy of 
Religion in 2015, much of this work remains apologetic in nature. Like some of the work in 
Jewish Studies surrounding animals, current research on animals in Islamic Studies tends to 
focus on rules of sacrifice and halal butchering practices, justifying them as compassionate 
alternatives to contemporary industrialized meat production.166 One exception to this trend is 
Sarra Tlili’s writing, which seeks to contrast the Qur’anic view of animals with that of later 
Islamic law and theology. In Animals in the Qur’an, she extends Amina Wadud’s assertion from 
Qur’an and Woman that the Qur’an distinguishes human beings from one another in terms of 
“excellence” based only on their individual piety, and not based on inherent qualities such as 
                                                            
165 On the problematic uses and abuses of the term “Abrahamic Religions” see Jon Leveson’s Inheriting Abraham, 
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. 
166 See, for example, the 2015 American Academy of Religion panel cosponsored by the Study of Islam Section and 
the Animals and Religion Group: “To Kill or Not to Kill: Islamic Perspectives on Animal Ethics.” Additionally the 
website beyondhallal.com, co-founded by Nuri Friedlander, has contains a number of readable articles and op-eds 
on this topic, addressed primarily to a Muslim audience. 
 
 
74 
gender, to argue that the Qur’an, and therefore God, also doesn’t distinguish by species.167  For 
Tlili, this egalitarian tradition is found in the Qur’an but swiftly ignored and discounted by 
later theologians and jurists. This chapter shows evidence of a counter-tradition, which picks 
up on these Qur’anic threads, in a major medieval poetic work.  
 
 
Animal Piety in Islamic Discourse 
This chapter builds on the prior work of both Sarah Tlili in Animals in the Qur’an and 
Richard Foltz in Animals in Islamic Tradition and Muslim Culture. Foltz’s coverage of animals in 
Islamic tradition covers much untrod ground. Though when he writes about the depictions of 
animals in poetry and in Sufi texts, he sets up an unfortunate binary to define what is and is not 
Islamic. By his definition, only authoritative theological and legal texts are properly Islamic, 
while Persian poetry and Sufi writings may be disregarded as mere entertainment.168 Along with 
this dismissal of popular piety comes a definition of the human as radically distinct from non-
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human animals. When discussing medieval Sufi poetry, Foltz is quick to highlight the 
importance of the concept of the nafs, or “Animal soul,” and influence of Neoplatonist 
articulations of Aristotle’s chain of being to Sufi cosmology.169 Yet, Foltz notes that technically, 
according to the Qur’an, humans and non-human animals are not ontologically distinct, and that 
non-human animals, angels, jinn, and humans all partake equally in creatureliness. If humans 
and jinn are unique amongst creatures, it may only be for their ability to stray from God’s will.170 
Tlili’s work builds on Foltz’ insights into the Qur’an but seeks to excavate the scripture 
for resources with which to advocate for an Islamic environmentalism and animal rights’ 
discourse. Tlili relies and expands upon contemporary Qur’an scholars such as Amina Wadud 
and Asma Barlas who read a previously under-utilized gender egalitarianism in the text.171 
According to Wadud’s gender-egalitarian readings of the Qur’an, God distinguishes between 
men and women based on their differing levels of piety and nothing else. Tlili notes that 
technically God doesn’t distinguish human beings exclusively by their piety, but indeed all 
created beings are judged based solely on their piety.172 Wadud and Barlas both note that the 
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gender-egalitarian possibilities of the Qur’an were ignored or suppressed by later generations 
of male interpreters. Tlili similarly argues that human-centric readings of the Qur’an, which 
developed in part in conversation with Jewish and Christian scriptures, came to cover over the 
radical creaturely equality of the Qur’an’s message.173 
Rather than concede, with Foltz and Tlili, that divine revelation might contain a message 
of radical equality forgotten or purposely dismissed by the later tradition, this analysis shows 
that this egalitarian strand gets picked up by at least one critical medieval poetic text—a text of 
great significance to the development of later Persian poetry and Sufi discourse.  
The Makhzan al-Asrar is the first of Nizami’s five major masnavis (long narrative poems 
written in rhyming couplets). It does not tell a single sustained story, but instead collects a 
number of short essays followed by exempla. These essays range in topic from the proper 
comportment around a king to the value of renouncing worldly wealth. Many of the exempla 
include prominent animal characters, from pet birds to a dead dog carcass, around which the 
story’s lesson revolves. Far from representing base instincts that must be overcome, often these 
creatures, especially birds, are fastidiously religious. In these tales, animal religiosity is 
repeatedly held up as an aspirational standard for human religiosity.  
 
                                                            
173 Ibid., 8-9. 
 
 
77 
Buraq 
There is perhaps no more perplexing or omnipresent hybrid creature in Islam than 
Buraq.174 A human-faced animal described as bigger than a mule and smaller than a donkey, he 
serves as Muhammad’s mount on his ascension to heaven. It is commonplace to interpret mules 
or donkeys as representations of the nafs (animal or lower soul) in Sufi literature. On this 
construal, the human is something layered atop the animal, which it must manage and control. 
Failure to manage the animal results in devolution back into the animal. Like Pinocchio on 
Pleasure Island, we risk becoming braying mules if we laugh, drink, and play too much. Read 
simplistically, Buraq represents what one can achieve through the proper disciplining of the 
nafs. The baser human drives need not be discarded to ascend to heaven, merely controlled and 
directed. 
But in many ascension narratives Buraq is both more complex and more elusive than 
such a singular reading would allow. In some ascension narratives, he initially refuses 
Muhammad’s attempt to mount him, even chastising him for touching gold—an implicit 
accusation of idolatry.175 It’s not that Buraq doesn’t want to be tamed, it’s that he sees himself as 
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more pious than those who might want to tame him. After Muhammad explains himself and the 
angel Gabriel chastises Buraq, he finally assents to be mounted, but not before extracting a 
promise of intercession from the Prophet on the Day of Judgment.  
Such a narrative thwarts Foltz’s easy interpretation of the human/animal binary, unless 
we concede that Ascension Narratives, Sufism, and Persian literature are somehow to be 
excluded from any understanding of “mainstream Islam,” which would be doing considerable 
violence to our understanding of Islamic history. Buraq is clearly conscious of God, aware of the 
dangers of the worst of transgressions against God, and concerned with its own status in the 
afterlife.  
 
God-Dog & Dog-God: 
Like Rumi, Nizami also uses counter-intuitive metaphors for the divine. In his Story of 
the Dog, the Hunter and the Fox: it is not a donkey, but a hunting dog that represents God.176 In 
Arabic, the words for dog and heart are dangerously close for the clumsy tongue of a non-
native speaker [kalb & qalb].177 Poets and mystics had much use of this near homophone, 
toying with the notion that the mystical seat of God in humans, the heart, might be sonically 
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confused with or compared to a ritually unclean animal. Nizami Ganjavi, a 12th century poet, 
took this analogy a step further, using the story of a hunter and his loyal dog as an analogy for 
the relationship between humans and God.  
In this tale, a hunter loves his dog greatly, and the dog provides the hunter with 
abundant sustenance through his skill at the hunt. One day, the dog runs off and does not 
return. The hunter is surprisingly sanguine about this turn of events, presuming that his 
beloved pet had run into a lion and been eaten. A fox appears, emboldened by the dog’s 
absence, to taunt and tempt the hunter. The fox questions the dog’s loyalty, implying that he 
ran off out of ingratitude. He also doubts the hunter’s love for the dog, pointing to the hunter’s 
lack of despair at the dog’s disappearance. No sooner has the fox finished taunting the hunter 
than the dog returns in a rush, capturing the fox for his master. This story is the exemplum for 
sixth discourse on creation, which argues that the world is filled with distractions that will 
lead us to forget our love of God and God’s loyalty to us.178 Though there are several 
metaphorical levels on which one can read this tale, in the most simplistic reading places the 
dog in the role of God.  
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The trope of the dog gets picked up again in the Story of Jesus and the Dog179: In this 
story, a crowd has gathered around a dead mutt in the street, insulting its mangy fur, foul odor, 
and hideous face. Jesus joins the crowd, but instead of jeering at its decaying corpse, he praises 
it’s fine teeth. Such a story often gets interpreted as a call to see the presence of God in 
everything and everyone.180 This is certainly a compelling and worthwhile interpretation of the 
story, but in relation to the discourse that it follows, there is more at stake. The story is used to 
exemplify the coming of the day of judgment. The critiques the villagers make of the dead dog 
are tinged with their own anxiety over death: “The fear of this brings darkness to the mind” says 
one. Another “it oppresses the heart.”181 Nizami calls on the reader to not fear judgment, but 
also to not be lulled into a false sense of hope based on comparison with others—in this case 
animals.182 He notes that piety looks different for each different species of animal: and if we 
congratulate ourselves for being more subservient than a dog or more long-suffering than a 
mule, we will be in for a surprise on the day of judgment.183 
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Bird-Souls 
Birds are a continuing trope throughout Sufi poetry. Metaphorically, birds come to 
symbolize the soul, and the world or the body is marked as a cage, or even the “abode of snares.” 
But birds are more than just metaphors for the human soul in Nizami’s work: in the story of 
Nurshirvan and the vizier,184 while out riding one day, the king and his chief counselor come 
across a bird marriage, complete with contractual negotiations over the bride price. One bird is 
hoping to delay payment of the bride-price until after the marriage, but the other refuses. He 
argues that the tyranny of Nushirvan means no one can plan on the future, and so must take 
what they can get now. Nushirvan is shocked by the accusation of tyranny, and worries about 
how unjust he must seem to his human subjects if his tyranny is the subject of discussion 
amongst birds. His vizier advises that birds will testify against him on Day of Judgment, and so 
Nushirvan changes his ways and becomes a just and generous king.185 As in Tlili’s analysis of the 
Qur’an, this story shows animals have a complex culture and set of interests beyond and outside 
of human actions, that nevertheless sometimes interact with human spheres of influence. It also 
demonstrates that animals will be present at the day of judgment and given the ability to affect 
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the fate of human souls in the hereafter: which clearly undercuts any notion that humans have 
been granted dominion over animals. 
 
Objections 
There are some limitations to this analysis. Perhaps the most obvious is articulated by 
Foltz: if the animals are just metaphors here, they are once again being pressed into service, this 
time symbolic service.186 Tlili addresses this notion in relation to the Qur’an, noting that the 
Qur’an depicts animals as having language, social relations, and inner-lives independent of their 
human interactions, and whose complexity cannot be easily reduced or pressed into service of 
the lesson at hand.187 Such complexity is likewise a hallmark of Nizami’s text, such as when he 
depicts a bird marriage. Likewise, Tlili argues that the personification of animal depictions in 
the Qur’an, including their apparent use of human languages and social customs, can be 
understood through the Qur’an’s intended audience—humans. She argues that the Qur’an was 
revealed in Arabic because its audience was Arabic-speaking, not because only Arabs are worthy 
of God’s attention. So too should we understand moments of seeming anthropomorphism in the 
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Qur’an.188 Non-human culture, innerlife, and piety surely looks nothing like its human 
parallels,189 but we would not understand the inner life of birds if presented to us in bird-
language and terms.   
A more direct objection might arise from a careless and casual reading of Nizami’s section 
headings: the poet, after all, addresses the matter directly in a chapter called: “Discourse on the 
superiority of humans [Adami] over animals [haywani].”190 Here Nizami uses Arabic-derived 
words, rather than the Persian equivalents, leaning on a Qur’anic and theological valence for his 
discourse. He marks humans as distinguished from non-human animals by their descent from 
Adam. The word for “animal,” haywan, can carry a pejorative meaning when applied to a human 
in contemporary Arabic, but at its roots just indicates a something that is living. The word for 
“superiority” here, fazila, is also Qur’anic Arabic. As Amina Wadud has indicated in her work 
Qur’an and Woman, the Qur’an distinguishes human beings from one another in terms of “excellence” 
based only on their individual piety, and not based on inherent qualities such as gender. Thus, 
many of Nizami’s animals, who are more pious than their human counterparts, are inherently 
more “excellent” than the humans. In case we were in doubt about Nizami’s tongue-in-cheek 
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title, he gives us these lines: “Whatever exists on this curtain, is worthy of a body and has a value 
for its life” and “Like you, they are the jewels of this world.”191  
Perhaps the clearest way forward is to build on and expand Tlili and Foltz’s research 
through Jan Bennett’s concept of “vibrant matter.” In Nizami’s work, non-human animals have 
language, ritual, political opinions, philosophical debates, and can have varying levels of 
relationships with one another, with humans, and with God. But they aren’t the only non-human 
figures with such capacities. Especially in relation to their interactions with the Prophet 
Muhammad, Nizami shows the fixed stars, constellations, flowers, and even stones to shimmer 
with sort of agency that can alter the fabric of the cosmos. For example, the stone that splits 
Muhammad’s lip at the Battle of Badr, thanks to contact with Muhammad’s blood, and out of a 
desire to do penance for its transgression, becomes the progenitor of all rubies.  
A number of writers in Animal Studies have pointed to the stakes of drawing a hard line 
between animals and humans. The same tools that are used to exclude pigs, apes and dogs 
from full subjecthood have also been used, in the past and present, to exclude women, 
children, the neurodiverse, and people of different skin color and ethnicity from the category 
of the human.192 As Ron Buckley points out in a 2013 article on the mythical creature Buraq, 
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human-animal relationships and hybridity can take on a civilizational aspect.193 For Christian 
writers encountering Muhammad’s ascension narrative, Buraq’s hybridity is clear sign of 
Islam’s scientific backwardness—and the credulity of Muslims toward such a creature a sign of 
their mental insufficiency. Deleuze and Guattari highlight how cultures and civilizations have 
been placed on an evolutionary continuum based on whether they read their kinship with 
animals as literal or figurative—based on how strongly they draw the line between the human 
and the animal.194 Schaefer notes that contemporary American Islamophobia has a strong 
affective pull — the affects of fear, rage, and companionship feel good for those engaging in 
Islamophobic rhetoric and acts. Little examined in his work, however, is the ways that 
relations with animals are used to mark and generate the affective elements of Muslim 
difference.195 
This section  extends the insights of Animality Studies into the critical realm of Islamic 
Studies, where Muslim engagement with animals plays an important role in contemporary 
representations of Islam in the American imagination: whether it confirm stereotypes of 
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Muslim cruelty and incivility through depictions of animal sacrifice, or fuel notions of Muslims 
“irrational” distaste for pigs and dogs.  By applying them to the portrayal of animals and 
human-animal hybrids in Nizami Ganjavi’s (d. 1209) Makhzan al-Asrar (Treasury of Secrets) this 
chapter challenges the easy human/animal binary presumed by such portrayals. Following 
Agamben, this section is interested in looking at the way a premodern text, one without access 
to the “machine” of homo sapiens or the devices of Linnaean Taxonomy to produce recognition 
of the human, uses other machines and devices to do so.196  
Historically, the category of the “human” has been used to exclude, not include. Used 
as a razor to slice off those beings which are “not us.” It sanctions oppression, enslavement, 
and murder. So, when we speak of the humanities, the study and cultivation of those attributes 
which long-lineages of learned men tell us separate us from the brutes, we must take a moment 
to reflect upon the laudable virtues we are here to discuss. What is the goal of the field of 
Islamic Studies in the humanities? Is it to, as Carl Ernst notes in the introduction to Following 
Muhammad,  “offer the thesis that Muslims are human beings”?197 Or can Islamic Studies be a 
force for challenging the very definitions of the “human” that have been used to exclude 
                                                            
196 Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell, 1 edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 23–27, 33–38. 
197 Carl W. Ernst, Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World (The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2004). 
 
 
87 
Muslims? Before we debate the role of Islamic Studies in the academy, me must first ask “What 
is the human?” And how can the field of Islamic Studies help us step outside of our calm 
assurances about the boundaries and valuation of the term. Any category we use to draw the 
line between the human and non-human animals can also be used to draw lines between 
different human animals. Speech, reason, shame (a la Derrida),198 all socially and culturally 
inflected, can be denied those who do not fit our understanding of those categories. I hope this 
section has shown that different, and more complex, attitudes towards non-humans animals 
can be found in a significant medieval poetic text, and that we misread such texts through our 
own contemporary human/animal binary at our peril. 
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CHAPTER 3: DISCIPLINING THE BODY 
 
Asceticism in the Makhzan al-asrar 
 
Now we must turn to Nizami’s first masnavi,  the Makhzan al-asrar. Often depicted as 
overly prescriptive and ascetic in its ethics, the word zuhd appears in the Makhzan only 5 
times…all in the story of the Pir and his students. This story echoes Attar’s tale of Shaykh 
Sanan, but in the form of a bawdy joke. The Shaykh breaks wind and most of his students 
scatter to the wind. Nizami notes that if one’s asceticism is not well founded, it will evaporate 
at the slightest breeze.199 
The slightly more emphatic term, riazat [self-mortification], however, appears 7 times. 
Twice in the chapter “Describing the Night and Cognizing the Heart,” which is a prelude to a 
section describing Nizami’s visions during his first 40-day religious seclusion,200 four times in 
Chapter Seven, “On the Superiority of Humans to Animals,” and once in Chapter 20, “On the 
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Shamelessness of People.” In each of these cases it has a positive valence, and is contrasted 
with the unrestrained impulses of nature: “Relinquish nature’s [tabi’at] silver to asceticism 
[riazat]; extract nature’s [tabi’at] gold through asceticism [riazat].”201 Elsewhere in the Makhzan, 
Nizami uses the term nafs (ego identity or animal soul) to refer to one’s undisciplined nature. 
This term has much stronger Sufi valences, and is often likened to a stubborn ass in Persian 
poetry. Here, Nizami uses as different animal metaphor for one’s nature:  “When you tame the 
wild horse [tausani] of nature [tab’], the coin of sincerity [ikhlas] is struck in your name.”202 
Nizami also aligns asceticism with reason, over and against nature. He compares reason [aql] to 
the perfumer and nature [tab’] to the blacksmith in reference to a hadith about selecting 
friends wisely. One is a friend who brings benefits no matter what--even in the worst case 
scenario, the perfumer will smell nice. The other brings detriment no matter what.203  
Though the words for asceticism themselves appear relatively infrequently, 
throughout the rest of the poem, Nizami gives us a good idea of what he means by zuhd and 
riazat in their most commendable forms. Just three lines before those quoted above, Nizami 
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says “Make your body (jism) purer than your soul (jan) by imprisoning it for 40 days.”204 Nizami 
knows the benefits of such seclusion from personal experience. The last two sections of the 
introduction, before Nizami begins his First Discourse, are titled “First Seclusion (Khalwa)” and 
“Second Seclusion (Khalwa).” Each section describes the visions Nizami attained during his 40 
day retreat. The second seclusion includes an explicit account of a mystical experience and 
annihilation in God (fana) and the despair which follows it. And just to be sure we understand 
this is not mere poetry, Nizami writes:  “I who have described this night, describe it from my 
own knowledge (ma’rifa).”205 
Beyond ritual seclusion, Nizami seems to generally counsel against worldly 
entanglements. This is in keeping with what we know of Nizami’s own personal life - he choose 
to remain in his hometown rather than pursue patrons while residing at court (“Like Nizami, 
seclude oneself [gushe gir] from the world”).206 This desire to remove oneself from the world is 
framed in terms of the threat posed by other human beings: “Gaze upon this globe on which, 
because of inhumanity (na mardomi), humanity (adami) is wary of humanity (adami).”207 And 
this threat is a spiritual one, because other humans can “take away spiritual knowledge 
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(marifa).”208 For this reason, the best recourse, according to Nizami, is to flee human company: 
“Strike through this world (jahan) and live without sorrow. Go far from this sphere and live 
peacefully.”209 
It is not just other humans who are a source of a spiritual threat, however. The world 
itself is fickle and untrustworthy: “Who desires discourse (sohbat) with the world (giti)? To 
whom has it been loyal, that it should be loyal to us?”210 Fleeing the world, then, does not just 
include seclusion from other human beings, but also a host of other practices. Nizami seems 
particularly taken with two practices: limiting of food and sleep - “There is value in not eating 
or sleeping.”211 The value of limiting food seems to have little to do with the hardship of 
enduring fasting and more to do with the effects such fasting has on the body: “The body’s 
gem is found in slimness [tonokee]; the soul’s value is found in lightness”212 Though Nizami 
argues for a general restriction on food intake, he also advocates limiting intake of certain 
types of food. He says nothing about avoiding meat, unlike some early Muslim ascetics, such as 
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Rabi’a.213 He is, however, quite concerned with wheat, which, in line with a number of Jewish 
and Muslim thinkers, he traces to the Fall. In lieu of wheat, Nizami advises one eat barley 
instead. This preference for barley is often attributed to Jesus in the Sufi tradition,214 where 
Jesus is seen as the prophet who best exemplifies the principle of asceticism.215 Wheat also 
provides a cunning metaphor for asceticism for Nizami: for Adam, like wheat “honor did not 
come to him until he was broken.”216 The role of wheat, as well as water, in the diet plays an 
important role in elevating Muhammad above the other prophets, since he is not dependent 
on worldy sustenance in the same way, according to Nizami. 
 
Defining Asceticism 
Often when discussing Sufism and bodily practice, discussion focuses on asceticism and 
bodily mortification. Literature on Sufism tends to view this as an early practice supplanted by a 
series of mystical techniques that advocated moderation in bodily mortification. Thus Nizami’s 
repeated emphasis on seclusion and renunciation seems a bit of a throw-back to a prior era. In 
this section we will explore some theories and definitions of asceticism before exploring how it 
is deployed in other Sufi works and in Nizami’s poetry. 
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In 1995, Vincent Wimbush and Richard Valantasis edited a volume titled simply 
Asceticism, collecting dozens of essays discussing theories of asceticism and ascetic practice, 
particularly in Early Christianity. With the exception of one or two authors discussing Eastern 
Orthodox understandings of the ascetic, and several dealing with pre-Christian Roman 
asceticism, the book focuses almost exclusively on Western Christianity, which was formed in 
a unique context of Roman persecution and whose methods were often modeled on early 
Christian martyrdom and Roman torture methods. Despite these limitations, there are few, if 
any, more comprehensive resources before or since for the study of asceticism in early 
Christianity and the construction of a general theory of ascetic practice. A decade later, editor 
Richard Valantasis collected a body of his own essays on the subject of asceticism in a book 
titled The Making of the Self. Relying on the work of numerous previous thinkers ideas about 
asceticism, Valantasis constructs a theory of asceticism which he hopes will transcend early 
Christian contexts and be applicable to other religious traditions and in other time periods, 
including contemporary ascetic practices. Valantasis’ theory of asceticism centers around 
ascetic practice and the formation of a resistant subjectivity. By implication, asceticism as 
resistance presumes that textual records of such ascetic practice will serve political ends, 
generally seeking to domesticate such resistant subjectivity.  
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After exploring the concept of asceticism as the formation of a resistant subjectivity, 
this section will then interrogate, the concept of asceticism as resistance in light of the work of 
Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood. Revisiting Valantasis’ theoretical sources, we will challenge 
Valantasis’ location of asceticism in the intent of a subject. Such challenges occur directly, 
such as in Nietzsche’s figuration of asceticism as a tool for channeling ressentiment, or 
indirectly, such as through Bataille’s notion of immanence, or Lacan’s insights into the mirror 
phase. By incorporating the works of Bataille, Deleuze, and Foucault in a reassessment of the 
theory of asceticism. Such an examination will expose the shortcomings in Valantasis’ 
theoretical model, especially when exposed to a non-Christian context.  
 
Richard Valantasis and Asceticism as Resistant Subjectivity 
Over a decade later, Valantasis collected thirteen of his own essays on the subject of 
asceticism, including one that appeared in Asceticism, in a book titled Making of the Self. In 
Making of the Self, Valantasis proposes a new theory of asceticism which he hopes will give 
scholars a framework through which to read all the varied manifestations of ascetic practice, 
Christian and non-Christian, ancient and modern. Through his theory of asceticism as resistant 
subjectivity, Valantasis reveals the ascetic to be an ideal site for investigating the dominant 
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social context, as he or she represents a pre-eminent and uniquely creative site of resistance to 
that context.  
Valantasis is Professor of Ascetical Theology and Christian Practice and Director of 
Anglican Studies at Emory University's Candler School of Theology. Much of his career has 
been spent analyzing asceticism in its various manifestations and contexts, especially Early 
Christianity, and developing a theory of asceticism that moves beyond identifying it 
exclusively with specific self-mortification practices. The Making of the Self serves as the 
culmination of this process, analyzing previous definitions of asceticism, positing a new 
definition by situating asceticism within academic discourses on power, and finally showing 
the versatility and applicability of his new definition by applying it to various early Christian 
texts to show how it provides a useful framework for examining early Christian writings and 
practices.  
The book is arranged into three sections:  “Theory,” “Christian Asceticism,” and 
“Roman Asceticism.”  Valantasis' theory of Asceticism is fully laid out in the first section, 
though he revisits aspects of it in each essay in the consecutive sections as well. Rather than 
presenting the reader with a single unified theory as a fait accomplit, the author expands and 
hones his definition of asceticism through a series of overlapping essays that put his proposed 
theory in dialogue with various textual and theoretical traditions. Of these five essays, the 
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second, “Constructions of Power in Asceticism,” is the longest and goes the farthest towards 
presenting the author's theory on asceticism, with a necessary clarification occurring in the 
fourth essay, “Asceticism or Formation: Theorizing Asceticism after Nietszche,” which 
distinguishes asceticism from enculturation or formation, two terms the author uses 
interchangeably.  
By situating asceticism within discussions of power, Valantasis is able to posit 
asceticism as, fundamentally, an orientation towards dominant power structures. The set of 
practices which emerge as a result of this orientation are merely symptomatic and do not 
encompass the whole of asceticism, which is the mistake made in most previous attempts to 
define asceticism. Stated concisely, Valentasis defines asceticism as “any performance 
resistant to an externally projected or subjectively experienced dominant social or religious 
context specifically intended...and purposefully performed in order to inaugurate a new and 
alternative subjectivity.”217 Later, however, he modifies this definition further, to indicate that 
asceticism begins not with actual performance, “not with withdrawal itself, but with the 
dissatisfaction with the dominant perspective that leads to withdrawal.”218 Thus asceticism is 
located at the nexus between a sense of dissatisfaction with the dominant social 
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context/available subjectivities and the realization of the possibility of an alternate, resistant 
subjectivity/social context towards which one may move.  
This convergence of dissatisfaction and available alternative is the beginning of a 
multivalent, dynamic process in which the ascetic moves towards a new intra- and inter-
subjectivity, which requires the transformation of social relationships and the construction of 
a new “symbolic universe...in order to explain and sustain the resistant subjectivity.”219 The 
process is dynamic because, as the subject moves from the rejected subjectivity towards the 
desired subjectivity, a third, interim subjectivity is created, which negotiates between the two. 
This third subjectivity changes and adapts as progress is made along the ascetic path. 
Similarly, as the ascetic negotiates the creation of a new subjectivity, the dominant social 
context pushes back against the ascetic's resistance to its demands for social relations and 
rejection of its symbolic universe. The dominant context's resistance to the ascetic takes both 
internal and external forms, manifesting in everything from metaphors of demons and 
memories of family, internally, to pleas for assistance or the imposition of political or 
ecclesiastical power through coercion or force, externally. The ascetic must adapt to the 
changing social context in order to effectively resist it. Thus asceticism is dynamic for 
Valantasis because the sites of resistance, both intra- and inter-subjectively, continually shift.  
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Like Peter Brown, a seminal 20th century thinker on the figure of the Holy Man in early 
Syriac Christianity, Valantasis locates the ascetic's power in his/her radical alterity.220 Unlike 
Brown, however, Valantasis does not locate this alterity in the strangeness of the ascetic's 
practices or lifestyle, but rather in the resistant subjectivity toward which these practices 
point. Furthermore, though Brown identifies the ascetic's power in his/her ability to act as 
dispassionate negotiators due to his/her location outside of normative social relationships, 
Valantasis argues that it is the allure of the resistant subjectivity and the threat it poses to the 
dominant social order which constitutes an ascetic's power. Valantasis asserts that defining 
asceticism as an orientation towards the dominant social context, its power structures, and the 
subjectivity the dominant context requires for participation, rather than as a series of 
practices, better describes the ascetic's journey, provides a definition of asceticism that can be 
applied across religious, cultural and temporal boundaries, and more aptly encompasses the 
vast array of ascetic phenomena, from living in celibate communities to standing on pillars, 
seen in early Christianity and beyond.  
After laying out and refining his theory of asceticism, Valantasis proceeds in the next 
two sections to apply it to a variety of texts. In Part Two, “Christian Asceticism,” he uses his 
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new definition of asceticism to enter into and attempt to resolve debates about the nature of 
various Christian writings, such as the Gospel of Thomas. For students of Syriac Christianity, 
Chapter 7, “Daemons and the Perfecting of the Monk's Body,” is useful to understanding the 
role of demon battles in Syriac literature such as Jacob of Serug's biography of Simeon Stylite. 
Here Valantasis most directly challenges the usefulness of transposing modern constructions 
of the self onto late ancient ascetics, the notion of demons as manifestations of a form of pre-
modern psychology, and Peter Brown's assertions that the late ancient body was inscribed 
with social responsibility. In this chapter Valantasis also makes a distinction between literary 
depictions of asceticism, which are meant to enact the desired ideal subjectivity, versus the 
documentary evidence, which often seems to conflict with this ideal. This understanding of 
the genre of ascetic biography as a form of ascetic performance seems to be Valantasis’ most 
problematic assertion, though it helps clarify the differences between the lives of saints as 
depicted by Theodoret, and the documentary evidence of an ascetic community like that found 
in the Liber Graduum.221 Valantasis’ notion of hagiography as textual ascetic performance seems 
to be based upon a false analogy. Though the body is a text, Valantasis’ assertion that what is 
done to bodies in text is equivalent to what is done to bodies as text seems to conflate two very 
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different processes. Rather, I view hagiography and biography as separate phenomena which 
perform different functions than the initial acts of asceticism themselves, and are used to 
domesticate the threatening character of Valantasis’ resistant ascetic subjectivity.  
In the final section, “Roman Asceticism,” Valantasis shows how his definition of 
asceticism requires scholars to look more closely at pre- and non-Christian sources and their 
ascetic practices for insights into the development of resistant subjectivities. In light of his 
research and theory, Valantasis argues that “scholars of early Christianity cannot seek to 
define asceticism by first looking to the fourth century Christian ascetics and working 
backward in time.”222 Though scarcity of textual resources in the intervening period is part of 
the reason for this traditional scholarly approach, Valantasis asserts that Christianity itself 
was born as an ascetic movement in response to the Roman social context and what should be 
examined in light of the rise of 4th century asceticism is not how these practices developed, 
but how alteration of the dominant social context inspired similar transformations in the 
expression of resistant alterity. For Valantasis, Christianity itself was an ascetic movement 
which constructed a new and subversive subjectivity out of the symbolic universe of the 
Roman world. Later Syrian ascetics resisted social power on several fronts—political and 
economic authority, ecclesiastical authority, but also the authority of the pagan symbolic 
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world of the countryside into which they withdrew. Thus pillar standing, for example, can be 
an image of crucifixion, and a co-optation and reconstruction of pagan practices, and a 
practical method for avoiding the dominant culture's attempt to rein in resistant subjectivity 
by giving the ascetic a social role through his/her interaction with supplicants. Since 
asceticism is performative, and the symbolic language ascetics adopt must be communicable, it 
is reasonable that they would adopt multi-layered symbols if speaking to several audiences 
simultaneously.223          
In building his own definition of asceticism, Valantasis provides quick overviews of the 
work done by seminal thinkers such as Weber, Foucault, Nietzsche, Althusser, Harpham and 
others. Some critics, whom he acknowledges in his essays, have argued that his theory of 
asceticism is too broad to be useful, divorced as it is from historical context, religious tradition, 
or specific practices. This may be true within the field of early Christian scholarship, but 
Valantasis' goal is specifically to link early Christian ascetic research with theories of 
asceticism in social semiotics, which are notably broader than the theory Valantasis puts forth. 
Other critics have argued that his definition of asceticism is too narrow, with its focus on 
resistance, ignoring acts of personal discipline or self-mortification that seek to bring 
individuals into greater harmony with their social context. Valantasis addresses these critics 
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with his distinction between enculturation/formation and asceticism, though this does mean 
some figures who may have thought of themselves as ascetics would not fall into Valantasis' 
definition of ascetic, which seems to indicate that the theory is problematic in at least this 
sense. For the student or scholar of Syriac Christianity this theory presents both advantages 
and challenges for one's approach to ascetic figures, biographies of saints, and one's 
understanding of the social role of ascetics in late antiquity. It applicability to non-Chrisitan 
contexts seems to vary depending on the particular religious tradition and ascetic figure under 
investigation.    
 
The Development of the Ascetic Subjectivity 
 There are several lenses through which commentators have tried to view 
asceticism in Early Christianity, all of them based around oppositional dichotomies, such as 
Roman vs. Christian, City vs. Countryside, Rich vs. Poor, Diffident vs. Devout. What all these 
characterizations have in common is an emphasis on the oppositional character of 
asceticism—asceticism is that which sets itself against something else. Peter Brown has 
suggested a non-oppositional character for the late antique holy man, instead advocating an 
understanding of the ascetic as mediator and conduit between oppositional forces thanks to 
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his location above/outside/beyond the social order out of which these dichotomies arise.224 
Although the holy man may be perceived to be above/outside the social order by his 
supplicants by virtue of his rejection of the standard markers of societal participation, his 
status as holy man re-embeds him in the social context. Though the holy man may be the 
perpetual outsider, he is only an outsider in relation to that which he stands outside. The 
characteristics and actions of the ascetic are shaped and bounded both by what it is he resists, 
and by the patterns others have set for such resistance. So, even in Peter Brown's re-
envisioning of the holy man, the ascetic's oppositional character remains central, if enlarged. 
Brown's holy man does not oppose a single subsection of his society, but rather resists all 
possible social roles for himself except that of the holy man.  
The notion of asceticism as a resistant subjectivity, as explicitly stated by Richard 
Valantasis, and gestured toward by others, forces those studying asceticism to shift their focus 
from specific practices to categories of action, and the motivations behind those actions. 
According to James Francis, asceticism does not begin with self-mortification practices, rather 
“the spirit of disaffection with society comes first, and only then produces novelties of 
doctrine and behavior.”225 The ascetic impulse can be halted merely at the stage of disaffection, 
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however, for it “functions along a spectrum that includes simple dissatisfaction, social or 
religious crisis, or a desire openly and directly to resist dominant modes”226 The ability to 
distance oneself enough from one's own social context to become disaffected with the entire 
range of available roles offered by one's society, and not simple one's own role, seems limited 
to only a few individuals. Furthermore, the ability to transform disaffection into action is 
limited to those for whom a viable alternative seems possible, and for whom the dangers of 
staying socially embedded seem to outweigh the risks of renunciation/withdrawal. This 
vantage is frequently linked to class background, and in the 4th & 5th Century Syriac Christian 
context it is not those with the least to lose from disengagement with society—the lowest 
classes—who prove most likely to follow the ascetic path. Rather, disaffection which leads to 
asceticism requires “a person socially aware of his or her ability to disengage from the group 
of origin. Such persons included converts to fictive kin groups, such as Christian groups before 
Constantine; and, afterwards, persons with appropriate social status, whether aristocratic or 
inheriting family members (head of the family, inheriting son, widow) who perceived the 
sense of taking such a step,”227 as is the case with both Simeon the Stylite and Symeon the Fool.  
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Resistance/Rejection/Transformation 
 Though disaffection is an essential aspect of the ascetic path, asceticism proper 
begins with the actions engendered by that disaffection, it “begins to operate when an 
alternative to the social and religious givens is developed.”228 This action begins with 
withdrawal from the dominant context which the ascetic has rejected. For Christian ascetics, 
the focus of such withdrawal was commitment to God. For them, “devotion to God meant 
pursuing God's purpose with body as well as soul, starting with the abandonment of society's 
comforts—family, home, and community.”229 This withdrawal is necessary for the development 
of a new subjectivity, the formation of a new social role for the ascetic. Through their 
hermitage, “Christian ascetics of the fourth and fifth centuries were pioneers in working out 
what must be done by people who find the ordinary human concerns of household and city an 
intolerable distraction from their commitment to God.”230 Thus dissatisfaction with society is 
couched in terms of distraction from relationship with the divine. The seeming intent of 
withdrawal is to eliminate distraction for the relatively personal reason of pursuing a closer 
relationship with God. Since the “self” is a socially embedded entity, or as Drijvers puts it, “the 
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concept of the person relates mortal human beings to a social continuum,” the self must be 
reduced or even eliminated in order to achieve undistracted attention to God.231 Achieving 
such an intimate relationship requires the ascetic “to rid the self of all social accretions with a 
view to reducing the self to its psycho-physical components, even to its primordial sensory 
and motor condition if possible.”232 Though the ascetic's intent was to achieve a new 
subjectivity, a self with a new relational orientation, embedded in a society of one—the 
individual purified and emptied to receive and contain the Spirit—achieving such a 
mental/spiritual state required a great deal of attention to the body. The goal was not to 
punish or eliminate the body, as a dualistic interpretation of asceticism would have it, but 
rather bodily discipline which reduced the relational “self” to nothing but a body. 
Though the transformational energy of asceticism appears to be directed inwardly, it 
necessarily transforms the world around the individual. This is because “asceticism involves 
the articulation of a subjectivity that defines the identities towards which the ascetic moves 
and away from which he/she withdraws.”233 Not only does ascetic practice identify itself both 
by what it rejects and what it wishes to become, but the subjectivity it desires to achieve is 
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defined through a form negative ontology—its boundaries can often only be traced by what it 
is not, since those describing it usually have not achieved it, and since its attainment is beyond 
the realm of common human experience, and therefore the bounds of descriptive language. 
Because ascetic practice defines itself by what it is not, and what it is not is the rest of human 
experience, “ascetic behavior, in whatever context it is clothed, is a response—a challenge, a 
rejoinder—to world.”234 But although “almost any form of extreme behavior that deviates from 
the cultural norm may serve as language of challenge or protest,” and ascetic behavior is 
certainly extreme, it is not the extremity of behavior that makes asceticism protestational.235 
Rather, asceticism's extremity emerges from its oppositional character, rather than vice versa, 
since “asceticism is of its nature combative [as] it defines itself through negation and 
exclusion.”236 For this reason, “ascetic practice may, therefore, frequently be seen as an 
intentional language of protest”237 Thus asceticism cannot be defined solely by cataloguing 
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various forms of self-mortification, but rather one must look to the intentions behind such 
practice, which lie in the rejection of other modes of being in the world. 
Although asceticism is cloaked in the language of withdrawal and disengagement, the 
tropes of “assimilation and resistance presuppose a relationship between two elements in 
society,” and through resistance/rejection/assimilation not only is the individual ascetic 
transformed, but also the world around him/her.238 For the individual practitioner of 
asceticism, the world transforming effects may be inadvertent and unanticipated: “When St. 
Benedict hid himself in a cave near Subaico, he wanted simply to save his own soul, and had 
not the slightest intention of saving Western civilization. But his solitary quest for personal 
salvation did in fact exercise in the long term a profoundly creative effect on European 
culture.”239 How does such a social transformation occur?  “In Western traditions of asceticism, 
the body itself appears to function as a metaphor for the world: the microcosm reflects, and, in 
a sense, replicates, the macrocosm. By examining the microcosm, the macrocosm can be 
interpreted, defined (have its boundaries drawn), or even refined (have undesirable 
boundaries redrawn) and consequently controlled to a degree.”240  Since the body is the text 
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upon which social relations are inscribed and in which social obligations are enacted, attention 
to the body yields insights into the society out of which that body emerges, and changes to the 
body have the power to enact changes upon society.  
Furthermore, since ascetic practice is a rejection of the ascetic's social context, the 
society being rejected must develop a response to the ascetic's challenge—either by rejection 
and exclusion (declaring the ascetic a heretic), or by assimilating the ascetic and finding a way 
to blunt the implicit accusation of ascetic practice (hagiography, enlisting the ascetic as 
patron). In the case of assimilation, “the trajectory may proceed under the impact of what 
Weber termed routinization, generating a functionally integrated subculture of its own or 
even be reintegrated into the cultural mainstream which it sought to leave behind and which 
it now changes and reforms.”241 Asceticism manifests as “a form of taking power, power over 
the microcosm (the body) when power over the macrocosm is denied or restricted,” but it also 
opens up a dialogue with the society it rejects, creating an avenue to power previously denied 
within the macrocosm.242  Thus “the construction of the ascetic body also ha[s] consequences 
for the body politic”243 Through resistance and rejection, the ascetic calls for a response from 
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the society that is resisted/rejected, and through this response, the social context which the 
ascetic first rejected for its limitations becomes malleable and open to reform. 
 
Audience/Performance/Social Involvement 
 As we have seen, ascetic practices are most clearly defined by their rejection of 
social obligations and traditional modes of being in the world. Self-discipline, which seeks to 
adapt the individual to his/her social context, is not asceticism, but what Valantasis calls 
“formation” or “enculturation.”244 The key difference between asceticism and enculturation is 
performance. Practices of enculturation seek to erase difference, whereas asceticism creates 
it.245 One seeking to erase difference seeks to blend with the dominant context and thus be 
unnoticed, whereas one who creates difference calls attention to oneself as different: “Ancient 
asceticism involved escaping group anonymity and its collective orientation, especially by 
standing out as an individual against the group and its demands for total loyalty and 
conformity”246 Therefore, asceticism, “while appearing to be the discourse of retreat, and thus 
of the marginalized...calls for an audience.”247 The ascetic resists marginalization through 
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performance, by placing him/herself at the center of a new social network, through 
performance. Even in the absence of an audience of other human beings (audience in the 
traditional sense), asceticism is performed before the audience of the rejected subjectivity 
which watches on as the ascetic inaugurates a new subjectivity. Alternately, the divine can act 
as the intended audience. Thus “every kind of asceticism involves an audience (whether 
personal, social or divine) and, therefore, every asceticism becomes a performance.”248 And just 
as every form of self-mortification is not asceticism, but only those which reject in order to 
transform, so too not every kind of performance is a form of asceticism, but only 
“performances intending to inaugurate a new, resistant subjectivity.”249     
 
The Formation of Ascetic Power 
The preceding construction of asceticism presumes that it is composed of two equally 
important elements: resistance and performance. Any practice of bodily restraint or self-
mortification which does not contain these two elements cannot be qualified as asceticism. 
What is helpful about such a definition is that it highlights the shortcomings of attempts to 
define asceticism in terms of its outward manifestations. Defining asceticism by creating lists 
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of ascetic activities will always fall short, because “asceticism has meaning not as a behavior 
unto itself, but in relationship to behaviors that are conceived of as different from, or in 
opposition to, or complimentary to it.”250 Because asceticism stands in relation to the 
opposition to the dominant social context, and because it calls for an audience to observe it, 
ascetic practice becomes a political activity. Essential to politics is the question of “who has 
control over what is acceptable speech and behavior, and who determines what is right and 
wrong.”251 Ascetics make a strong claim for the reevaluation of the categories of right and 
wrong, and challenge social restrictions on acceptable behavior. If we “understand politics, 
then, to be about the relationships and systems of power and authority that exist within a 
given cultural context,” asceticism is a political activity because it creates a new avenue of 
power creation within a particular social context.252  
Ascetics create power for themselves through the dual avenues of resistance and 
performance. As Valantasis notes, “by resisting the power of the dominant context, ascetics 
amass power for themselves.”253  Ascetic resistance imparts power to the practitioner because, 
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in its rejection of social norms through self-mortification, it takes the tools of punishment for 
resistance out of the hands of authorities in power:  “To endure pain is to signify that one has 
no fear of power, that one is impervious to power, and that power wielders can have no effect. 
Since power wielders are normally those of superior status in society, freely choosing suffering 
is a claim to superiority over persons of superior status, if not a claim to their power”254  
Ascetics differ from martyrs because they do not simply endure, submit to, or abide by 
punishment, they actually impose punishment upon themselves preemptively. This is one 
reason why defining asceticism by its manifestation in certain self-mortification practices will 
always limit the scope of such a definition to a specific cultural context. Since forms of 
punishment will differ from society to society, based upon what each society holds valuable 
enough to count as a loss when deprived, ascetic practices will differ accordingly. For example, 
early Christian forms of bodily asceticism owe much to Roman torture and execution practices, 
the re-enactment of which ascetics understood in terms of imitation of Christ's passion.255 
Since punishment functions through depriving an individual of what is considered valuable to 
society, by imposing punishment upon oneself, an ascetic asserts that his/her values differ 
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from those of society at large, and in doing so denies political authorities the ability to punish 
him/her.  
The ability to resist coercive power deprives political authorities of their power over 
the ascetic, but it does not necessarily generate power for the ascetic. Peter Brown argues that 
it is the radical alterity of the ascetic which generates his power, for as a figure who “could not 
be affected by isolation or indoctrination (partisan influence); socially they were available for 
mediation, arbitration, or whatever else anyone may have sought from a person who was not 
embedded in a group.”256 Although this is an important manifestation of the ascetic's power, it 
is not the source of it, for before the ascetic can exercise social power as an “outsider,” he/she 
must be re-embedded within a social context in which such categories become meaningful. 
Thus, it is the performance aspect of asceticism from which the ascetic truly draws power, for 
“the social power of the saint resides in the saint’s empowering of others to imitation.”257 
Whereas political authorities wield coercive power, which the ascetic can resist, “the holy man 
wield[s] non-coercive power,” which, in Althusserian terms, means the ascetic wields 
ideological power.258 Similarly to the way ascetics impose physical punishment upon 
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themselves, public performance of their alterity is an act of self-humiliation, but “humiliation 
can be turned to honor...a person is expected to comply under threat of shame with the wishes 
of the one shaming. If, however, the person does not comply, even in the face of shame and 
utter humiliation, then the position of the one attempting to humiliate is open to question in 
the eyes of the public...humiliation endured can thus produce an increase of honor and a sense 
of solidarity in the eyes of the observing public.”259 Again, however, resistance of humiliation 
does not generate power, though it does diminish the punitive power of authority. What public 
humiliation does achieve, however, is solidarity. Furthermore, the public spectacle of ascetic 
practice has as “its object and its raison d'etre...advertisement.”260 For, “an ascetic performance 
was wasted if it did not possess some display value.”261 Through public performance, “the 
ascetic saint on the one hand 'acted out a ritual of social disengagement' (Peter Brown), but on 
the other stood in the centre of a new society of which he represented the ideal of manhood, in 
which the divine had come to dwell.”262 The performative aspect of ascetic practice generates 
power for the ascetic through forming a new social order in which he/she is the center, as an 
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idealized figure. As such, “imitability of their practices was crucial,” as the ascetic aspired “to 
inspire others to similar performance.”263  Social disengagement was not an end of itself, but 
rather an avenue to the creation of a new social order with the ascetic at its center. Through 
performance the ascetic was able to use his/her resistant subjectivity to transform society 
through inspiring adulation and emulation, which were generated by the extremity of the 
ascetic's practices, his/her ability to resist coercive power, and his/her utility as the 'ritually 
disengaged' to the new community which formed around the him/her. Thus the engine which 
generated ascetic power was not renunciation, nor mediation, but the community formation 
engendered by the public performance of self-mortification rituals.  
 
Reassimilation through Hagiography 
The power of ascetics is threatening to the dominant social order, and thus ascetics 
must be either resisted or assimilated. As we have seen, coercive power does not work to quell 
ascetic resistance, since ascetic practice, by its very nature, holds up as virtue the depravations 
which are the means of punishment within a given society. Rather the battle between society 
and ascetic resistance has to be fought on ideological grounds. This could occur either by 
casting the ascetic as a heretic or by assimilating him into the religious worldview of the 
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dominant social order. Rejecting the ascetic as a heretic was a difficult proposition, for it 
required the collusion of ecclesiastical and political authorities—one to make the declaration, 
the other to enforce its might. Once labeled a heretic, the ascetic loses his audience, thus his 
resistance to coercive power no longer generates power for him through performance. 
Resistance becomes mere stubbornness, death cannot tip into martyrdom. There is an 
additional danger in declaring an ascetic a heretic, however, for if they accusation can be 
refuted or debunked, heresy charges would damage the authority of the ascetic’s accusers. 
Ideological rejection of an ascetic thus proves more complicated and potentially dangerous 
route than assimilation, which carries not fewer risks and potential benefits for both political 
and ecclesiastical authorities.  
Asceticism, unlike its earlier corollary Cyncism, is not anarchic, but rather “rejects 
culture only in order to prescribe higher rules; and is thus also in its very nature 
authoritarian.”264 Since asceticism proposes some kind of goal towards which it strives, rather 
than simply rejecting the dominant social order for its own sake, ascetic goals could be co-
opted, reframed through biography and hagiography, and made to work for, rather than 
against, ecclesiastical and political authorities. Narrative accounts of an ascetic's life and 
practices are a form of what Valantasis calls “textualized performance” of asceticism, which 
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“discuss the rigor, strictness, and steadfastness of the ascetic’s life in order to idealize and 
dramatize the ascetic's efforts.”265 Like physical performance of self-mortification, “textualized 
performance constructs an imitable subject, an imitable performance.”266 But unlike physical 
performances, which center around a living individual, “textualized performances do not 
actually exist, but are created of the stuff of narrative and metaphor, precisely in order to set 
up the illusion of a reality to be imitated.”267 Textual performance thus gives the authors of the 
text authority over the ascetic's performance, and the freedom to construct its meaning in 
ways they see fit. If performance of an imitable, community-forming act of asceticism garners 
authority for the ascetic, the retelling of those performances by ecclesiastical authorities can 
diffuse or redirect that authority. 
Though both biography and hagiography are forms of textualized performance, they 
have different interests in and approaches to managing ascetic resistance—the former seeking 
to de-radicalize the image of the ascetic through humanizing him/her; the latter seeking to 
undercut the imitability of ascetic resistance by elevating his/her acts above the possible 
aspirations of the anticipated audience. In the biographies of ascetics by John of Ephesus, and 
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even to some extent Theodoret of Cyrrhus, the humanity and fragility of the ascetics is 
highlighted. What differentiates these biographies from hagiography is not the veracity of the 
account, or the proximity of the biographer in time and space to his subjects, for “these 
biographies,” like hagiography, “do not primarily describe the lives and fates of particular 
individuals, but put them into the framework of current concepts of the human person; as 
such they are the expressions of collective perceptions.”268 Even in biographies written by 
authors who knew and met the ascetics, the ascetics are symbols, but in biographies they are 
symbolic figures not because of the work of the biographer, but rather because the ascetic 
him/herself has composed their ascetic performance out of symbols and tropes meant to 
communicate to his/her audience. The job of the biographer is to humanize the ascetic and 
undermine their symbolic performance. The purpose of such humanizing is to clarify the lines 
between the ascetic's performative self-mortification and Jesus' renunciations and Passion. 
The concern of the biographers is that the ascetic's performance not result in deification by 
the ascetic's audience. Ironically, while undermining the symbolic nature of the ascetics 
performance through this humanization, the biographer may inadvertently increase the 
ascetic's power. In these textualized performances, “real lives, it was hinted, should follow the 
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pattern set in texts, themselves accounts of exemplary lives.”269 The more human and flawed 
the ascetic became, the more achievable his practices became for the audience admiring 
his/her performance. The biographer therefore walked a delicate tightrope, attempting to 
undermine the ascetic's position as outsider by showing him/her to be human, which, as 
Drijver mentions, re-embeds them in a social context, thus undermining the pillar of ascetic 
resistance, while simultaneously bolstering the other pillar of asceticism, giving the holy man 
a wider audience through dissemination of the text, and making the ascetic's performance 
more imitable by revealing his/her faults, flaws and shortcomings. 
In contrast to biography, hagiography seems to be a much more effective and favored 
method of assimilating threatening ascetics, because it does not seek to undermine 
asceticism's resistance, but rather undermines the ascetic's source of power, the audience of 
imitators, by seemingly conceding to the efficacy of the ascetic's performance. Hagiography 
“presents a portrait of holy men and women who never fail, figures of seamless perfection, and 
hence removes us from any real contact with them.”270 Idealizing the ascetic would seem to 
work at cross purposes to the goals of authority figures wishing to restrain ascetic power, but 
in elevating the ascetic to such a height, hagiography both reduces the imitability of ascetic 
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performance, and opens a gap between the performance and the possible achievements of 
those who may wish to imitate. In this way, “deviance is thus safely locked away as the 
prerogative earned by the accomplishments of the ascetic few, and emphatically not a 
prescription for the many.”271 The space between what the ascetic, who becomes nearly super-
human in hagiography, can achieve and what his/her merely human followers can hope to 
achieve through imitation, thus becomes the province of the hagiographer, who sets the 
barrier above which the audience cannot hope to rise and defines what successful imitation 
looks like in principle if it cannot be achieved through actual mimesis of the ascetic 
performance. For this reason, “hagiographical accounts of rigorous, even extreme, ascetic 
mortifications exist alongside treatises and other more theoretical ascetic writings which 
emphasize the need for moderation.”272 The former elevates the ascetic beyond imitability, the 
latter prescribes socially approved methods by which the ascetic's audience may emulate the 
ascetic in the absence of the possibility of achieving full imitation. Hagiography works to 
neutralize the ascetic's radicalism because, “by becoming characteristic of the rare heroic 
individual, such practices as poverty and celibacy lose their social character and, therefore, 
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their social threat.”273 Such elevation of the ascetic is particularly effective for two reasons: 
first, hagiography is usually written after the death of the ascetic, leaving him/her no chance 
to respond, but second, and more importantly, hagiography leaves an ascetic only one possible 
avenue of rebuttal—to admit his/her own fallibility and risk undermining his/her position as 
resistant “other.”  Thus it is through hagiography, and not the monastery, as Francis identifies, 
that “radical ascetics were shorn of their threat, liminized, heroized, and transformed from 
rivals to authority (whether emperor or bishop) into allies of that authority and paragons of its 
values.”274  
 
Problems with the Resistance Model of Asceticism 
 Though compelling for its explanatory power, the resistance model of 
asceticism is vulnerable to the same critique that Saba Mahmood levels against a resistance 
model of feminism. In her book Politics of Piety, Mahmood notes that, in feminist scholarship, 
“there is a tendency among scholars to look for expressions and moments of resistance that 
may suggest a challenge to male domination.”275 This is problematic for Mahmood, because it 
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simply defers the question of universality of experience. She does not presume that a 
particular series of actions can be classified as empowering women across all cultures and time 
periods, just as Valantasis does not presume that celibacy and restricted diet, for example, can 
be understood as asceticism in all contexts across all time periods. But if we replace a series of 
actions with an assumption about the disposition of the subject in relation to those actions, we 
a priori posit a subject with an intent, from which the meaning of his/her actions naturally 
unfolds. Mahmood instead asserts that “the meaning and sense of agency cannot be fixed in 
advance, but must emerge through an analysis of the particular concepts that enable specific 
modes of being, responsibility, and effectivity…agentival capacity is entailed not only in those 
acts that resist norms but also in the multiple ways in which one inhabits norms.”276   
Mahmood goes further still, not merely asking us to broaden our understanding beyond 
the resistance model in order to encompass non-resistive acts, but asserts: “I believe that it is 
critical that we ask whether it is even possible to identify a universal category of acts—such as 
those of resistance—outside of the ethical and political conditions within which such acts 
acquire their particular meaning.”277 This question undermines the presumption that the 
category of “resistance” can provide a lens through which to examine ascetic practice across 
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cultures, religious traditions, and time periods freed of the local specificity of particular ascetic 
practices themselves. Indeed, the category of resistance itself only has meaning within a 
context for, as Mahmood notes, leaning on Judith Butler, “the possibility of agency [is located] 
within structures of power (rather than outside of it)…in other words, there is no possibility of 
‘undoing’ social norms that is independent of the ‘doing’ of norms.”278 This does not 
necessarily devastate Valantasis’ critical framework, it simply requires that we use resistance 
as a more contingent and localized category than we at first would have liked to assume. 
Mahmood goes further than Butler, however, noting that Butler’s own work focuses almost 
entirely on the destabilization of norms: “her discussion of agency tends to focus on those 
operations of power that resignify and subvert norms,” which Mahmood finds problematically 
one-sided.279 Mahmood argues, citing Talal Asad, “we should keep the meaning of agency 
open” in order to develop it “within semantic and institutional networks that define and make 
possible particular ways of relating to people, things, and oneself.”280   
In Mahmood’s own work, she looks towards Michel Foucault for a method to analyze 
agency, referring to his four-fold analytic framework for examining subject formation: 
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 1) Substance of Ethics—which refers those categories of the self that are subject to 
ethical judgment, meaning are ethics defined as how one manages one’s body, how 
intentions undergird actions, the outcome of social interactions, etc. 
 
 2) Mode of Subjectivation—how people are “called upon to recognize their moral 
obligations” (i.e. upon what kind of authority does the ethic rest).281 
 
 3) Techniques of the Self—what does one have to do to become ethical? 
 4) Telos—the self one seeks to become through these techniques. 
Previous methods of analyzing asceticism have tended to focus on the techniques of the 
self, arguing that the substance of ethics and the mode of subjectivation are the same for 
ascetics as they are for all Christians, and what differs are the extremity of techniques of the 
self. These extreme techniques of self are either construed as the only appropriate avenue 
towards the desired telos (by the ascetics themselves), an avenue toward an alternate (perhaps 
superior) telos to those available to other Christians, or in some cases as a hindrance to 
attainment of the desired telos, as in the depictions of asceticism provided by Theodoret.282   
The resistance model for understanding asceticism argues that asceticism begins with a 
new telos, the desired subjectivity, and then works its way back through new techniques of self 
and modes of subjectivation. If there is room for Butler’s notion of ‘doing’ norms while 
‘undoing’ them, this would probably be located in the substance of ethics, where the ascetic 
selects from a range of available categories already in circulation for the sake of making his or 
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her message communicable, an essential part of the performative aspect of asceticism in the 
resistance model. All of this presumes, however, an autonomous subject who can project a new 
subjectivity in opposition to those subjectivities already available to him/her, and choose to 
select it and work towards it as an independent agent, against attempts to thwart or hinder 
such movement by political and ecclesiastical authorities, not to mention the larger cultural 
context. This fails to address not only Foucault’s complexification of the subject, but even 
Peter Brown’s earlier concern that it is problematic to assume that late ancient ascetics 
understood themselves and their relationship with others in the same terms in which we do 
today.  
 
Toward a New Genealogy of Asceticism 
Hegel (& Weber) 
In Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel discusses the two presumptions of the scientific model 
of consciousness—it assumes cognition to be both a medium and an instrument283 (47). The 
problem in this, for Hegel, is that it presumes a difference between what one is and what one 
thinks/perceives. With the assistance of Weber, we can argue that the ascetic attempts to 
overcome this division, but not through resolving the binary, rather through trying to 
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eliminate one side of the opposition and turn the self into pure instrumentality. For Weber, 
religious responses are divided into two categories: mystical and ascetic. The mystic path he 
describes as the path of resignation, the ascetic path as that of mastery. He further subdivides 
these categories based on their object: 
 
Inner-Worldly Mysticism: 
 
Living in the world but deny real world 
experiences any meaning (later Sufism, based 
around the tariqah) 
 
 
 
Other-Worldly Mysticism: 
 
Seeks to avoid all subjective desire, which 
leads to a loss of interest in all worldly 
concerns (such as with Messalianism) 
 
Inner-Worldly Asceticism: 
 
Mastery over the worldly component of one’s 
personality and all aspects of the human 
condition (as exemplified by Calvinism for 
Weber) 
 
 
 
World-Rejecting Asceticism: 
 
Mastery over the flesh (Desert Fathers in early 
Christianity, early Sufis such as Rabi’a) 
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For Weber, attempts to transform the self into pure medium are mystical, and attempts 
to subsume the self into instrumentality are ascetic. Of course Weber’s categorizations284 are 
constraining in a way that may obscure as much as they reveal, especially since many 
individuals or communities move in an out of several of these categories at various times and 
on various occasions. Furthermore, what we normally designate as asceticism is only covered 
by “world-rejecting asceticism,” which is not the primary category of interest for Weber, who 
uses this four-fold division to isolate and discuss the “inner-worldly asceticism” of Calvinism, 
which gives rise to modern Captialism.  
Nevertheless, what Weber does point to is the association of asceticism with mastery. 
Weber’s linkage of world-rejection and mastery over the flesh anticipates Valantasis’ 
definition of asceticism, where Valantasis adds complexity to the elements of the world the 
ascetic rejects and the methods through which this rejection can occur. Mastery over the flesh 
is certainly an element of this later definition of asceticism, but what biological, social, and 
economic aspects of the body one must control, and how they are mastered changes with 
context.  
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Turning to Hegel on the question of mastery,285 we may wonder how the ascetic comes 
to mastery. Is the ascetic a figure who first fears death and seeks to preserve life, but later 
escapes the master through working on a object the master cannot make use of—him/herself?  
Or, since according to much hagiography the ascetic comes from a position of wealth and 
authority, is the ascetic a master who rejects his/her dependence upon the slave to acquire 
subjectivity?  Is asceticism a mode by which a master can internalize the dialectic by making 
him/herself a slave to him/herself? 
 
Nietzsche 
Nietzsche seems to confirm this extrapolation from Hegel—that the ascetic is both 
slave and master contained in one individual. For Nietzsche, the delight one feels in self-denial 
is based in its cruelty, just as the suitability of punishment as compensation for an unpaid debt 
rests in the compensatory pleasure exacting cruelty on the debtor provides to the creditor.286 
For Nietzsche, the ascetic ideal is amorphous, and means various things to various people. For 
him this is indication that asceticism is mastery without an object—it is the will itself.287  But it 
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is here that the self-contradictory nature of asceticism becomes apparent. If the will wishes to 
propagate itself, but does so through denying the means by which the human body can 
flourish and reproduce, how can this will propagate itself?    
Nietzsche appears to give several answers to this question. First, he notes that the will 
expressed by the ascetic is the will to dominate life itself—by overcoming the necessities 
imposed upon the individual, through the “three great slogans of the ascetic ideal…poverty, 
humility, chastity.”288 Each of these imposes limitations on the ability of an individual to 
expand and propagate him/herself in the economic, social, and biological realms, respectively. 
On this construal, Nietzsche’s conception of the ascetic helps to support Valantasis’ thesis 
about the radical alterity of the ascetic—the ascetic is the one who rejects the usual 
construction of what it means to be human, and this rejection occurs through an avoidance or 
rejection of entanglements with other human beings. How does this impulse become life-
preserving? In one of two ways. First, Nietzsche seems enamored of the notion of sublimation. 
It would appear that in Nietzsche asceticism inaugurates a dialectic in which the self 
synthesizes a previous sensuality into something other than sexuality. Nietzsche promises to 
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write more on this subject in a later work, but never completed such an essay on 
sublimation.289   
His second solution to this problem is more in keeping with the theme of On the 
Genealogy of Morals. He notes that asceticism becomes life-preserving to the degree that it 
redirects ressentiment. Thus the ascetic redirects ressentiment for the master inward and directs 
it at the self. On this construal, asceticism is life preserving only to the degree that it maintains 
a particular socio-economic order. Thus asceticism thwarts biological necessity for the sake of 
preserving or reinforcing modes of communal living—it is the practical application of the herd 
instinct.290      
 
Bataille 
The question of where the ascetic fits in Bataille’s tripartite world of 
Immanence/Profane/Sacred is complex but potentially fruitful. Beginning with his emphasis 
on tools and their role in dividing humans from their surroundings, it is useful to observe the 
degree to which ascetics eschew tools, refuse to plan, and rely on chance to supply their needs, 
including food. (citations from hagiography about Issa throwing away his comb and cup, Rab’ia 
                                                            
289 Ibid, 111. 
290 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), 175. 
 
 
132 
refusing to cook, etc). Is the ascetic then, as Bruce Malina has suggested, trying to pare away 
the self in order to return the body to “its primordial sensory and motor condition,” thus 
returning to Bataille’s animality, experiencing immanence as presence of divinity?291 In this 
case the sacred is not a category of significance for the ascetic, who is trying to return to 
immanence directly, rather than through the world of the profane. If, however, we see the 
ascetic act as a self-sacrifice, a sacrifice of the thing most valuable and most utilitarian to us, 
and a sacrifice not unto death but unto ill-utility, then the ascetic does enter the realm of the 
sacred and seeks to linger there through resisting being reintegrated into the world of the 
profane. For Valantasis, however, and to some degree for Nietzsche, the profane world takes 
the ill-utility of the ascetic and reintegrates it as “role model.”  I argue that reintegration, 
though sometimes enacted by the ascetic him or herself (see Peter Brown on the Holy Man as 
mediator) is most often accomplished through hagiography.  
 
Lacan 
It is difficult to discuss Malina’s conception of asceticism as a return to sensory/motor 
function without reference to Lacan, who would tell us that once we presume this collection of 
limbs and functions to be unified in a single, coherent body and to be under the control of the 
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“I,” we have already posited a subject and removed ourselves from the world of immanence. 
Thus the presumption that the ascetic can return to immanence by controlling the body is 
inherently flawed. Rather, asceticism, if Nietzsche is correct that it is the expression of the will 
over life, is the mode of subject formation par excellence. The ascetic seeks to control or deny 
even those elements of bodily function that remain beyond the control of the “I” in a human 
adult—hunger, excretion, sleep, sex.  
What remains to be discussed?  In terms of the work before us, it seems an 
investigation of William James on the question of asceticism is critical, as is an exploration of 
Durkheim’s “Negative Cult.”  The question of the relationship between sacrifice, festival, and 
asceticism is a looming one—is asceticism as self-sacrifice aborted martyrdom?  Early Christian 
scholarship has debated the question of whether martyrdom was the model for later 
asceticism, though the Syriac context seems to complicate the history of Christian asceticism 
in a way that excludes or delays the contribution of martyrdom. Finally, if one is to bring in 
Saussure and Derrida, the question of the Vow of Silence and the relationship between speech 
and the subject seems pertinent. 
As this exploration has shown, asceticism is a complex phenomena that cannot be 
defined based upon particular practices or social roles. Any definition of asceticism which 
hopes to encompass ancient and contemporary practice, across a variety of religious and social 
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contexts, must necessarily look beyond individual practices and the social implications of 
these actions. Rather than being defined by self-mortification, asceticism is defined as a 
rejection of the dominant social context which leans toward or aspires to a new configuration 
of social relations, paired with a performative aspect which invites imitation and begins to 
form the basis for a new community freed of the distractions and detractions of the society 
from which the ascetic fled. Furthermore, textual performance becomes a key element of 
asceticism, both because it is the primary way in which society at large makes sense of and 
domesticates ascetic rejection and rebellion, and because for some ascetics it is the only way in 
which their asceticism gets performed before an audience. Textual performance is therefore 
not separate from asceticism, but in some cases is the necessary performative element that 
transforms resistant self-mortification into asceticism. Biography and hagiography serve as 
vehicles by which a society responds to the challenge of ascetic renunciation and rejection, 
transforming the ascetic performance and the social context which receives it, while shaping 
the methods future ascetics will use to enact their own resistance.  
 
Asceticism in Islam 
The linkage between ascetic practice and resistance to dominant political and social 
orders is often explicitly acknowledged in research on asceticism in early Islam. The standard 
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answer to the question of the rise of asceticism in Islam has looked to the sudden growth and 
prosperity of the Muslim empire and the disillusionment with the excessive wealth that such 
expansion brought to the still-young religious community. In his introductory survey text, 
Alexander Knysh gives a concise version of this argument:  
The acts of penitence and self-renunciation, which their practitioners justified by 
references to certain Qur’anic verses and the Prophet’s utterances, may be seen as a 
reaction against Islam’s newly acquired wealth that often lead many faithful to 
abandon the frugal ways and heroic self-denial associated with the primitive Muslim 
community in Medina. The secular pastimes and lavish lifestyles of the Umayyad rulers 
and their officials were seen by many as contrary to the original Islamic ideals…They 
argued that the truly God-fearing person should try to save himself by withdrawing 
from the overbearing world and its sinful and unjust ways.292  
 
Other studies have focused less on the sheer opulence of the Umayyad dynasty, and 
more on the injustices of the Umayyad system: “Until the ninth century, Islamic spirituality fit 
almost exclusively within the framework of zuhd, a word that can be translated as 
‘detachment’ or ‘renunciation’…This ascetic movement was mainly a reaction to the worldly 
character of the Umayyad dynasty, which governed the Muslim community from 661 to 750. It 
was also a reaction to the many injustices of this dynasty…’293 The author here discusses the 
massacre at Karbala as the injustice of primary significance for this development, linking 
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Sufism to Shi’ism as a form of political protest, like Egger. Knysh likewise mentions such 
injustices, though he underplays their significance in comparison to Geoffroy: “The latter 
[voluntary poverty] occasionally had an underlying political intent, as some early ascetics 
consciously abandoned gainful professions or even refused to inherit in protest against the 
perceived injustices and corruption of the oppressive Umayyad regime.”294 Such arguments 
about the origins of Sufi asceticism locate it specifically within a class of Arabs who stood to 
most benefit from the expansions of the empire, through land grants, booming trade, and war 
booty. Such an argument, which focuses on the economic disparities of the Umayyad system 
rather than the sheer opulence of the Umayyad rulers, does more to explain the continuation 
of asceticism after the fall of the Umayyads, for the economic disparities which they 
inaugurated continued under the Abbasids.295  
For the moment, however, we must take with a grain of salt the hagiographic story of a 
wealthy heir-apparent who renounces it all to pursue a life of poverty and seclusion. As with 
ascetic hagiographies in Late Antique Syriac Christianity, the trope of the wealthy renunciate 
may be just that: a literary device used to highlight the severity of the subject’s renunciation of 
material wealth. A quick survey of early Sufi ascetics would also seem to belie this explanation 
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of the rise of asceticism—Rabi’a al-‘Adawiyya was a freed slave, for example, and prominent 
figures such as Bayazid Bistami were Persian, which calls into question how they might have 
benefited from Arab-centric Umayyad largess.296 Nevertheless, there may be certain political or 
economic conditions necessary to support wandering ascetics or make such a-communal living 
feasible, which cease to exist in later times.297  
Though we know quite a lot about what early ascetics and Sufis supposedly say about 
themselves, we do not yet have a thorough explanation for why in some places and during 
some time periods self-mortification becomes a widespread phenomena, and these individuals 
gain political or social prestige through their acts of self-denial. It is not a given that extreme 
fasting, for example, should be coded as indicative of spiritual power—in our own context such 
behavior, though still coded as threatening, is pathologized.298 As such, an anthropological and 
historical investigation into the conditions of early renunciates—their locations, practices, 
interactions with religious and political authorities, engagements with one another—and 
discussion of how these factors change 300 years later with the decline of ascetic practice, is 
required to understand the development of Baghdadi Sufism as the dominant mystical and 
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ascetic movement over and above its rival movements in early Islam. One avenue through 
which to begin to understand such a development is through examining the category of 
poverty in early Sufi manuals and texts. By observing how poverty begins as an early stage on 
the Sufi path, concerned with very practical matters of dress and debts, but by the 13th 
century comes to be described as an internal state near the end of the mystic path, 
coterminous with annihilation in God (fana), we can begin to understand how notions of 
asceticism changed in the early Sufi tradition.  
 
Material Poverty in Early Sufism 
 What seems well researched in the study of early Sufism is what Cohn calls 
representations: “those situations, to follow Durkheim, in which some members of society 
represent their theories and systems of classifications and constructs to themselves and 
others. By representations I mean, among other things, etiquette, codes of conduct, large-scale 
political/religious rituals, and the various forms of mythics which underlie such 
representations.”299 The study of Sufi manuals, biographies, hagiographies, and mystical 
treatises certainly provide us with a wealth of information regarding the ways in which Sufis 
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represent Sufism to themselves and others. Cohn, however, sees the study of these 
representations as ultimately aimed at a comparative project: “It is through the study of these 
phenomena…that we can understand and ultimately compare systems of representation.”300 
Very little has been done to evaluate the various competing claims for authority between early 
Islamic mystical and ascetic groups, and until recently, the vast outpouring of Sufi literature in 
the 10th and 11th centuries was read primarily as a form of apologia, justifying the 
“orthodoxy” of Sufism to Sunni authorities. Such an argument is untenable because Sunni 
consensus was not dominant in all the places we find Sufism (and certainly not accompanied 
by the political power that might provide for the suppression of oppositional movements). 
Likewise, once we clear our vision of the fog created by the contemporary pop-cultural 
obsession with a Wahabbi/Sufi divide, which seems to imply that Sunnism and Sufism are 
inherently at odds with one another, we see that they managed to co-exist amicably (even 
symbiotically, if we follow Marshall Hodgson’s reading) for almost a millennia.301 When Sufis 
did encounter strong Sunni political authorities (as in the case of the Seljuks), they tended to 
provide an essential service of religious authorization for the rulers, and were usually 
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handsomely rewarded with institutional support and waqf endowments.302 Furthermore, many 
exemplary Sufis also made their living as legal scholars within one of the four Sunni madhahib.  
In light of this realization, more recent work has looked at Sufi writings in the context 
of arguments against other mystical and ascetic groups. It is especially telling that the key Sufi 
manuals were written by authors from Khurasan and Transoxania, areas with strong 
alternative mystical and ascetic movements that differed greatly from Baghdadi Sufism in 
vocabulary, theology, and practice. Knysh admits that “the gradual expansion and eventual 
ascendancy of Iraqi Sufism in these areas [Khurusan and Transoxania], which began in the first 
quarter of the fourth/tenth centuries and gained momentum in the next two centuries, has 
not yet found a satisfactory explanation in scholarly literature.”303 Some authors attribute its 
success to its ability to absorb and incorporate the strengths of its competitors, while others 
emphasize the support lent to Sufism by political powers who saw it as, at minimum, the least 
threatening of the mystical movements. Only a few recent works, however, have looked at the 
representational output of these various groups in a comparative light, as Cohn would advise. 
An investigation of the concepts of zuhd (renunciation) and faqr (poverty) will reveal the ways 
in which debates over the status of the spiritual station of poverty get tied to Junayd’s notion 
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of fana (self-annihilation in God), until actual material poverty becomes irrelevant to the Sufi 
path, and meticulous attention to material poverty becomes evidence of a low spiritual station.  
Developing out of early Islamic ascetic traditions, Sufism was closely tied to the notion 
of poverty during its formative period. Among the various etymologies proposed for the word 
Sufi, ṣūf, meaning wool and indicating the practical and unadorned wool garments of an 
ascetic, is the most accepted derivation of the word.304 This woolen garment, called a muraqqa'a 
(patched frock) was a personal symbol for the Sufi him/herself reminding of his/her 
renunciation of worldly desires. It also served as a public symbol, marking the Sufi as a person 
separate from society. Another frequently posited derivation for the word, though 
linguistically unlikely, comes from the Arabic suffa (bench), indicating a group of early 
Muslims who lived in the mosque at Medina and who had no possessions, relying on the 
Prophet's largess to sustain them in their devotion to God.305 Thus two of the most frequently 
cited derivations for the term “Sufi” emphasize notions of impoverishment and unworldliness.  
No biography of an early Sufi saint is complete without descriptions of his or her 
ascetic practices, whether it be going without food for days on end, sleeping on nothing but a 
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reed mat, or wearing the same tattered frock for decades. Poverty was not simply an abstract 
concept but a lived reality for these early saints. Later commentators grappled with the 
practical questions surrounding how one enacts a life of poverty including questions of 
whether or not there should be set floors or ceilings on the personal resources of a Sufi, 
whether certain extremes of poverty might actually harm the aspirant in their quest for God, 
and whether a Sufi was required to earn enough to meet prior financial obligations or could 
leave these obligations behind.  
Definitions and stipulations regarding poverty in the early period are as diverse as are 
the writers addressing the topic. All commentators agree that it is a station along the path 
towards God, but disagreements arise over where this station occurs along, what it leads to, 
and its relative value in relation to other stations. For Abu Nasr al-Sarraj, poverty comes in 
three forms depending upon the spiritual advancement of the practitioner. The most basic 
form is the poverty of one who renounces all worldly possessions, does not complain about his 
material want or request assistance, and vehemently refuses aid should it be offered. The 
second form is actually less stringent, and indicates one who meets the above criteria, but may 
accept assistance freely offered to them. The third form is yet more relaxed still, meeting the 
criteria of form two, with the added benefit of being able to ask for assistance when 
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necessary.306 This scale of poverty, with the strictest form actually being the lowest in spiritual 
attainment, indicates the way in which post-Junaydi Sufism articulates itself as being distinct 
from asceticism for asceticism's sake.307 The implication is that poverty is a tool to train a Sufi 
to no longer desire worldly goods. Those first starting on the path require the greatest 
restrictions on their access to worldly temptations, whereas those who have already overcome 
the temptations of food and comfort may accept or even seek it out if it will benefit them in 
their higher spiritual pursuits, or if lack of one or the other might hinder them. For Sarraj, 
poverty leads to the station of patience (sabr) and comes relatively early along the path, just 
after renunciation (zuhd). Nevertheless, with his demarcation of three separate forms, it 
encompasses a great deal of spiritual development within a single station. 
Other more practical discussion of material poverty are prevalent. Ghazali, attempting 
to demarcate the minimum bar one must meet to achieve poverty, argues that “poverty is the 
privation of what is essentially needed by a human being...privation of what is unessential to a 
person is not called poverty.”308 Other writers might take issue with this definition, however, 
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since the goal of poverty is the realization that one really needs nothing but God, so 
approaching poverty with the understanding that one is giving up something “essentially 
needed” might seem contradictory to the goals of such privation.  
Kalabadhi, highly concerned with minutiae of the life of poverty, discusses whether or 
not it is appropriate for a Sufi to acquire any earnings whatsoever, resolving that it is 
permissible should those earnings be used to assist others or to repress desires which might 
distract one from remembrance of God.309 He goes so far as to argue that earning is compulsory 
for one who is responsible for dependents, so poverty is not a state that can or should be 
imposed upon one's family members.310 His emphasis rests much more clearly upon material 
poverty, but reveals his interest in poverty as a path towards spiritual attainment, rejecting its 
extremes when they may hinder one's development or harm others.  
Qushayri generally agrees with Kalabadhi's practical view of material poverty, but 
supports his arguments with a greater bulk of spiritual reasons. Among his list of spiritual 
stations, poverty ranks relatively high, but is followed by Sufism (tasawwuf). Like Sarraj and 
Kalabadhi, Qushayri engages in arguments about the physical manifestations of poverty, such 
as from whom, if anyone, one can accept gifts and the proper attitude the poor should 
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demonstrate towards the wealthy.311 He quotes al-Daqqaq approvingly, who says it is 
“preferable that a man be given enough to sustain himself and maintain himself within those 
limits.”312 The goal of poverty is not impoverishment then, but rather ridding oneself of 
unreasonable wants. For Qushayri, true poverty is fear of poverty and so the goal of material 
poverty is to free oneself from the prison of fear.313  
With Ansari, we see a greater emphasis on the spiritual attributes of poverty and less 
concern for its practical attributes. Ansari places poverty relatively low among the spiritual 
stations, listing it as number 48 out of 100, followed by wealth (ghani).314 Like Sarraj, however, 
he divides poverty into three kinds: compulsory, voluntary, and realized.315 These three 
categories do not directly relate to Sarraj's, though there is some overlap. Whereas Sarraj 
concerns himself primarily with the physical actions one may or may not take and only implies 
the inner state to which these actions may relate, Ansari's definitions revolve around the 
attitude one has towards poverty rather than the characteristics of one's poverty.     
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Hujwiri notes that poverty has both a form (rasm) and essence (haqiat) and in his 
writings we see the balance between discussing spiritual and material poverty prevalent in the 
work of later Persian poet Farid al-Din 'Attar. Like Qushayri and Kalabadhi before him, he 
notes that “poverty is being empty of desire not empty of provision.”316 He addresses a debate 
about the relative value of the stations of poverty and wealth, as Ansari had previously, but 
disagrees with those who argue that wealth is superior since it is an attribute of God whereas 
poverty is not. He argues that material wealth is both created and a means to an end, whereas 
divine wealth is both uncreated and an end itself, therefore human wealth and God's wealth 
cannot be compared.317 Turning this argument on its head, Hujwiri notes that wealth is not 
about the acquisition of “benefits, but of acquisition of the benefactor.”318 Thus true wealth is 
really just the opposite side of the coin of spiritual poverty, where the former focuses on the 
fullness of divine presence, and the latter emphasizes the absence of veils that may hinder the 
experience of such presence.  
All this discussion of the relationship between asceticism and Sufism, especially if we 
understand poverty as synechdochally standing in for renunciation, comes to a head in the 
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writings of Farid al-Din ‘Attar. By 'Attar's life time, the notion of poverty in Sufism had 
developed far beyond early Islamic asceticism. Concerned with both the practical aspects of 
material poverty and the benefits attained through spiritual poverty, Hujwiri's notion of 
poverty begins to resemble the multi-faceted concept of poverty 'Attar utilizes in his Manṭiq al-
Ṭayr—a concept which seems complex and expansive enough to warrant 'Attar's placement of 
it right beside annihilation (fana') as the final stage along the Sufi path. 
 
Spiritual Poverty  
In his book on the body in Sufism, Scott Kugle argues that the trials of the spiritual path 
are “like refining metal through intense heat: heat does not actually destroy the metal but 
rather burns away the impurities to create a substance that is still metal, but stronger.…”319 For 
'Attar this intense heat is provided by the notion of poverty, because poverty is the uniquely 
human condition. The primary difference between humans and angels, humans and Iblis, is 
that “Adam's makeup was molded of need.…”320 The Qur'anic statement that man was made in 
his own image has historically been interpreted in two ways. Either it means that humans were 
made to meet a preexisting pattern in the mind of God, implying a system similar to the 
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Platonic notion of Forms, or it means that humans were created in God's own image. 'Attar 
favors the latter of these two interpretations, seeing the human souls as actually being derived 
from divine essence. So how could a creature created in God's image also be a creature of 
need?  
According to one account, when God first created humans, Iblis went to inspect the 
new creation and discovered Adam to be hollow, which he interpreted as a sign of weakness, 
not suspecting what that hollowness was meant to be filled with.321 For 'Attar, this hollowness 
is filled with the Divine breath which was breathed into Adam to animate him. This mystery of 
creation, that humans should be a frail hollow shell somehow able to contain and encompass a 
portion of the divine, perplexed even Iblis. Thus “Adam's need distinguishes him sharply from 
all other creatures, who are satisfied with what they have.”322 For Ibn Arabi, “poverty is an 
affair that is inherent in everything other than God,” and while this may be so, it is only 
humans who realize their poverty because they have been created out of the combination of 
utter lack and overabundance, earth and divine breath, and thus feel their shortcoming.323 
Humans are only “possible being” which require the “Necessary Being” in order to actually 
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exist.324 It is this need that ends up being the greatest asset of humans, since it creates a space 
for union with the Divine, a space other beings do not have.  
When 'Attar speaks of spiritual poverty, it is this level of ultimate need for which he 
aspires, though there are other elements of poverty along the path. Spiritual poverty must 
start as material poverty because “initially poverty is renunciation of the world and all in it; 
ultimately it is annihilation.”325 Material poverty clears the path for spiritual poverty, because 
“to the degree that people find wealth and independence in themselves and see themselves as 
positive and good, they will be empty of love for God.”326 But material poverty cannot be an 
end in itself, for one can come to pride oneself on one's asceticism, which would be another 
barrier separating one from God. Thus spiritual poverty must also be cultivated because “only 
those who possess no perfection whatsoever can truly love God, for only they have absolute, 
unqualified need.”327 The story of Shaykh Ṣan'ān exemplifies the numerous layers of poverty 
along the spiritual path, and how for 'Attar it is not simply a single waystation near the 
beginning or end, but rather a constant presence along one's journey, and a necessary 
prerequisite to annihilation in God (fana').  
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The Story of Shaykh Ṣan'ān  
 The story of Shaykh Ṣan'ān is the single longest vignette in the Manṭiq al-Ṭayr at 434 
lines, and perhaps the most famous of the individual stories within the collection. It tells the 
story of a Shaykh, custodian of the Ka’ba, renowned for his piety, with numerous followers, 
perfect in his ritual observations, who one night dreams that he is worshiping an idol in 
Byzantium. Tormented by the thought of this dream, he travels to the city of his dream with 
his disciples and falls in love with a Christian girl who has no idea the Shaykh even exists. After 
a month she notices his obsession and decides to test it by asking him to forswear Islam, drink 
wine, burn the Qur'an, convert to Christianity and finally work as a swine herd for a year to 
prove his love. During this time his disciples abandon him in order to return to Mecca. When 
they arrive in Mecca, a loyal disciple and friend of the shaykh listens to their tales and 
nevertheless scolds them for abandoning their teacher, ordering them to return to Byzantium 
immediately and continue to follow their shaykh's example, even if that means herding pigs 
and converting to Christianity. During their return journey they pray daily until the loyal 
disciple is visited by Muhammad in a dream. The dream reveals that the shaykh has been freed 
from his obsession over the Christian girl and absolved of wrongdoing. The shaykh leaves 
Byzantium and is reunited with his disciples, resuming his life as a Sufi. But shortly after his 
 
 
151 
departure, the Christian girl realizes her love for the shaykh and leaves her royal life behind to 
pursue him through the desert, perishing from exhaustion just moments after catching up 
with the group and falling into the shaykh's arms.328 
This story is often read through the lens of passionate love; the Christian girl 
interpreted as analogous to God, for whom one gives up all sense of self just for a chance at 
proximity. It is also used to depict the importance of following one's shaykh, no matter how 
bizarre his/her requests and actions may seem. The most important lesson of the story, 
however, revolves around the subject of poverty, which it addresses in detail on all its various 
levels. The thread of poverty may not be obvious at first, because unlike the story of 'Attar's 
introduction to Sufism, outlined earlier, the story of Shaykh Ṣan'ān does not start with a main 
character engulfed in worldly pleasures. The shaykh is a long-time Sufi who has worn the 
patched frock for many years and lives in the Ka’ba in Mecca. One would assume that material 
poverty is not an issue for such a man. What the story reveals, however, is that though the 
shaykh was not weighed down by worldly goods, he was burdened with his positive reputation, 
students, and pride in his own spiritual attainments. The story of Shaykh Ṣan'ān is one in 
which a Sufi who has outwardly achieved a high station along the path, must begin his journey 
over again because of hidden barriers that are preventing his attainment of union with God. 
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The concept of poverty in Sufism is deep and multi-layered, but took many generations 
of writers discussing and refining the concept to gain such texture. 'Attar's Manṭiq al-Ṭayr uses 
numerous memorable stories, especially the tale of Shaykh Ṣan'ān, to explore and exemplify 
the complexity of the concept as it comes down to him. But 'Attar is not merely a recorder of 
Sufi thought. In his images and metaphors, he provides a rich pool of short-hand references 
for complex concepts, to which future authors and teachers can refer. Furthermore, by linking 
the concept of poverty so closely to annihilation (fana'), 'Attar gives the concept added 
importance as a metaphor for the spiritual journey itself.  
Previous thinkers had developed concepts of poverty that decoupled it from material 
poverty, indicating that true poverty is a state of mind; they warned against ostentatious 
material poverty standing in for true renunciation of worldly desire; but few had gone so far as 
to make poverty the necessary condition for spiritual attainment. Indeed as early Sufism 
distanced itself from early Islamic asceticism, the concept of poverty seemed to be losing 
importance as its definition became more complex and accompanied with greater 
qualifications. 'Attar reaffirmed the importance of poverty to the Sufi by making it the 
necessary condition for spiritual attainment. Those Sufis who came after 'Attar did not fail to 
miss the importance of poverty in his work, or the significance of his contribution to the 
concept. It is picked up by Rumi, who “often employs the term 'poverty' in a context showing 
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that it is synonymous with 'annihilation' and ‘nonexistence.’”329 His biographers also clearly 
understood the importance of poverty to 'Attar's understanding of Sufism, making it a central 
feature of his introduction to the Sufi path and his death. If we understand poverty as 
synechdochally representing all acts of austerity and renunciation (zuhd), then this analysis 
has revealed a clear trajectory of development, culminating in ‘Attar, in which early Sufi 
asceticism gives way to a mysticism which elevates the station of poverty above the need to 
outwardly practice it. But an alternate trajectory is also present, one best exemplified in the 
writings of Nizami Ganjavi.  
 
Conclusion 
As we have discussed in this chapter, rethinking religion and mysticism in terms of the 
body is an important avenue for better understanding of Sufi texts and contexts. Though 
materialist approaches to the study of religion encourage us to focus less on elite, textual 
output and more on the lived experiences of non-elites, several authors have noted a 
continued place for textual analysis in the growing field of religion and the body. Nevertheless, 
much discussion of the place of the body in Sufism has focused on ascetic practice, ranging 
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from sleep deprivation to self-mortification. Implicit within these discussions is the notion 
that men are speaking to other men about resisting bodily temptation. The varied kinds of 
bodily transformations sleep deprivation or extreme fasting might induce are framed around 
the male body. The potential threats the world can offer to distract a mystic often focus upon 
women and children. Within this conversation, little thought is given to this elevated 
valuation of the male human body over other kinds of bodies. The next two chapters will 
discuss the question of what kinds of bodies matter in greater detail, by first exploring the role 
of gender in the Sufi tradition and Nizami’s work. Following this, we will then explore the 
difference between human and non-human bodies, and Nizami’s playful refutation of 
Aristotelian notions of their relative worth and proximity to God. 
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CHAPTER 4: ASCENSION AS A MYSTICAL PARADIGM 
 
Devotion to Muhammad 
 
“Show me your relationship to Muhammad, and I’ll show you what kind of Muslim you 
are,” writes Omid Safi in his account of Muslim devotion to the Prophets memory.330 In 
Memories of Muhammad, Safi posits Muhammad less as a historical figure, and more as a 
repository for the hopes, dreams, fears, desires, and aspirations of various people over time 
and across space. Such a close examination of the relevance of Muhammad to Muslims seems 
timely in the wake of the Danish Cartoon Controversy, Charlie Hebdo, and the shootings in 
Waco, Texas, but Dr. Safi’s presentation of the Prophet may perplex or upset those who were 
most vocal in the protestation of these cartoons. 
As Jamal Elias highlights in Aisha’s Cushion, the cartoon controversy was not about 
Muslim aniconism, despite what Euro-American media sources might have said. He shows a 
long heritage of complex Muslim relations with figurative art and depictions of the Prophet. 
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What’s more, aniconism wouldn’t touch on non-Muslim use of images of the Prophet, where 
the question of improper worship is not at issue. He notes an early account of Muslims 
traveling to the Byzantine court. The Byzantine emperor, in questioning these messengers 
from Muhammad about their leader, pulls out a box containing portraits of each monotheistic 
prophet. After questioning whether the emissaries recognize the images of Adam and 
Abraham, the emperor then pulls out a portrait that is the exact image of Muhammad. Unlike 
with the other portraits, the narrative does not go on to describe the image depicted, but 
likewise the emissaries do not object to the emperor possessing this portrait. Rather, its 
existence serves as a confirmation of the Prophet’s place in the line of monotheistic 
messengers.331 As others have noted, the Danish Cartoon Controversy, then, is not about an 
irrational Muslim aniconism, which wouldn’t be at issue in this instance anyway, but rather 
about disrespectful depictions of the Prophet and the legacy of colonialism, war, Islamophobia, 
and discrimination that such disrespect highlights. 
That said, such defensiveness towards the Prophet’s image is somewhat paradoxical 
given the complicated relationship contemporary Muslims have with Muhammad and his 
legacy. Some Muslim modernists, interested in positing Islam as a rational system in accord 
with the scientific, but not cultural, developments of Western modernity have an unusual 
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circle to square. Muhammad is a figure of importance, the disrespectful depiction of whom is 
cause for anger and protest, but he cannot be too important. Saudi authorities who decried the 
Danish cartoons also strictly control access to the Prophet’s tomb and destroy potential sites 
and relics of devotion to his memory. He is the last great monotheistic Prophet, but, as we 
discussed in chapter one, the purity of his message is assured by his own passivity in its 
deliverance.332 He is utterly human, which affirms the importance of his Sunna—if he can do it, 
so can we.333 Yet at the same time, he is infallible—a position upon which, as Shahab Ahmed 
has highlighted, even Ibn Tamiyya would disagree with his modern interpreters. Not only do 
these modernist and Salafist positions hold in tension a simultaneous respect for and 
devaluation of the Prophet’s importance, they are also at odds with the vast majority of 
historical Muslim engagements with the Prophet and his legacy. 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr is acutely aware of the problems of contemporary portrayals of 
the Prophet, both among Muslim modernist apologists and Christian polemicists. His 
Muhammad: Man of God is written as an English-language introduction to Muhammad’s 
biography for those who don’t have access to Arabic source materials. Highly defensive in 
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tone, the book counters Western depictions of the Prophet as a lascivious war-monger, an 
image honed in Medieval Christian texts but recently re-deployed to fit contemporary geo-
political agendas. Rather than providing a comprehensive biography of the Prophet, he is 
instead interested in highlighting aspects of his life that Nasr feels are overlooked or 
underemphasized in contemporary accounts. Of prime interest to him are the spiritual aspects 
of Muhammad’s career. After a brief excursus into Muhammad’s first marriage to Khadija, Nasr 
immediately jumps to the first occasion of revelation. Here, he highlights Muhammad’s 
illiteracy as confirmation of the miraculous nature of the Qur’an. Lest one think this is simply 
Muhammad-as-Megaphone redux,334 Nasr follows this chapter with a discussion of the Miʿraj. 
It is fitting that the ascension should be discussed in close proximity to the first 
revelation, because it is one of the key events that confirms Muhammad’s status as a prophet. 
It serves a number of purposes in the hadith tradition, from etiological myth establishing daily 
prayer, to confirming Muhammad’s lineage amongst the biblical prophets, to providing a 
testament of faith. In hadith collections, the ascension often occurs under the section heading 
Iman,335 since the mir’aj is a test of the believers faith alongside other dogmatic matters such as 
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belief in the Day of Judgement or angels.336 The ascension thus also becomes a sticking point of 
belief—in the original narrative Abu Sufyan is cast as the doubter of Muhammad’s trip, Abu 
Bakr as faithful believer.  
Key among the ascensions purposes, however, is to confirm Muhammad’s prophethood. 
Hadith literature now places the tale of the washing of Muhammad’s heart in early childhood, 
in part as a shift in views on prophetic infallibility.337 The ascension was significant enough 
that in early hadith traditions, however, it was said to occur immediately before the mir’aj.338 
By lassoing it to the washing of the heart, and placing it shortly before the hijra the ascension 
comes to represent “an event in which the initiation of the Prophet is completed.”339 
 
Outline of the Ascension Narrative 
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Virtually every aspect of the ascension340 has been up for debate at some point in 
Islamic history. Questions have ranged from whether the ascension was physical, spiritual, or 
metaphorical to where Muhammad departed and returned from. Modernist thinkers such as 
Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan, have objected to mir’aj narratives based on their fabulosity. Other 
contemporary Muslims have discounted the ascension for the problematic influence of 
Isra’iliyyat in fleshing out the larger narrative. Yet others object to the materialistic 
descriptions of heaven, arguing that heaven cannot be captured in such mundane imagery. 
Fazlur Rahman attacks bodily ascension as part of his broader critique of hadith. More recent 
writers have even plugged the mir’aj story into ancient astronaut theories.341 Even the date of 
the occurrence has probably shifted. Traditionally it is placed on Monday, 12 Rabi' al-awwal, 
but Amir-Moezzi notes that this date seems to be largely symbolic, since it is also the date of 
his birth, death, first revelation and the hijra.342 It also marks the coming of spring, which, as 
                                                            
340 It is worth noting that though we will discuss the ascension here in the singular, it is not a given that 
Muhammad ascended to meet God only once. In many Shi'i traditions, Muhammad had as many as 120 heavenly 
ascensions. Amir-Moezzi, The Spirituality of Shi’i Islam,142. Buckley notes that initially, the Isra and Miʿraj seemed 
to be discussed as separate occurrences. In Sunni sources, consensus forms around one bodily ascension and 
multiple spiritual ascensions thereafter. R Buckley, The Night Journey and Ascension in Islam: The Reception of Religious 
Narrative in Sunnī, Shī’ī and Western Culture (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013). 
341 Ibid. 
342 Rubin, Eye of the Beholder, 190. 
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we shall see in chapter 5, is a key aspect of Nizami’s depiction of Muhammad’s ascent through 
the Zodiac.  
What follows is the general outline of the ascension based on Ibn Ishaq’s biography of 
Muhammad. Ibn Ishaq notes that his narrative is pieced together from the accounts of a 
number of Companions. For our purposes, it is notable that Hasan al-Basri is one of the sources 
of Ibn Ishaq’s account, since he was an important early ascetic who later becomes a 
foundational figure in the development of Sufism and transmission of Muhammad’s esoteric 
teachings to later generations. Medieval ascension narratives added to, amended, or 
rearranged elements of this tale according to genre conventions and rhetorical function, but 
Ibn Ishaq’s account will provide us a baseline for comparison.  
One night, Muhammad is sleeping beside the Kaba and is awoken by the angel Gabriel. 
Gabriel escorts the prophet to the door of the mosque and shows him a white “half mule, half 
donkey” whose strides spanned “the limit of its sight.”343 He mounted this creature, called 
Buraq, and swiftly travelled to Jerusalem where he meets a number of prior prophets, whom 
he leads in prayer. He is then offered a choice of drink—in this account he may choose between 
milk and wine—and chooses the milk. Gabriel then explains that because of this apt choice, 
                                                            
343 Ibn Ishaq, 182. 
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wine is forbidden to Muhammad and his people.344 At this point, a ladder descended from 
heaven and Gabriel and Muhammad climb to the gates of heaven together. The angel Ismail 
greets them and asks Gabriel if Muhammad has been sent for, which Gabriel confirms. At this, 
Ismail allows them to enter heaven. He then meets the angel Malik who shows him a vision of 
hell, which is described as a blast of flames that Muhammad fears will consume all creation. He 
is then shown a number of people being punished for the sins of stealing from orphans, usury, 
and adultery. From here, Muhammad leaves the first heaven and ascends the remaining 6 
levels of heaven, encountering a different prophet or prophets at each level along the way. In 
Ibn Ishaq’s account the prophets occur in the following order: though we will see how this 
varies in other ascension narratives later in the chapter:  
2nd Heaven: Jesus and John the Baptist 
3rd Heaven: Joseph 
4th Heaven: Idris345  
5th Heaven: Aaron (Moses’ brother) 
6th Heaven: Moses 
                                                            
344 This appears to serve as an etiological myth explaining the prohibition on wine and clarifying the three 
differing Qur’anic verses on the topic. Qur’an 4:43 advocates bodily purity in prayer, which includes sobriety. 
2:219 argues that wine (ﺮْﻤَﺨْﻟا), along with gambling, has some benefits, but is a greater source of sin (ﻢِۡﺛإ). In 5:90, 
wine, gambling, idol worship and divination are lumped together as abominations (ﺲۡﺟِر). Ibn Ishaq’s biography 
was penned before the legal tradition had formulated its theories of abrogation to account for seemingly 
contradictory Qur’an verses, so this part of the ascension story might have served s similar purpose for earlier 
communities. 
345 Idris is often associated with Enoch, father of Methuselah, in the Book of Genesis. 
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7th Heaven: Abraham346 
 
After meeting Abraham, he is taken to “Paradise” where he meets his companion 
Zayd’s heavenly wife, a compensation for his failed marriage to Zaynab, whom the prophet 
later married. Finally, Muhammad meets with God who requests that Muhammad and his 
people pray 50 times per day. When he returns to the 6th Heaven, Moses notes that this is too 
much to ask of people and advises that he return to request a reduction. Muhammad gets 
several incremental reductions to the prayer obligations, with Moses continuing to object to 
the heavy prayer burden. Finally, when the daily prayer is reduced to five, Muhammad is too 
embarrassed to request a further reduction.  
This is where the ascension narrative ends in Ibn Ishaq. Issues of Muhammad’s return 
to Mecca from heaven and Jerusalem are notably handled in relation to the first part of the 
narrative, the night journey to Jerusalem. Here, the emphasis is on the miraculous nature of 
                                                            
346 Frederick Colby and Maria Subtelny have both noted that the location and order of the prophets changes 
depending on the ascension narrative. Subtelny argues that the order of the prophets can be used as a tool of 
polemic or conversion, depending upon the religious community to which the ascension narrative is targeted. 
She states, for example, that ascension narratives circulating amongst Jewish communities with a Christian 
population will remove Jesus from the first heaven, but place Adam in the seventh, with Adam symbolizing both 
himself and Jesus, the second Adam—an attempt not to upset Jewish sensibilities, while appeasing Christian ones. 
Maria E. Subtelny, “Jews at the Edge of the World in a Timurid-Era Miʿrājnāma: The Islamic Ascension Narrative as 
Missionary Text,”  The Prophet’s Ascension: Cross-Cultural Encounters with the Islamic Miʿraj Tales, Christiane Gruber 
and Frederick S. Colby, eds.,  (Indiana University Press, 2010), 50-66. 
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Muhammad’s swift journey as a testament of faith, as well as the proofs he offered of the 
physicality of his journey.  
 
Qur’anic Sources for Ascension Narratives 
 
For centuries after Muhammad’s death, two Qur’anic verses have been subjected to 
intense scrutiny and debate by Muslim scholars and intellectual elites across a range of 
disciplines and theological inclinations. Eventually biographers of Muhammad’s life, Qur’anic 
interpreters, and scholars of Islamic Law came to agree that these verses all referred to a single 
event involving the Prophet’s ascension into heaven in a single evening. It is at this point that 
agreement ends. Debates as to whether the “farthest mosque” (al-masjid al-aqsa) was located in 
heaven or Jerusalem abounded. Legal scholars and theologians differed on the significance to 
be drawn from the heavenly journey, the latter arguing that it confirmed Muhammad’s pre-
eminence among the prophets, the former pointing to it as the moment in which Muhammad 
negotiated with God over daily prayer requirements. Perhaps the most long-lasting and 
theologically significant debate, however, involved the question of whether the Prophet 
ascended to heaven bodily, or spiritually, or only in a dream state. By the 13th century, these 
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issues were resolved well enough that long works embellishing upon the sparse Qur’anic 
outlines of the Prophetic ascension narrative were being produced in both Arabic and Persian.  
Miʿraj narratives invite a great deal of debate and creativity, in part because the tale 
itself is so evocative, inviting questions such as: what does heaven look like? Who does 
Muhammad meet along the way? What does God say to Muhammad? The Qur’an is relatively 
abstruse on these issues. From the Qur’anic verses that have generally been interpreted as 
discussing the Miʿraj, we learn that 1) Muhammad was shown the signs of God (Surat al-Isra 
17:1), 2) that Muhammad drew within “two-bows lengths” of God (Surat al-Najm 53:8-18) at the 
Lote Tree of Farthest Limit, and 3) That the Prophet did not turn away from what he saw.347 
Beyond these two key passages, a number of other verses have been interpreted as involving 
the ascension. For example, later exegetes come to interpret verses where the prophet is being 
guided by God as relating to the mir’aj.348  Other information, such as Muhammad’s mount, 
Boraq, his accompaniment by Gabriel, the prophets he met along the way, etc are filled in by 
biographic and hadith literature. About a century after the Prophet Muhammad’s death, by the 
                                                            
347 Even these issues, however, are up for debate. Some commentators have argued that it is the angel Gabriel, not 
God, that draws close to Muhammad by two bows lengths in Surat al-Najm. 
348 The theory here is that the prophet was perfect in matters of religious practice and knowledge, and so could 
not have needed divine guidance for anything but navigating the terrain of heaven. See Rubin, Eye of the Beholder, 
96. 
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time of Ibn Ishaq’a Sira, we have the outlines of a complete journey to heaven and back.349 In 
this section, I will examine some of the Qur’an verses on the ascension and their impact on 
later ascension narratives.   
 
Surat al-Isra 
Glory be to Him Who carried His servant by night from the Sacred Mosque to the 
Farthest Mosque, whose precincts We have blessed, that We might show him some of 
Our signs. Truly He is the Hearer, the Seer. 
 - Qurʾan, 17:1350 
 
The broad contours of the first part of the Night Journey and Ascension can be found in 
Surat al-Isra, the seventeenth chapter of the Qur’an. This Sura is traditionally titled after the 
third Arabic word in the first verse, which becomes a proper name for the event described in 
the rest of the verse. Though this verse becomes a Qur’anic touchstone for later ascension 
narratives, it is worth noting that the meaning of this verse is ambiguous without the details 
provided by later hadith and biographical literature. Maria Massi Dakake, in her footnotes to 
Surat al-Isra in the Study Qur’an, provides over a page of commentary on this one verse, 
                                                            
349 Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad. 
350 Seyyed Hossein Nasr et al., The Study Quran: A New Translation and Commentary, Tra edition (New York, NY: 
HarperOne, 2015), 694. 
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outlining this its place in the broader miʿraj narrative.351 Generally, this verse is said to refer to 
Muhammad’s overland journey from Mecca to Jerusalem.352 Though the identity of “the 
servant” is not explicit here, Muslim exegetical work has almost universally interpreted this to 
mean the Prophet Muhammad.353 The location of the Farthest Mosque (Masjid al-aqsa), 
however, was a subject of debate, opinion eventually settled on the former site of the Temple 
in Jerusalem.354 This lead to a number of questions about the nature of Muhammad’s journey. If 
he departed at night, and in most narratives was awoken from sleep to make the journey, why 
did he depart from the mosque in Mecca rather than his bed?355 How was he able to travel such 
a large distance in one evening?356  As we shall discuss later in the chapter, the difficulty 
Muhammad’s contemporaries have in answering these questions eventually become part of 
the story of the night journey itself. 
                                                            
351 Ibid., 694-695. 
352 Some early hadith narratives argue that this verse encapsulates the entirety of the miʿraj. 
353 Frederick S. Colby, Narrating Muhammad’s Night Journey: Tracing the Development of the Ibn Abbas Ascension 
Discourse (State University of New York Press, 2009), 14. 
354 Early sources seem to indicate that the isra took place entirely within the precincts of Mecca or that the Masjid 
al-aqsa is located  in heaven. The shift to Jerusalem seems to have occurred during the Umayyad period, perhaps 
as a form of religious competition with Christians. See, for example, Rubin, The Eye of the Beholder, 65. 
355 Early accounts have him departing either from his own bed or from the house of his relative, Umm Hāniʾ. 
356 Later commentators make this a key point of discussion. For some, belief in the prophet’s ability to physically 
make the journey in one night becomes dogma. Others attempt to argue how such a feat is physically possible. Yet 
others argue for a metaphorical reading of the passage. 
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Also of note in this passage is the question of what “show him some of Our signs 
[ayatna]” might mean. While some have interpreted this, especially because of the use of the 
word “signs” as an indication of a moment of Qur’anic revelation, others have argued that this 
refers to the revelation of the daily prayer requirements. Sufi interpretations tend to argue 
that the content of these signs are left purposely ambiguous, since they are mystical secrets 
only for the spiritual elite.357  
 
 
Surat al-Najm 
Endowed with surpassing power, who in time manifested himself in his true shape and 
nature, / appearing in the horizon’s loftiest part, / and then drew near, and came close, 
/ until he was but two bow-lengths away, or even nearer. / And thus did [God] reveal 
unto His servant whatever He deemed right to reveal. / The [servant’s] heart did not 
give the lie to what he saw: / will you, then, contend with him as to what he saw? / 
And, indeed, he saw him a second time / by the lote-tree of the farthest limit, / near 
unto the garden of promise. / With the lote-tree veiled in a veil of nameless splendor… 
/ the eye did not waver, nor yet did it stray: / truly did he see some of the most 
profound of his Sustainer’s symbols. 
 - Qurʾan 53:6-18 
 
                                                            
357 Colby, Narrating Muhammad’s Night Journey, 16. 
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These verses come from Surat al-Najm in the context of defending the veracity of 
Muhammad’s message as “naught but a revelation revealed.”358 Thus it can be placed in line 
with the Qur’anic passages that take pains to distinguish Muhammad’s revelations from 
poetry, soothsaying, and fakery.359 For this reason, some interpreters have argued against 
reading this passage as an account of the mir’aj. They instead argue that the one who “drew 
near, and came close” is the Angel Gabriel, who is drawing near to Muhammad, rather than 
Muhammad drawing near to God.360  
In spite of this ambiguity, a host of other interpreters, including most Sufi readers, 
have argued that this is an account of Muhammad’s ascension to heaven to have a direct 
encounter with God. The imagery of this passage is particularly potent for poets and mystics, 
who reflect on the question of how proximate “two bow-lengths” might be. Likewise, as we see 
in Nizami’s own writing, the image of a tree marking a dividing line between God and material 
creation, which Muhammad can bodily pass, is particularly evocative for poets and mystics. 
Nizami, for example, has the Lote Tree subordinate itself Muhammad in various ways, from 
                                                            
358 Qur’an 53:4. 
359 See chapter 4 for an extended discussion of these issues. 
360 This interpretation is made explicit in some translations of the verse, such as Mohsin Khan’s English 
translation which inserts Gabriel’s name in brackets in these verses to remove all ambiguity. 
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bowing down to him, to becoming and adornment on his shirt.361 In each case the indication is 
that Muhammad’s direct encounter with God elevates him above the status of even this 
symbolic barrier between God and creation. 
 
Ascension Narratives and Muslim Identity 
 
Over the past decade, a handful of monographs and edited volumes have expanded our 
understanding of the Mir‘aj and its role in identity formation in the early and medieval Muslim 
community. Unlike earlier scholarly works on the Prophet’s biography, which are interested in 
source tracing and critical approaches to hagiographic material, these contemporary works 
are less interested in the “quest for the historical Muhammad” and more interested in 
excavating historical Muslim engagement with Muhammad’s legacy. Brook Vucovic’s book 
title, Heavenly Journeys, Earthly Concerns, perhaps most clearly highlights the focus of these new 
investigations. Rather than focus upon what Muhammad’s vision of heaven can tell us about 
the afterlife or God, she is instead interested in what these accounts tell us about relationships 
between the Muslims who read, share, expand upon and transmit these accounts.362 
                                                            
361 Nizami Ganjavi, Makhzan al-asrar, 24.  
362 Brooke Olson Vuckovic, Heavenly Journeys, Earthly Concerns: The Legacy of the Miʿraj in the Formation of Islam 
(Routledge, 2004). 
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Vucovic states quite clearly that she is disinterested in source-hunting, and instead 
wants to investigate Muslim engagement with the Prophet’s legacy. Of particular interest to 
her are the ways in which medieval Arabic accounts of the Mir‘aj are used to define the Muslim 
community in relation to other monotheist traditions and then define rules of praxis within 
this clearly bounded community. Citing Fred Donner’s work on the early community of 
believers, she notes that Muslim identity, as distinct from other monotheistic groups, is rather 
late in coming.363 As Donner clearly depicts in Muhammad and the Believers, the Arabic nature of 
Muhammad’s message, the structure of Umayyad taxation practices, and the disinterest in 
conversion along with a relatively slow rate of conversion to Islam among conquered peoples, 
meant that distinguishing Muhammad’s followers from other monotheists was not a pressing 
concern for the early community.364 For Vucovic, continued engagements with Zoroastrians 
and Christians, as well as political and military encounters with the reduced Byzantine Empire, 
necessitated such boundary drawing. She highlights how Muhammad’s encounter with the 
Prophets on his ascent serves to subordinate Muhammad’s mission to those of previous 
messengers. This develops alongside triumphalist notions of the “seal of prophecy” as not just 
a confirmation of Muhammad’s mission, but also a lid on future revelation.  
                                                            
363 Ibid., 42. 
364 Fred M. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers: At the Origins of Islam, Reprint (Belknap Press, 2012). 
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In Christiane Gruber and Frederick Colby’s collected volume, The Prophet’s Ascension, 
Maria Subtleney writes on the role of ascension narratives in outreach to and conversion of 
non-Muslim communities in the Timurid era. She notes that her Mirajnama was often bundled 
with Attar’s Tazkirat al-Awliya, a text which features delightful stories of the feats of Muslim 
saints—at times highlighting their engagements with non-Muslim figures. She notes the 
symbolic overlap between this Mir‘aj account and images from the religious traditions Muslims 
are encountering and attempting to convert. Especially important in this work is the unusual 
order of the prophets in heaven. Jesus is not mentioned in this ascension narrative, which 
Subtleney reads as an effort not to offend the intended Jewish audience of the text. Adam, 
however, is placed in the highest, rather than lowest level of heaven. She argues that this is a 
nod to savvy Christians who would understand Jesus as the Second Adam. Likewise she notes 
that angelic figures, such as the half-snow, half-fire angel have precedence in Jewish midrashic 
texts on Moses’ ascension365. Similarly, Colby argues in Narrating Muhammad’s Night Journey, 
that the rooster angel is derived from Zoroastrian heavenly imagery.366 The supersessionist 
message directed at these non-Muslim communities is clear: your previous belief system can 
remain intact, it is just subordinate to Muhammad’s revelation.  
                                                            
365 Subtleny, “The Jews at the Edge of the World.” 
366 Colby, Narrating Muhammad’s Night Journey. 
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Colby’s monograph takes a different tack to this material. While Colby is not interested 
in source hunting for the sake of verifying authenticity, he is interested in tracing the hadith 
materials which inform medieval ascension narratives in order to understand how sectarian 
debates might have influenced the development of these texts. Earlier scholarship on the 
Prophet’s biography incorrectly identified the Sira as a late-developing genre based on hadith. 
Thus, to discover the “real” Muhammad, one must bypass the Sira in favor of hadith literature. 
Recent scholarship on both Sira and hadith has revealed that Ibn Ishaq’s biography of the 
Prophet might actually be a relatively early collection of stories about the Prophet, with hadith 
material being a later accretion of the jurisprudential system.367 Colby likewise notes that Ibn 
Ishaq’s Sira is not the beginning and end of the ascension tale, but that hadith material traced 
back to one transmitter—Ibn Abbas—becomes a source of creative re-interpretation of the 
ascension narrative throughout the medieval period. By the 15th century, he notes, we have 
two distinct Ibn Abbas recensions of the Mir‘aj—one shorter and one longer. Though much 
remains the same between the two, the order of events shifts a bit, as does the detail into 
which each narrative goes regarding Muhammad’s experience on each level of heaven. Colby is 
interested both in how this narrative develops Muhammad as an intercessory figure and the 
ways in which the development of the Ibn Abbas narratives seem to be influenced by 
                                                            
367 See, for example, Rubin’s Eye of the Beholder. 
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Sunni/Shi‘a debates. In relation to the first topic, he emphasizes Muhammad’s selflessness in 
his encounter with God. Whereas previous prophets trembled in the face of God, asking for 
personal salvation on the day of judgment, Muhammad asks for salvation for his community. 
The message to non-Muslim readers is clear—your own prophet will be too frightened to speak 
up for you on the day of judgment. It is better to throw your lot in with the one who will: 
Muhammad. In relation to the Sunni/Shi‘i debates, he notes that visions of the cosmic 
Muhammad triumphant seem to come out of a textual escalation in relation to narratives 
which place ‘Ali at the throne of God before Muhammad arrives.368 
These Shi‘i triumphalist narratives are discussed by Christiane Gruber in relation to 
Safavid political realities and by Vernon Schubel regarding Bektashi and later Alawite 
portrayals of the ascension.369 For Gruber, Shah Ismail is especially keen to associate himself 
with Muhammad as a renewer and redeemer. As such, he commissioned miniatures of the 
ascension in Nizami’s Khamsa which feature, for the first time in artistic depictions of the 
ascension, an oculus in the sky and a veil over Muhammad’s face. For Gruber, the veil is meant 
                                                            
368 Colby, Narrating Muhammad’s Night Journey. 
369 Christiane Gruber, “When Nubuvvat Encounters Valāyat: Safavid Paintings of the Prophet Mohammad’s Mi’rāj, 
C. 1500-50,” in The Art and Material Culture of Iranian Shi’ism: Iconography and Religious Devotion in Shi’i Islam, ed. 
Pedram Khosronejad (I. B. Tauris, 2011), 25–45; Vernon Schubel, “‘When the Prophet Went on a Mirac, He Saw a 
Lion on the Road.,’” in The Prophet’s Ascension: Cross-Cultural Encounters with the Islamic Miʿraj Tales, ed. Christiane 
Gruber and Frederick S. Colby (Indiana University Press, 2010).  
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to obscure the Prophet’s face not out of aniconic concerns, but rather to facilitate an elision 
between the Prophet’s face and Shah Ismail’s. Likewise, the oculus represents the veil-rending 
power of the renewer, who provides direct access to God.370 For Schubel, Bektashi and Alawite 
ascension narratives contrast Muhammad as the exoteric prophet and Ali as the esoteric font 
of divine wisdom. In these accounts, Muhammad encounters a lion on his ascension into 
heaven, and gives him his signet ring to ward him off. Later, as he approaches the Throne, he 
sees Ali has arrived there before him, wearing the same signet ring bequeathed to the lion. 
This is taken as a symbol both of Ali’s place as rightful successor to the prophet and as an 
indication of his pre-eminence in spiritual understanding—Ali was already a party to mysteries 
that Muhammad had to have explained.371  
Finally, both Gruber and Vukovic highlight the role that ascension narratives play in 
governing community norms amongst Muslims. For Vukovic, the visions of torture and 
punishment for earthly deeds serves to make explicit Quranic imperatives against backbiting 
or stealing from orphans, for example372. Such texts were used as teaching tools to instruct 
new and young Muslims through fearful images of future punishment. In Gruber’s monograph, 
                                                            
370 Gruber, “When Nubuvvat Encounters Valāyat” 
371 Schubel, “When the Prophet Went on a Mirac, He Saw a Lion on the Road.” 
372 Vuckovic, Heavenly Journeys, Earthly Concerns. 
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The Ilkhanid Book of Ascension, Muhammad’s ritual encounters on the ascension are of utmost 
importance. Besides describing why one must pray five-times a day, through the common story 
of Muhammad negotiating with God for a reduction in prayer obligations at Moses’ urging, this 
book also highlights how one should pray. Gruber notes that images accompanying the scenes 
of Muhammad leading the prophets and angels in prayer each highlight proper bodily 
comportment in each stage of prayer. Such a book then becomes an instructional guide for 
new Muslims—confirming the ascension’s central position in establishing the boundary 
between their new and old religious communities. Not only does Muhammad’s ascension 
confirm his primacy over previous dispensations, but it brings with it a new and distinct ritual 
package.373 
 
Body and Ascension 
 
 Returning to Nasr’s apologetic account of the ascension, we must note the importance 
of the body to his understanding of the miraculous nature of the mir’aj.  Nasr directly addresses 
contemporary Muslims who are keen to reject the bodily ascension.374 He notes that scientific 
                                                            
373 Christiane Gruber, The Ilkhanid Book of Ascension: A Persian-Sunni Prayer Manual (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010). 
374 Arguments for a physical miʿraj begin with Tabari, who shows that the miʿraj as both miracle and non-
allegorical necessitate a physical ascension. Arguments from Fakr al-Din Razi onwards focus on whether or not 
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rationalism can’t tell us about higher planes of existence, but that the bodily ascension is 
necessary to confirm the inherent dignity of creation and the human being. Nasr’s approach 
here is interesting, because it, unlike traditional arguments for bodily ascension, such as those 
of Tabari or Fakr al-Din Razi,375 separates the material realm into distinct levels. Likewise, 
rather than emphasize the bodily ascension as an important confirmation of God’s 
omnipotence and Muhammad’s uniqueness, Nasr’s take on the ascension confers dignity on all 
humanity, diffusing the intercessory implications of medieval approaches to the miʿraj and 
marking a clear boundary between Islam and Christianity, since the latter does not dignify 
human embodiment. Here, Nasr is joining a long tradition of authors who use the Prophet’s 
ascension to mark a boundary between Muhammad’s community and other monotheists.  
In the very next chapter, Nasr devotes his time to emphasizing the importance of the 
miʿraj’s occurrence before the hijra. He notes that one must have a change of heart before one 
                                                            
fast movement is theoretically possible—he argues it is on both scientific and scriptural grounds (e.g. movement 
of the sun, speed of eye-rays in extravision, movement of satan). Ibn Sina denies a bodily ascension, arguing it was 
spiritual and the material elements of the description are metaphorical (more on this in chapter 5). Buckley, The 
Night Journey and Ascension in Islam. 
375 Razi, in particular, spills a great deal of ink discussing how the isra might have been possible without breaking 
the laws of the universe. Sighting both the speed of Satan and the speed of eye-rays used in sight, based on a 
theory of extraversion, Razi argues that since other material objects can and do travel at near infinite speeds, so 
too might the Prophet have been granted such speed. 
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can change the world.376 In a dig at modernist Muslims who see Muhammad primarily as a 
nation-builder, Nasr warns against seeking to change the world without first seeking to change 
themselves. Such a sentiment is echoed in Omid Safi’s concept of the “Muhammadi 
Revolution” which calls for a revolution of heart on Muhammad’s model as an avenue for or 
precursor to positive political change.377  
Buckley focuses much more keenly on the development of notions of a bodily ascension 
and contemporary rejections of this trope. He traces the historical development of arguments 
for bodily ascension back to the earliest source materials. Though important Muslim thinkers, 
such as Ibn Sina, have rejected the bodily ascension, he notes that from very early on both 
Sunni and Shi‘i authors accepted the concept of one bodily ascension, positing multiple 
spiritual ascensions afterwards. Buckley’s tracing of the historical tradition makes 
contemporary Muslim rejections of bodily ascension all the more problematic, considering the 
place the Mir‘aj has historically played as a testament of faith in Muhammad’s prophethood. As 
numerous other authors on this list note, the ascension of Muhammad plays an important role 
in drawing community boundaries. What Buckley highlights, however, is that before the Mir‘aj 
                                                            
376 Perhaps a subtle gesture to the cleansing of the heart story, which Uri Rubin helpfully traces through the 
hadith tradition. 
377 Safi, Memories of Muhammad. 
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was used to distinguish sectarian or inter-religious identities between monotheists, it was used 
to mark those who did and did not support Muhammad’s mission.378  
Several versions of the ascension narrative foreshadow the disbelief with which 
Muhammad’s tale will be met, with various characters warning Muhammad not to share his 
experience with the Meccans. When he does declare it, he is met with disbelief. Some 
traditions resolve this disbelief by having the Prophet produce proof of his ‘isra, such as 
detailed descriptions of Jerusalem or information about caravans travelling between Mecca 
and Jerusalem which he passed during the night journey.379 Buckley is quick to mention, 
however, that early traditions seemed to keep separate the ‘isra and mir‘aj, only later 
combining them into a single outing in the same night. This combination allows the proofs of 
the ‘isra to also serve as confirmation of the mir‘aj. In other discussions of the ascension, 
however, there is no suitable confirmation of Muhammad’s travels—it is an article of faith 
which divides those who believe, such as Abu Bakr (from whence, by some accounts, he attains 
his nickname Siddiq) and Abu Jahl. Tabari highlights the importance of the irrational, 
unproven bodily ascension as proof of Muhammad’s prophecy. For Tabari, the Mir‘aj must be a 
miracle, and it is only miraculous if it occurs bodily. He notes that were Muhammad’s 
                                                            
378 Buckley, The Night Journey and Ascension in Islam. 
379 Ibn Ishaq, 183. 
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ascension spiritual or metaphorical, it would not be a miracle. Yet it must be a miracle to 
confirm Muhammad’s special role as Prophet. Through this tautology, he confirms that belief 
in Muhammad’s bodily ascension as a pre-requisite for membership in the Muslim community. 
From this very early period, then, belief in the bodily ascension of the Prophet, despite lack of 
proof, becomes a marker of those who are within the Muslim community and those who 
remain in ignorance.380 
Buckley also discusses later thinkers who attempt to rationally prove the bodily 
ascension is possible. Fakr al-Din Razi, and many after him, focus on the possibility of fast 
travel as essential to their proofs. For these thinkers, miraculous acts can push the physical 
laws of the universe to their limits, but cannot break them, so it seems. One question involves 
the physical wholenesss of the spheres. Muhammad must “break through” them in order to 
ascend to a higher sphere—but such rupture would leave a hole. Questions of whether or not 
this hole could be repaired or the implication of the hole for the perfection of the spheres 
abounded. Of greater concern is whether or not this journey could occur in one night. Fakr al-
Din Razi turns to both scientific and scriptural sources for such confirmation. Sighting the 
speed at which the sun moves through the sky, he notes such movement is easily possible. He 
also relies on a theory of sight involving extra-vision. Noting that eye-rays move at impossibly 
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quick speed in order to facilitate sight, he again argues that such speedy movement is well 
within God’s power within the limits of the material world. In terms of scriptural proofs, Razi 
cites verses related to Solomon and Bilquis which mention movement between Jerusalem and 
Yemen occurring within “a twinkling of an eye.” He also cites the speed at which Satan can 
move to spread whispers and deceit among believers.381  
Such a tradition of scientific rationalization of the bodily ascension obviously runs into 
difficulty as the scientific understanding of the cosmos changes. As some contemporary 
Egyptian thinkers have noted, the idea of an ascension through the spheres becomes absurd 
once astronauts have landed on the moon. Contemporary Muslims are left with a few 
possibilities for discussing the Mir‘aj: 1) reject the physical ascension outright; 2) mark the 
physical ascension as happening in a different realm of reality (as Nasr does); 3) apply Ancient 
Astronaut theories of alien space visitation to the ascension. None of these solutions are ideal. 
In the latter approach, Buraq and the rafraf become pre-modern descriptions of alien space 
vehicles. In Nasr’s approach, the line between metaphorical ascension and physical ascension 
becomes a bit wobbly. And in the former approach, Muslims run into the problem of the 
miraculous ascension as litmus test of faith. Buckley notes several modernist objections to the 
physical ascension. Some, such as Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan, posit the physical ascension as a 
                                                            
381 Buckley, The Night Journey and Ascension in Islam. 
 
 
182 
byproduct of the wild medieval imagination. Others note the problematic influence of 
Israeliyyat in the development of ascension narratives—such rejections go hand-in-hand with 
denigration of the hadith tradition in general, but are also tinged with a suspicion of Jewish 
motives and reliability based in contemporary political concerns over the modern nation state 
of Israel.  
In short, though contemporary Muslims may wish to get away from medieval 
depictions of the Prophet’s bodily ascension, the Mir‘aj remains an important issue with which 
they must grapple. Buckley highlights that it remains significant because of its early role in 
defining the boundaries of community. Contemporary scholarly approaches to the ascension 
further enrich our understanding of just how significant Mir‘aj accounts were to the 
development of Muslim identity in the medieval period. In the next chapter, we will explore 
how the community-drawing aspects of ascension narratives play a role in defining Sufism and 
the goal of the mystical path. 
 
Ascension as Paradigm for Mystical Experience 
 
In the previous section I discussed the Qur’anic underpinnings of the ascension 
narrative, its general contours in sira literature, and its importance in defining and negotiating 
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sectarian boundaries in the medieval period.  This chapter will explore the role of the 
ascension in Sufi writing, where it acts as a key metaphor for the Sufi path. A variety of Sufi 
authors have used the ascension to authorize their own practices, argue for their personal 
spiritual authority, or even assert the primacy of Sufi piety over other forms of Muslim 
devotion. In this chapter I will argue that Nizami’s ascension narratives fit this paradigm, 
asserting the centrality of the mir’aj in the prophet’s career and the superiority of direct 
mystical knowledge over other forms of piety, knowledge, and authority. 
A number of scholars and commentators have noted the important role the ascension 
has played as a paradigm for mystical experience.382 Several features of the ascension made it 
particularly fruitful for Sufi exploration and explication. Muhammad’s journey through the 
seven heavens, for example, was frequently analogized to the stages of the Sufi path. His face-
to-face encounter with God comes to represent the goal of the Sufi path: mystical union with 
God. 
We see early evidence of the use of the mir’aj by Sufis in the writings of Abu Abd al-
Rahman Sulami (d. 412 AH/1021 CE). Sulami was an important early biographer of Sufi saints, 
whose writings helped to consolidate and mark the boundaries of the Sufi tradition. In 
Subtleties of the Ascension, Sulami collects fifty-six sayings by earlier Sufis on the topic of the 
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mir’aj. In Fredrick Colby’s translation and commentary on Sulami’s work, he notes 4 major 
themes in the collected sayings:383  
1) The ascension as confirmation of Muhammad’s unique position among created 
beings.384  
2) The ascension as an initiatory journey in which Muhammad gets clothed in garments 
of light.385 
3) Muhammad’s vision of God as a model for Sufi mystical encounters.386  
4) The ineffability of mystical encounters.  
Thus, for Sulami, Muhammad is an ontologically unique being who nevertheless 
provides a model for Sufi practice. He provides a model in four different ways: confirming the 
necessity of approaching God through stages,387 affirming the practice of garment bestowal as 
                                                            
383 Frederick S. Colby, The Subtleties of the Ascension: Lata’if Al-Miʿraj: Early Mystical Sayings on Muhammad’s Heavenly 
Journey (Fons Vitae, 2006), 16–20. 
384 We’ve seen this theme before, especially in relation to Muhammad’s status as intercessor on the Day of 
Judgment. Many Sufi writers link Muhammad’s departure from Gabriel at the Lote Tree as a paradigmatic 
instance of fana or annihilation in God. 
385 As we will see later in this chapter, garment bestowal is a typical Sufi symbol of investiture that becomes a 
critical feature of Nizami’s own ascension narratives. 
386 For Sulami, Muhammad’s ability to see God provides a way around the Qur’anic interdiction of such a vision. 
See Colby, Subtleties of the Ascension, xx. The wording here is especially important, for as Zargar notes in Sufi 
Aesthetics, ru’yah is the highest mode of Divine vision and requires a divine unveiling to occur (13-15). 
387 For example, in one saying, an anonymous commentator asserts that Muhammad’s journey through the seven 
heavens was “so that he would learn propriety” before encountering God directly. Colby, The Subtleties of the 
Ascension, 41. The implication here is that Sufis too must learn proper manners before a direct encounter with 
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sign of acquiring spiritual authority, highlighting the dangers of temptation along the path 
and the importance of rejecting lesser heavenly rewards in favor of a direct encounter with 
God, and, finally, asserting the difficulty and potential danger in putting into words what one 
experiences in God’s presence. As we shall see, these themes all arise, to lesser or greater 
degrees in Nizami’s writing as well.  
In Sulami’s work, the ascension is primarily a metaphor for the Sufi path. One might 
compare and contrast Sulami’s understanding of the ascension with Ibn Sina’s approach. 388For 
Ibn Sina, the ascension is not an embodied, but a spiritual occurrence depicted through 
embodied metaphors. A lengthy discussion of Ibn Sina’s psychology and cosmology is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, but in short, for Ibn Sina, the Prophet’s heavenly journey occurred in 
the Ilm al-Mithal, realm of similitudes.389 For Ibn Sina, Buraq is a metaphor for the Active 
Intellect who descends to take Muhammad for an encounter with the Intelligibles. As a 
Prophet, describing these non-material forms in language is not a problem—Muhammad’s 
perfected Imaginative Faculty does that work for him. Thus Ibn Sina is able to draw one-to-one 
                                                            
God, and that the stages along the Sufi path provide an analogous experience to Muhammad’s encounter with 
angles and prophets on his ascent. 
388 Peter Heath, Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna (Ibn Sina): With a Translation of the Book of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
Ascent to Heaven (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992). 
389 See chapter 4 for more information on this topic and how it relates to mysticism and Muhammad’s role as 
prophet. 
 
 
186 
parallels between Muhammad’s metaphorical description of his ascent, which is meant for the 
masses, and his own philosophical understanding of the experience, which can only be 
understood by the elite. In contrast to Sulami, who argued for the ineffability of Muhammad’s 
encounter with God, Ibn Sina argues that the prophet did not have trouble putting the 
ascension into words at all. Rather, he put them into the ideal metaphorical terms to convey 
meaning to the masses. 
In other Sufi writings, however, the mir’aj functions less as a metaphor and more as a 
map to guide Sufis as they ascend toward God during their own mystical journeys. Given Ibn 
Sina’s interpretation of the ascension, one can see how it may be difficult to maintain 
Muhammad’s uniqueness while also arguing that his most unique act could be replicated. For 
many writers, this tension was resolved by insisting on the bodily nature of Muhammad’s 
ascension, in contrast with the spiritual or dream ascensions available to others. As we shall 
see in this chapter, this approach to the ascension was not always a given, but is key to 
Nizami’s writings on the topic and theorization of the body. 
 
Sufi Ascension Narratives 
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For Sufi writers, Muhammad’s ascension is often a touchstone for their own spiritual 
practice. As discussed in the previous section, many Sufis read the mir’aj as a metaphor for 
their own spiritual journey. For these Sufis, Muhammad accomplishes in an evening what 
might take them a lifetime. For others, however, the mir’aj is more model than metaphor. In 
this section we will discuss a few accounts of Sufis who have claimed to replicate Muhammad’s 
journey. 
 
The Ascension of Bayazid Bistami 
 
Bayazid Bistami’s ascension narrative is as among the earliest writings in this genre. 
Like those ascension narratives discussed in chapter 4, Bistami’s miʿraj is also a site of 
interreligious and interdisciplinary debate. Within the Sufi context, as Michael Sells notes, 
“What is at stake in these symbolic worlds is the goal of the mystical path” as framed by the 
author, whether that be “to become more purely intellectual, more angelic, or more deeply 
human.”390 For Bistami, his ascent is framed as a competition with the angels, who provide a 
series of tests to see whether he will settle for a reward of lesser worth than a direct encounter 
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http://search.lib.unc.edu?R=UNCb2932363. 
 
 
188 
with God.391 Since his focus is on the angels’ tests, his description of the heavens themselves 
are spare—he notes landscape features only to highlight how they were used to tempt him to 
halt his journey before its completion. He repeatedly relies on phrase that the angels showed 
him sights that would “wear out the tongue to describe.”392 This allows him to nod to the vast 
glories of heaven, without expending ink describing them. For Bistami, the rewards of heaven 
are not only besides the point, they are temptations to be avoided: it would be unfruitful or 
even dangerously tempting to recount them. 
In contrast to Muhammad’s ascension, where his meetings with previous prophets are 
key to affirming his status as Seal of the Prophets, Bistami’s ascension features no prophetic 
encounters. Instead, Bistami encounters a variety of angels who attempt to awe him with their 
numbers, size, or brightness. Bistami pointedly rejects their overtures, sometimes boasting or 
demonstrating his superiority to the angels, such as in the Fifth Heaven, when the angels greet 
him in a number of languages, and greets them back in all the same languages.393 In each 
heaven, however, he ends his encounter with respect and humility, declining the angels with 
                                                            
391 As Sells notes, this is related to Qur’an 2:30, in which the angels object to God’s creation of Adam. 
392 Sells, Early Islamic Mysticism, 245-248. 
393 Presumably this is a testament to his spiritual excellence, not that he is a studious polyglot. Sells, Early Islamic 
Mysticism, 247. 
 
 
189 
the phrase “My goal is other than that which you are showing me.”394 As a metaphor for the 
Sufi path, Bistami’s ascension narrative warns prospective mystics of the dangers of the Sufi 
path. Much like Attar’s Conference of the Birds, in which each valley represents a danger on the 
path to union with God, for Bistami, each level of heaven has the potential to harmfully waylay 
a Sufi.  
Another similarity between Bistami’s ascension and Attar’s later work is the role of 
birds. As discussed in chapter 3, birds as metaphors for the soul, and descriptions of ascension 
as being like flight, abound in Sufi writings. At the beginning of his ascension, Bistami 
encounters a green bird in the First Heaven, who takes him to a group of angels. There is no 
commentary on the nature of this bird or its place in heaven - it is taken as a given that 
transport by bird should be a feature of heaven. In the rest of Bistami’s narrative, however, 
this bird is the only non-angelic being he encounters so its inclusion hardly seems incidental. 
This initial bird encounter is all the more noteworthy because it occurs in parallelism in the 
narrative. It is a bird who brings Bistami into the presence of the tempting angels in the first 
heaven and a bird who takes him away from them in the seventh. In the seventh heaven, after 
rejecting the angels’ final overtures, God turns Bistami into a giant bird whose feathers were 
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“greater than the distance from East to West one thousand times.”395 In his bird form, Bistami 
is able to soar over the vast expanses of the heavens directly to the divine throne. Though he 
does not describe a transformation back into a human, when in God’s presence, God invites 
him to “sit upon the carpet of my holiness,” a metaphor which implies a return to human 
form.396  
Perhaps most noteworthy about Bistami’s use of bird metaphors is that the bird doesn’t 
provide transportation to or from the heavens, but only around various parts of the heavens. 
At the start of his narrative, he simply finds himself “risen to the heavens.”397 The two-fold 
focus of his narrative seems to preclude inclusion of an overland journey, or trip through the 
fixed stars before approaching heaven. The only mention we get of the stars in Bistami’s 
account is when he encounters the angels in the first heaven, who are “standing with their feet 
aflame among the stars.”398 Jumping straight into the heaven’s allows Bistami to highlight his 
competition with the angels, but it also serves a second purpose—to emphasize the spiritual 
and disembodied nature of his ascension. Accounts of Muhammad’s ascension often spend as 
much time describing his journey overland and through the stars as his encounters in the 
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heavens. This is because, as discussed in chapter 4, Muhammad’s embodied ascension provides 
proof of its miraculousness. Questions of how he was able to travel so quickly in one night and 
overcome normal human limitations abound in discussions of Muhammad’s ascension. This 
aspect of Bistami’s journey is precluded with a very simple opening: “I saw myself in a 
dream.”399 Bistami travelled to heaven in a dream, so his journey through the material realm 
becomes insignificant. What matters are the spiritual insights he gained while in the heavens. 
This critical distinction between Bistami’s ascension and Muhammad’s would prove important 
for other Sufis who wished to write about their personal ascensions. His work provided a 
model for a number of later Sufis writing on the topic, including Ibn Arabi400 and Qadi al-
Numani.401 And as well shall see in the next section, failure to properly frame one’s ascension 
as disembodied could have severe consequences. 
 
The Ascension of Muhammad Ghwath 
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Muhammad Ghwath was a 16th Century South Asian Sufi whose claim to have had an 
embodied ascension both allowed him to garner a large popular following and caused him to 
run afoul of religious and political authorities. In this section, we will examine the contours of 
his ascension account before turning to the theological controversies to which it gave rise. By 
doing so, we will see the critical issues which can arise in telling a mir’aj narratives, and how 
Sufis might protect themselves from accusations of heresy in discussing their own mystical 
ascents. 
Muhammad Ghwath’s narrative begins somewhat differently than Bistami’s, with clear 
parallels to Muhammad’s own mir’aj.  Muhammad Ghwath states that he spends the night half-
sleep and half-awake before hearing a voice calling him to prayer. Instead of being called on 
his ascent by Gabriel, Muhammad Ghwath is called forth by Khidr. Unlike Bistami, Muhammad 
Ghwath does not state that this encounter happened in a dream, but instead leaves it 
ambiguous, noting that he remained in the half-waking, half-sleeping state throughout. One 
key to the potential embodied nature of Muhammad Ghwath’s ascent is that he requires a 
means of transport up to heaven. In his narrative, all of creation and then the elements water, 
air, and fire transform into a series of immense human beings upon whose heads he steps to 
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ascend to heaven.402 Allowing Muhammad Ghwath to place his feet upon their heads is a sign of 
utmost respect for the saint, who “encompasses, completes, and perfects each element.”403 As 
Kugle notes, these elements also represent the constituent parts of the human body, so 
“ascending upward is also delving inward, through bodily materiality.”404 The very contours of 
Muhammad Ghwath’s ascent make little sense if he leaves his body behind on the journey. 
Once Muhammad Ghwath reaches the seven heavens, his narrative further diverges 
from Bistami’s, since he meets a number of saints and prophets, not just angels. These figures 
great him with warmth rather than temptation and testing. They note that Muhammad 
Ghwath accompanied Muhammad in spirit on his mir’aj, but appear surprised at his current 
ascent. What most shocks the denizens of heaven is that Muhammad Ghwath is “fully attached 
to [his] body!” which is “a completely new and different spectacle.”405 If we, with Michale Sells, 
view the stakes of Sufi ascension narratives as revolving around the goal of the mystical path, 
what does Muhammad Ghwath’s insistence of embodied ascension tell us?  
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Throughout the narrative, Muhammad Ghwath attempts to unite or resolve binaries. 
His body joins his soul on the ascent, he sees a vision of heaven and hell as one form with two 
essences, he resolves esoteric and exoteric religious knowledge, he places male and female 
piety on equal footing.406 This appears most starkly in his descent from heaven, where, after 
attaining union with God, the denizens of heaven appear not as distinct entities, but abstract 
emanations of God. Thus the goal of Muhammad Ghwath’s is to attain a loss of self within God 
which afterwards makes apparent the mystical principle of wahdat al-wujud, or unity of 
being.407  
Though Muhammad Ghwath’s ascension highlights mainstream Sufi principles, and is 
couched in a number of qualifications,408 it nevertheless caused controversy. As with prior 
controversial Sufi figures, it seems Muhammad Ghwath’s theologically problematic claims 
would not have garnered attention had he not run afoul of political authorities.409 Once he did, 
however, his ascension narrative became a key site of contention. His embodied ascension, for 
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example, threatened the uniqueness of Muhammad’s own mir’aj. Muhammad Ghwath seems to 
anticipate this difficulty, for he explicitly preserves the distinction between saint and 
prophet.410 He notes: 
When I heard this command call out to Muhammad to rise and ascend, I was confused. I turned 
to Jesus who was standing beside me, and asked, “I thought that this was the night of my 
ascension, so why should Muhammad be called up now to ascend to the Divine Throne?” Jesus 
answered, “Each saint is a member of the community that was founded by a specific prophet. The 
Prophet must ascend first, so that the saint can follow after him up to the appointed place. That 
way, the structure of prophethood and sainthood can be established in good order.”411 
Of greater concern to the ulema than his embodied ascension was the fact that  
Muhammad Ghwath seems to articulate a form monism, arguing that heaven and hell will be 
united on the Day of Judgment. Nevertheless, it was only when he conceded that his vision had 
been a dream, rather than an embodied experience, that his persecution on theological 
grounds came to and end.412  
From this brief survey of two non-prophetic ascension narratives, we can draw a few 
conclusions about the ways in which Sufis deployed the mir’aj. First, the structure of the ascent 
represents a metaphor for the Sufi path to God. Second, the nature of the figures and 
challenges encountered on the journey tells us how the author perceives the ultimate goal of 
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the mystical path. Third, when discussing Muhammad’s ascension as a model for Sufi practice, 
Sufis had to be careful to preserve the uniqueness of Muhammad’s ascent. They often did do by 
emphasizing his bodily ascent in contrast to their disembodied or dream ascent. 
Shahzad Bashir cautions us, however about drawing overly broad conclusions about 
“Sufi” depictions of the ascension.413 He explores three case studies on the Prophet’s 
ascension—one by Jami, one by Sayyid Muhammad Nurbaksh, and on by Shaykh Ahmed 
Bashiri. In a long treatise on Muhammad, Witness to Prophecy, Jami, like Tabari before him, is 
concerned with the ascension as confirmation of Muhammad’s prophethood. His main critique 
seems to be aimed at those who, following in the footsteps of Ibn Sina, wish to treat the 
ascension as an allegory. As we have previously noted, authors wishing to emphasize the 
embodied nature of the ascension often spend significant time discussing the ‘isra. This is true 
not only in Jami’s longer work on the prophet, but also, as we shall see later in the chapter, in 
his ascension narrative in the introduction to the Gift of the Noble (Tohfat al-ahrar), his response 
to Nizami’s Makhzan al-asrar. 
In sharp contrast to Jami’s approach is Nurbaksh’s description of the ascension, which 
plays on themes of Muhammadan Reality and Nur-i Muhammad414 to mark himself as a new 
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physical manifestation of this pre-existent reality. Finally, Shaykh Ahemed Bashiri is a humble 
Uvaysi Sufi master who uses the ascension narrative as the basis for his own spiritual initiation 
into a Sufi lineage. For Bashir, this range of uses for the Prophet’s ascension over a relatively 
short time period and geographic range, should cause us to hesitate when making declarations 
about a single approach to Sufi ascensions. While these qualifications are certainly worth 
noting, what seems to remain true across Sufi ascension accounts is that they are an important 
site for highlighting what the particular author most values about the Sufi path. In the next 
section we will explore Nizami’s ascension account in the Treasury of Mysteries, and analyze it to 
better understand how he views the goal of the mystic path. 
 
The Ascension Narrative in Nizami Ganjavi’s Makhzan al-Asrar 
 
What would you say of a Prophet who, on his ascent to heaven, extinguishes the poison 
of Scorpio’s tail with his Crest-fresh breath, wears Qur’anic verses as khol, has the Throne of 
God touch the hem of his robe, and listens to Libra who turns her scales to castinets to play 
him a song? Well, probably a number of things—but one thing you wouldn’t say about him is 
that he left his body behind on earth. In this section we will investigate the rich sensorium of 
the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad’s ascension to heaven (or miʿraj) in the introduction 
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to Nizami Ganjavi’s first Masnavi – the Makhzan al-Asrar (or Treasury of Secrets). Through a close 
reading of this passage, we will see how Nizami’s ascension subordinates symbols of kingship 
and the philosophy to symbols drawn from the Sufi tradition, through very physical 
interactions.  
 
Ascension as Literary Trope in Persian Masnavi’s 
  
Beginning with Vukovic, scholars on the ascension note a rich trove of ascension 
narratives to be found in the introductions to Persian Masnavis, especially those emulating 
Nizami’s Khamsa.415 Vukovic notes that her own language abilities preclude an investigation of 
Persian sources.416 Christians Gruber’s dissertation includes a chapter on Perisan poetic 
materials, but, due to disciplinary boundaries, after a brief description of the potential sources 
worth investigating, veers into a discussion of miniature paintings in Safavid editions of 
Nizami’s Khamsa.417 In The Prophet’s Ascension, Selim Kuru notes that ascension narratives 
continue in the works of Ottoman poets working in the masnavi form—arguing for reading 
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these introductory passages as an interpretive lens through which to understand the rest of 
the text.418 William Hanaway likewise argues for reading these brief ascension narratives as an 
interpretive tool for reading medieval Persian romances. Devoting a mere three-pages of an 
already brief article to the topic, Hanaway emphasizes the importance of Mir‘aj introductions 
to our understanding of romances as a mystical genre.419 Given its brevity, his argument must 
necessarily paint in broad brushstrokes, neglecting to note that these introductions do not 
always accompany sustained narrative romances. Likewise, an article by French scholar De 
Fouchecour briefly examines the ascension narratives in the introduction of Nizami’s 
Khamsa.420 His interest is mainly in comparing the ascension narratives across Nizami’s work, 
arguing that the introductory tale found in the Haft Paykar, thanks to its conformity with Sufi 
notions of the ascension, is the model toward which Nizami was aiming but falling short in his 
other mir‘aj accounts. This leaves room for further investigation of how these ascension 
narratives might relate to the broader text which they accompany, following the lead of 
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Victoria Holbrook and Selim Kuru, as well as to an investigation of their main features as a 
genre, distinct from Sufi ascension narratives or Mirajanama used as tools of conversion or 
ritual instruction.  
Following the lead of contemporary scholarship on the ascension, and in light of the 
importance of current debates on the ascension for Muslim reformers, this investigation of the 
ascension as a literary genre in Persian poetry has several features. First, following the lead of 
Gruber, Colby and Vukovic, among others, the primary focus is upon what ascension 
narratives can tell us about the Muslim communities in which they were created and 
distributed. Persian Masnavi introductions, for example, seem entirely uninterested in 
Muhammad’s encounter with previous monotheistic prophets, which indicates that they were 
not being used in encounters with non-Muslims or recent converts. Likewise, following 
Shahzad Bashir’s lead, this analysis is careful of drawing broad conclusions across multiple 
sources. Though generic conventions and tropes might help to bind poetic mir‘aj narratives 
into a more coherent lineage than the three accounts presented by Bashir, such generic 
constraints mandate an even greater attention to the subtle differences in presentation, 
language and imagery in these accounts. Finally, this investigation is careful to respect the 
bounds of contemporary debates within the Muslim community. Without taking positions on 
the veracity of Muhammad’s bodily ascension, I hope this discussion can nevertheless 
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contribute to the conversation by highlighting the long history of Muslim engagement with 
Muhammad’s ascension in pre-modern sources, especially in texts that remain touchstones for 
contemporary Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 
 
 
Embodiment in the Makhzan’s Ascension Narrative 
 
This section explores the ascension narrative from a previously under-examined 
genre—Persian Sufi poetry. Nizami Ganjavi’s (d. 1209) Makhzan al-asrar inaugurated a tradition 
of beginning Persian masnavis with a series of introductions in praise of the Prophet (naʿat). 
Nizami focuses special attention on the Prophet’s ascension (miʿraj), but his account 
distinguishes itself from other ascension narratives through its elaborate description of 
Muhammad’s trip through the Zodiac. Frederick Colby and Christiane Gruber have highlighted 
how ascension narratives subordinate competing symbolic systems to Muhammad’s revelation 
for the purposes of winning converts and training the newly converted.421 Though aimed at a 
courtly audience, I argue that Nizami’s ascension narrative nevertheless fits this paradigm. 
                                                            
421 See: Colby, Narrating Muhammad’s Night Journey; Colby, The Subtleties of the Ascension; Christiane Gruber and 
Frederick S. Colby, eds., The Prophet’s Ascension: Cross-Cultural Encounters with the Islamic Miʿraj Tales (Indiana 
University Press, 2010); Gruber, The Ilkhanid Book of Ascension; Gruber, “When Nubuvvat Encounters Valāyat: 
Safavid Paintings of the Prophet Mohammad’s Mi’rāj, C. 1500-50.”
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Through a close reading of nine lines of the Makhzan, roughly one for each astrological sign 
(some signs share a line), I argue that Nizami’s Miʿraj account: 1) demonstrates the author’s 
thorough knowledge of astrology and 2) demonstrates the superiority of mystical knowledge 
to philosophy for understanding God and the cosmos. 
Within the manuscript tradition, the importance of Nizami’s first work, Makhzan al-
asrar, and the ascension narrative within it, is highlighted by this fact: among the 10-15 full-
page illuminations to be provided for most Khamsa manuscripts, the ascension narrative in the 
Makhzan al-asrar is usually one of the scenes selected for illustration, and is often the first 
illustration in the codex.422 This might be because the depiction of the ascension in the 
Makhzan is particularly evocative, with its unique account of Muhammad’s tour of the Zodiac 
and emphatic insistence on Muhammad’s bodily ascension. The uses to which ascension 
narratives were put during Nizami’s era, and his unique relationship to courtly culture, might 
help explain the most provocative attributes of his account. 
The ascension narrative in the Makhzan al-Asrar is 68 lines long and directly preceded 
by a brief, 25-line section praising Muhammad in more general terms. This section highlights 
Muhammad’s importance to salvation history and to creation itself: he is the “alef drawn on 
                                                            
422 Yael Rice, “Between the Brush and the Pen: On the Intertwined Histories of Mughal Painting and Calligraphy” 
(Lecture at UNC-Chapel Hill, March 28, 2013). 
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the first tablet (takhte-ye aval)” whose name spans from the “alef of Adam to the Mim of 
messiah.”423 He is the “brightest [roshan-tar] center of the circle [par-gar – two compases or a 
circle made by them] of ‘be thou’ [Kun].”424  
Existing alongside these descriptions of Muhammad as integral to existence are verses 
which incorporate imagery of kingship and the bestowal of kingly authority. Thus the letters 
of Muhammad’s name become a signet ring—Ha, a belt—Dal, and a collar—Mim, marking his 
authority over the “two worlds,” which bow before him 425 Throughout this section Nizami 
juxtaposes images of humility with those of royalty, inadequacy with super-efficacy—thus 
Muhammad is the illiterate who is more loquacious [guyā] than all eloquent speech [zaban-I 
Faṣīḥ].426 
 
Body/Heart 
 
Muhammad’s pre-eminence in creation and the images of kingship continue in the next 
section—the mir‘aj narrative itself. Here, Nizami makes a distinction between body and soul. 
                                                            
423 Nizami Ganjavi, Makhzan al-asrar, 12. 
424 Ibid., 13. 
425 Ibid., 12. 
426 Ibid., 13. 
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The words he uses form a sonic as well as conceptual binary: body or outward form – qālab and 
heart/soul – qalb. As early as Hasan al-Basri, Muslim mystics and ascetics began to develop a 
heart-symbolism out of Qur’anic references to the word qalb. In Revival of the Religious Sciences, 
Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali defines qalb as the immortal and spiritual essence of a human being, 
through which one comes to know God.427 
This focus on the physicality of the ascension begins with the metaphors Nizami uses to 
describe Muhammad’s journey. He notes: 
With the birdcage of his body [qafas-e qāleb] from this place of snares [dām-gah]  
the bird of his heart (soul) [mourgh-e del-esh] went to the place of freedom [āzām-gah]428 
The metaphor of soul as bird and the world as a snare is a familiar Sufi trope, deployed 
in brief treatises by Ahmad al-Ghazali (d. c. 1123-26) and Shahab al-din Suhrawardi Maqtul (d. 
1191), and at length in the Mantiq al-Tayr of Farid al-Din ‘Attar (d. c. 1221) – a rough 
contemporary of Nizami.429 He continues to describe the heart’s role in lifting Muhammad to 
heaven: 
His divine bird [mourgh-e alhīsh] filled the cage [qafas] 
                                                            
427 Hellmut Ritter, The Ocean of the Soul: Man, the World, and God in the Stories of Farid Al-Din ’Attar (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 
428 Nizami Ganjavi, Makhzan al-asrar, 14. 
429 See chapter 1 for more on the use of animal metaphors in Sufi poetry broadly, and Nizami’s work more 
specifically. 
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His body/form [qāleb-esh] became lighter from his heart/soul430 
In these lines, it is not simply the world which is a snare for the soul, but the body itself 
which is a cage for it. Muhammad’s soul, however, is particularly buoyant, and can lift the 
body out of this world of snares. It can’t, however, do all the work by itself: 
 As he moved on step-by-step,  
 he was seized and carried further [rubūdan – to rob, sieze, carry off] by blessing 
[tabarruk]…431 
So Muhammad’s initial impetus is met with an enthusiastic divine response—a 
reciprocal interaction which echoes that found in the Hadith qudsi: “and if he draws near to 
Me an arm's length, I draw near to him a fathom's length. And if he comes to Me walking, I go 
to him at speed.”432 
Perhaps most interesting about this passage is the apparent ambivalence toward the 
body. The world is a place of snares to be escaped, the body is a cage which traps the heart. Yet 
even though Muhammad departs from “the seven climes [haft khziaṭ] and the 4 cardinal 
directions [chār had] and the six orientations [shesh jahāt – up, down, left, right, forward, 
                                                            
430 Nizami Ganjavi, Makhzan al-asrar, 14. 
431 Ibid. 
432 Javad Nurbakhsh, Traditions of the Prophet, Volume 1 (Khaniqahi Nimatullahi Publications (KNP), 1981). 
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backward],” his ascension is not an escape from the body, it is a journey with it. 433 And it’s not 
just his body that ascends in Nizami’s account, but Muhammad’s clothing also comes along for 
the ride. 
 
 
Clothing and Gift Bestowal 
 
References to clothing and the exchange of clothing as gifts are a prominent feature of 
Nizami’s ascension narrative. Sometimes Muhammad is metaphorized as an article of clothing 
himself, such as when “the heavens [siphir] bore him as a crown [taj].”434 Elsewhere the 
situation is reversed, such as when he enters the presence of God and “His head poked out 
from the collar [garībān] of nature [ṭabī‘at]”435 and he thus wears all creation as a robe of 
discipleship. Elsewhere, the stars themselves disrobe in his presence, such as when the 
celestial sphere [falak] throws down [dar āndākhteh] its patched frock [khirqah] in 
Muhammad’s presence.436 Some commenters, such as Vahid Dastgirdi, take this line to mean 
                                                            
433 Nizami Ganjavi, Makhzan al-asrar, Sarvatiyan edition, 14. 
434 Ibid., 15. 
435 Ibid., 18. 
436 Ibid., 14. 
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that the fixed stars threw off their khirqas to begin a sema in Muhammad’s honor.437 This 
resonates with Nizami’s portrayal of Muhammad’s encounter with Libra. Finding that her 
scales aren’t up to the task of weighing Muhammad’s infinite worth, according to one 
interpretation which toys with the definition of sanj, she turns the plates of her scales into 
castinets to play Muhammad a song.438  
Other constellations honor Muhammad through the exchange of gifts. Taurus allows 
Muhammad to ride him as a steed, and Sagittarius slays Aries with his arrow, to lay a feast for 
the Prophet. More interestingly, however, is a pair of verses in which Cancer and Orion give 
over their crown and belt to Muhammad as pesh-kash, a term that denotes extraordinary gifts 
given to superiors, especially royal ones. Thus throughout Muhammad’s ascension, the signs of 
the zodiac break, transform or give up their characteristic symbols in order to welcome 
Muhammad as a guest and in recognition of his superiority to and authority over them.439 
Once he leaves the realm of the fixed stars and enters into heaven proper, we discover 
that Muhammad has not only received clothing as gifts upon his journey, but also brought 
clothing with him from earth. The furniture of heaven engages with Muhammad physically, 
                                                            
437 Ibid., 14, footnote 7. 
438 Ibid., 15. 
439 Ibid., 15-16. 
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just as the fixed stars did.  But rather than gifting the Prophet clothing, they instead touch (or 
even become) his clothes.440 For example, “The Lote Tree [sidrat] reached his vest [pīrāhan-
esh] / the Throne [arsh] touched the hem of his skirt [dāman-esh].”441 The terms here have Sufi 
valences: the pirahan, as Lloyd Ridgeon points out, is associated with futuwwa and was worn as 
a “finishing garment” on top of a khirqa.442 As such it represented the outer “form” to the 
khirqa’s inner form. These physical interactions between the Prophet and the very symbols of 
Divine proximity are slightly ambiguous, however: is Muhammad receiving blessings through 
these exchanges, or are the Lote Tree and Throne acknowledging his pre-eminence? 
By now we are familiar with the first of Nizami Ganjavi’s (d. 1209) five masnavis, The 
Makhzan al-asrar (Treasury of Secrets). The work was emulated in both meter and structure by 
a host of major Persian poets, including two I’ll discuss in this section: Amir Khosrow (d. 1325) 
and Jami (d. 1492). The Makhzan formalized a tradition of beginning mansavis with several 
lengthy prolegomena, covering topics such as God’s unity (tawhid), praise of the patron, and 
praise of the Prophet. Invocations of the Prophet in the Makhzan and its descendants make a 
                                                            
440 In a later portion of the introduction in praise of the Prophet, Nizami notes that “The Lote tree [sidrat] is a 
brooch [arayesh] on your chest [sudrat]; the heavenly throne is an lowly chair in your palace.” ⁠ Nizami Ganjavi, 
Makhzan al-asrar, 24. 
441 Ibid., 17. 
442 Lloyd Ridgeon, Jawanmardi: A Sufi Code of Honour: A Sufi Code of Honour (Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 82; 
Lloyd Ridgeon, Morals and Mysticism in Persian Sufism: A History of Sufi-Futuwwat in Iran (Routledge, 2010), 79. 
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point of highlighting Muhammad’s heavenly journey (Miʿraj) as a separate chapter. As 
numerous other scholars, including Michael Sells, Annemarie Schimmel, Christiane Gruber, 
and Elizabeth Alexandrine, have previously highlighted, the Miʿraj narratives in Persian 
Masnavis focus upon the ascension as an initiatory model for Sufis to follow.  
One thread that runs through each of these poetic ascension accounts is the recurrence 
of references to garments, garment touching, and the bestowal of garments—especially cloaks 
and belts. Such an analysis is important for situating Persian Masnavis within a larger emerging 
discourse that takes seriously depictions of and interactions with the body in premodern 
Sufism, such as those by Shahzad Bashir and Scott Kugle. Likewise, if Selim Kuru is correct 
when he asserts that Miʿraj narratives in Ottoman Turkish emulations of Nizami’s Khamsa 
provide a useful lens through which to interpret the rest of the poem, understanding the role 
of the body and clothing in these narratives can help us better understand what the poets are 
hoping to achieve through their discourses and exempla in the rest of the work.  
Though the Makhzan inaugurated a tradition of including miʿraj narratives in the 
introductions of masnavis, Nizami’s ascension account is nevertheless interesting for its 
repeated insistence on Muhammad’s bodily ascent. Nizami is emphatic that “the bird of his 
soul flew with the cage [of the body],” and he repeatedly demonstrates Muhammad’s physical 
interaction with celestial entities: his fragrant breath quells the sting of Scorpio’s tail, the 
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throne of heaven bows to touch the hem of his robe, and he returns to earth carrying a new 
muskiness obtained on his journey. Most notably, Nizami insists that Muhammad saw God with 
“this eye and that eye of his head.”  
Works such as Ahmet Karamustafa’s God’s Unruly Friends, Scott Kugle’s Sufis and Saints 
Bodies, and Shazad Bashir’s Sufi Bodies, have cleared a space for the body as a subject of study in 
medieval Sufism. Most relevant to this chapter, Bashir notes a “high valorization of corporeal 
contact as a marker of social solidarity and transmission of authority in the literature and art” 
of the medieval period (3). Bashir further states that the texts in his study seem to link 
“increasing intimacy with greater corporeal access” (Bashir, 5). Bashir’s work alerts us to the 
importance of the physical transmission of authority in the texts and contexts of medieval 
Sufism. The significance of this relationship between physical contact, spiritual intimacy, and 
the transmission of mystical knowledge helps to shed light on Nizami’s repeated reference to 
the physicality of Muhammad’s ascension. 
Frederick Colby and Christiane Gruber have already highlighted how ascension 
narratives subordinate competing symbolic systems to Muhammad’s revelation for the 
purposes of negotiating sectarian debates, winning converts, and training the newly 
converted. Though aimed at a courtly audience rather than potential converts, Nizami’s 
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ascension narrative nevertheless fits this paradigm, because it subordinates competing 
discourses of knowledge and authority to the direct encounter with God enabled by Sufism.  
In And Muhammad Is His Messenger, Annemarie Schimmel highlights masnavi 
introductions as one source for Miʿraj imagery. She notes that Persian poets used “every 
conceivable rhetorical device” and “embellished [it] with ever more charming details.”443 
Religious studies approaches to Persian poetry can often be dismissive of the rhetorical flair of 
poetry itself, seeing the artifice of poetry as something to be read through in order to reach 
some straightforward spiritual message. Scholars as august as William Chittick have argued 
that we should understand of Rumi as a reluctant poet, who used verse to affectively reach an 
ignorant public.444 While Michael Sells has effectively highlighted the apophatic aspects of Sufi 
writing, and Fatemeh Keshevarz has helpfully applied Sell’s method of analysis to Rumi’s verse, 
in many ways Rumi is a stylistic outlier, especially in the Masnavi-ye Manavi, and a similar 
defense of the complex, even baroque aspects of high Persian literary style has not been 
suitably mounted in the context of religious studies.445  
                                                            
443 Schimmel, And Muhammad Is His Messenger, 165.  
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445 Michael A. Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1994); Fatemeh Keshavarz, 
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Miʿraj narratives invite a great deal of creativity, in part because the tale itself is so 
evocative, inviting questions such as: what does heaven look like? Who does Muhammad meet 
along the way? and What does God say to Muhammad? The Qur’an is notably quiet on these 
issues. From the Qur’anic verses that have generally been interpreted as discussing the Miʿraj, 
we learn that 1) Muhammad was shown the signs of God (Surat al-Isra 17:1), 2) that Muhammad 
drew within “two-bows lengths” of God (Surat an-Najm 53:8-18) at the Lote Tree of Farthest 
Limit, and 3) That the Prophet did not turn away from what he saw. Other information, such as 
Muhammad’s mount, Boraq, his accompaniment by Gabriel, the prophets he met along the 
way, etc are filled in by hadith literature. By the time of Ibn Ishaq’a Sira, we have the outlines 
of a complete journey to heaven and back. 
Nevertheless, the Miʿraj narrative in the Sira leaves considerable space for invention 
and addition. Frederick Colby has discussed the development of what he calls the “Ibn Abbas” 
model of Miʿraj narrative, a collection of works which trace their descriptions of the heavens 
back to one hadith transmitter, Ibn Abbas.446 He notes that some aspects of these texts bear the 
marking of sectarian debates, specifically asserting that images of the Cosmic Muhammad 
might have developed in response to proto-Shi’i attempts to co-opt the ascension narrative by 
                                                            
446 Colby, Narrating Muhammad’s Night Journey. 
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portraying ʿAli as already waiting at the throne of God when Muhammad arrives.447 Beyond 
being a site of sectarian contestation, Colby and others have noted that Miʿraj narratives were 
often used in inter-religious discourse, to highlight Islam’s superiority to previous revelations 
and encourage conversion by incorporating the symbols and holy figures of other religious 
traditions into the sights and scenes of Muhammad’s ascension. Maria E. Subtelny, for 
example, shows the ways in which encounters between Muhammad and Jews living at the end 
of the world were used in missionary encounters with Jewish communities.448 Likewise, 
perplexing but pervasive aspects of the ascension narrative, such as the rooster angel and the 
angel made of half-fire and half-snow, become scrutable if read in the context of conversations 
with Zoroastrians or recent converts from Zoroastrianism.449 The message delivered in these 
texts is as respectful of new believers (or potential new believers) as it is clear: your previous 
belief system is not untrue, it is simply subordinate to that of Muhammad. Indeed, during the 
Sassanian period, doctrinal reforms were authorized and verified through recourse to visions 
of heaven and hell, and such visions were used to combat and de-authorize threats posed by 
                                                            
447 Frederick Colby, “The Early Imami Shiʿi Narratives and Contestation over Intimate Colloquy Scenes in 
Muḥammad’s Miʿrāj,”  The Prophet’s Ascension: Cross-Cultural Encounters with the Islamic Miʿraj Tales, Christiane Gruber 
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reformers and prophets such as Mani.450 Thus the ascension narrative as a genre for 
negotiating inter- and intra-religious disputes has a pedigree that would make it familiar and 
readable to many religious elites and practitioners alike.  
Beyond its uses for bolstering claims to doctrinal authority or pious pre-eminence in 
religious debates, ascension narratives were also used to authorize or de-authorize certain 
political discourse and figures. Christiane Gruber has helpfully pointed to the changes that 
take place in pictorial representations of the Miʿraj (including illuminations of Nizami’s 
Khamsa) during the early Safavid period. Under the patronage of Shah Ismaʿil, a veil was added 
to the Prophet’s face and a portal into the heavens was added to depictions of the night sky. 
Such artistic alterations, Gruber claims, were meant to elide the difference between 
Muhammad and Shah Ismaʿil, highlighting the emperor’s role as saint and God-ordained 
renewer (mujaddid).451 Through her work, it becomes clear that political authorities saw both 
the ascension and Nizami’s Khamsa as two places in which to stake their claims to authority 
and legitimacy.   
Given this context, it is not beyond reason to suggest that the Miraj narratives in these 
poems might be used assert the primacy of Sufism over rival modes of knowledge and sources 
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of authority. To see what this might look like, let’s take a closer look at Nizami, Amir Khosrow, 
and Jami’s takes on the Miraj: 
The beginning of Nizami’s narrative describes Muhammad’s ascension in general terms 
and details the Prophet’s introduction to his steed, Boraq. Eliding numerous aspects of 
standard ascension narratives, such as Muhammad’s journey to Jerusalem, his failure to heed 
the calls of strangers along the way, or his leading prayer in the Farthest Mosque, Nizami 
launches Muhammad into the heavens seemingly directly from his bed. This choice in and of 
itself indicates that Nizami is not deploying the Miʿraj for the standard rhetorical purposes. 
Instead, Muhammad is “a pearl in the mine of the world set to become the crown of heaven”—
his ontological pre-eminence is present before he even begins his ascent.      
Once he ascends to the sky, Muhammad trades Boraq out for Taurus as his temporary 
steed. Unlike Ibn Abbas accounts, in which Boraq shies away from Muhammad’s touch until 
scolded by Gabriel, in Nizami’s narrative this scene is not recounted, and Muhammad’s worth 
is so apparent that Taurus recognizes it immediately and allows Muhammad to mount. This 
trope of Muhammad as the instantly-recognized superior to the constellations is carried 
through the next distich, in which Cancer and Gemini (or Orion) grant him their crown and 
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belt as tribute (pesh-kash).452 Nizami’s choice of words for “gift” here is especially telling, as 
pesh-kash are lavish gifts heaped upon a superior, especially a king. The gifts themselves, 
however, are not simply extravagant, they are the very symbols of kingship and authority. 
Thus by turning over their crown and belt to Muhammad, Nizami depicts Cancer and Gemini 
turning over their dominion to him. 
Muhammad then moves from the Zodiac to a very brief encounter with the assembled 
prophets before he encounters the Lote Tree of Farthest Limit, which touches the front of his 
robe, and the Throne of God (‘arsh), which touches his hem (dāman). These signs of honor and 
respect seem nearly blasphemous, but do the work of subordinating even the furniture of 
heaven to Muhammad’s pre-eminence—a way of highlighting his uniqueness without having 
to repeat the well-known story of Gabriel’s refusal to step beyond the Lote Tree. The physical 
contact, however, also indicates an intimacy through which blessings are transferred—though 
in Nizami’s narrative, it’s not always clear whether Muhammad is receiving the blessings or 
giving them.  
Amir Khosrow expands slightly upon Nizami’s account. He includes more details about 
the Isra than Nizami, and like Nizami includes precise details of Muhammad’s ascension 
                                                            
452 Orion inhabits the same region of the sky as Gemini and the Arabic word Nizami uses here, Jauza, can indicate 
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through the Zodiac – this time Muhammad’s breath makes Cancer cheerful instead of taking 
the sting out of Scorpio’s tale, for example. Unlike either Nizami or Jami, Amir Khosrow 
mentions prophets by name, such as Issa and Idris. Amir Khosrow does not have the throne or 
Lote Tree bow down to Muhammad, but instead describes how Muhammad’s light feet quickly 
ascend from the base of the footstool (kursi), to it’s top, finally reaching the throne (kursi). At 
this point, Muhammad takes of his sandals to shake the road dust from his feet, sprinkling 
light below. Here we see the concept of Nur-i Muhammad merge with the intercessory aspects 
of ascension narratives, a merger negotiated through contact with the Throne and via the Sufi 
metaphor of the long journey. 
Jami’s depiction of the ascension is much briefer that either Nizami or Amir Khosrow’s. 
Unlike Nizami, he’s not insistent upon or emphatic about Muhammad’s bodily ascension. Jami 
spends an almost inordinate amount of time on Muhammad’s steed, Boraq, in part because he 
seems to enjoy the play on word between Boraq’s name and the word for lightning, (barq). 
Nevertheless, in Jami, as with Nizami, Muhammad begins his journey as a pre-eminent being: 
the dirt of his feet is the crown of humanity, even before he first ascends to God’s presence.  
Unlike Nizami, Jami doesn’t entirely skip over the Isra’, though his account is very brief 
and sketchy. Muhammad’s journey through the lower realms of heaven and meetings with the 
prophets is elided. Like Nizami, he also shows the throne of heaven bowing down at 
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Muhammad’s feet. Immediately afterwards, Jami describes the body as a Khurqa (mendicant’s 
patched frock) which gets separated from the soul (fikandan – to throw away). He repeats this 
sentiment in the next hemistich, this time describing his body as a “Robe of Honor” (Khilat). 
This khirqa gives those who look upon it a strong sense of yearning (shawq). Likewise in Jami’s 
work, the Lote Tree of Farthest Limit again appears, reaching up only as far as Muhammad’s 
chest—a slight upgrade in stature from in Nizami’s poem. Here Jami is able to have his cake 
and eat it too. In his 2011 book, Sufi Aesthetics, Cyrus Ali Zargar shows how Arab authors, such 
as Fakhr al-Din ‘Iraqi (d. 1289), attempted to resolve multiple intellectual and philosophical 
strands of mysticism through their poetic writings. In attempting to resolve a practical and 
ecstatic love mysticism that calls for direct encounters with God with a philosophically 
rigorous theoretical mysticism which problematizes the possibility of such an unmediated 
encounter, ‘Iraqi settles on the male human form as the ideal symbolic medium through which 
divine-human encounters can take place. Jami taps into this poetic and mystical thread, 
positing the body of the Prophet as an ideal form which inspires yearning for God, using 
imagery that unites God and Muhammad along a Master-Disciple axis. At the same time, 
however, he is able to leave aside the question of direct, bodily contact with the divine, as 
Muhammad sheds this bodily “robe of honor” before entering into the divine presence. 
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Clearly there is some consonance between Nizami’s imagery and that of his emulators. 
Though this section has focused primarily on garments in these narratives, each of them are 
rich in sensory description and embodied experiences of heaven. Not much has been written 
in European languages before on Amir Khosrow’s Matla al-Anwar or Jami’s Tohfat al-Ahrar. The 
main scholarship on Nizami’s writing is carried out within comparative literature, area studies, 
and religious studies and is often concerned with whether or not Nizami was himself a mystic. 
These debates occur around two foci: 1) authorial intent and 2) historical context.  
Julie Scott Meisami, along with Kamran Talatoff and a handful of other writers, argue 
that there is little evidence to make a case for Nizami as a mystical writer.453 In Meisami’s case, 
she uses evidence internal to the text of Layli o Majnun to argue against a mystical 
interpretation of the work. More important to her argument, however, is the question of when 
the trope of courtly love gained a mystical gloss. Using historical and textual evidence she 
asserts that Nizami wrote his love epics as a critique of the court and the trope of courtly love. 
In her reading of Layli o Majnun, Majnun is not a mystical hero to be revered, but a selfish boy 
who indulges in his fantasy ideal of love to such a degree that it thwarts a real relationship 
                                                            
453 See: Meisami, “Kings and Lovers: Ethical Dimensions of Medieval Persian Romance”; Meisami, Medieval Persian 
Court Poetry; Talattof, “Nizami’s Unlikely Heroines: A Study of the Characterizations of Women in Classical Persian 
Literature.” 
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with Layla and leads to both of their deaths.454 This reading, which puts Majnun in the good 
company of other tragic figures such as Romeo and Goethe’s Werther, has few parallels within 
the Persian and Arabic reception history of the tale.  
In contrast to Meisami’s reading of Nizami’s work, scholars such as A.A. Seyed-Gohrab 
and Seyyed Hossein Nasr argue for a thoroughly mystical reading.455 Nasr especially makes 
pains to connect Nizami to a long theosophical lineage, showing how his use of astronomy 
connects him to important philosophical figures, from Suhrawardi al-Maqtul back to the 
Neoplatonists, and with mystical figures such as Ayn al-Qudat and Ahmad al-Ghazali. More 
compelling than Nasr’s attempt to show historical connections between these far-flung 
individuals is Seyed-Gohrab’s evidence that mystical understandings of the trope of courtly 
love, images of the pearl and shell, and certain aspects of astronomy, were already in 
circulation at this time.  
No doubt, asking questions about the contents and context of Nizami’s poems is a 
helpful scholarly contribution. And discerning authorial intent may be critical when compiling 
manuscripts into an edited volume or determining the best translation for ambiguous words or 
                                                            
454 Meisami, Medieval Persian Court Poetry, 171. 
455 Nasr, “The World View and Philosophical Perspective of Hakim Nizāmi Ganjawi”; Seyed-Gohrab, Metaphor and 
Imagery in Persian Poetry; Seyed-Gohrab, Laylī and Majnūn; Seyed-Gohrab, “Leyli O Majnun”; Seyed-Gohrab, “A 
Mystical Reading of Nizāmī’s Use of Nature.” 
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metaphors. But when such information is used to argue for pre-set fixed limits on the 
interpretive possibilities of a text, and pushes back against hundreds of years of interpretation 
history, perhaps this should give us pause. 
Given the similarities and differences between the three short sections discussed in this 
section, we can in part side with Meisami—Nizami’s bodily encounters with God and the 
bestowal of authority clearly happen using imagery of subjecthood and kingship, rather than 
of master and discipleship. At the same time, however, Nizami’s ascension narrative clearly 
adheres to familiar paradigms of triumphalism within the ascension narrative genre, positing 
direct encounters with God as the pre-eminent form of knowledge. His narrative likewise 
contains the most emphatic and insistent account of Muhammad’s direct, face-to-face 
encounter with God. If Shahzad Bashir is correct that the medieval period demonstrated a 
“high valorization of corporeal contact as a marker of social solidarity and transmission of 
authority” and that often this corporeal contact was symbolized through the sharing or 
passing down of garments, than all three authors we’ve considered today, to varying degrees, 
rely on this paradigm. In all three cases, though Muhammad already begins his ascension as a 
unique being, the garment touching and bestowal which occurs along his journey transmits 
authority to the Prophet, which is then transmitted to the rest of humanity. The implication 
here is that, if the Throne of God touched Muhammad’s cloak, perhaps through it we can touch 
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the throne of God. Or better still…perhaps the Prophet has shown us a path to touch it directly 
ourselves. But such questions are best left for another venue and another day.  
 
 
Scent 
 
The prophet’s uniqueness and purity, even before the ascent, is demonstrated, in part, 
through the scents he emanates. A number of recent historians have pointed to the 
importance of scent and perfumery in pre-modern texts. Though our own noses are poorly 
trained, Jame McHugh has noted that religious and political elites of most pre-modern polities 
were well-versed in the character of odors, components of perfumes, and the uses to which 
certain scents were best put.456 He notes, tellingly, that scent has both internal and external 
component—it can alter one’s interaction with others but also reflect or even have an effect on 
one’s own state. This is because scent was seen to involve an element of touch – particles of the 
thing being smelled were understood to enter nose as part of the process of smelling them. 
Thus it was an intimate sense—And could be more intimate than sight, for example, because of 
its partially involuntary nature.    
                                                            
456 McHugh, Sandalwood and Carrion. 
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Muhammad’s scent is key to several verses in Nizami’s account. First, he notes that on 
the night of the ascension “Midnight was filled with the musk of his lips.”457 Numerous 
ascension accounts depict Muhammad returning from his ascent with a musky odor—which is 
understood as the scent of heaven. For Al-Ghazali, heavenly muskiness is a solution to the 
question of eating and excrement in the afterlife - he has resurrected bodies sweating and 
belching musk. Nizami inverts this, having Muhammad enter the heavens already emitting a 
musky scent, with which he perfumes the night. Thus, in some ways, all of heaven is touched 
by particles of the Prophet on his ascent. His bodily odors do not simply perfume those they 
touch, however, they also have curative powers. In one evocative line, Nizami has Muhammad 
exhale his minty breath [dam-e sisambari] upon Scorpio’s tale, which cures its poison.458 
 
 
Vision of God 
 
The association of senses with physical contact also plays a role in Nizami’s account of 
Muhammad’s vision of God. Nizami insists that Muhammad saw God with “this eye [didam] 
                                                            
457 Nizami Ganjavi, Makhzan al-asrar, 16. 
458 Ibid. 
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and that eye of his head.”459 Likewise, when encountered with the brilliance of the divine 
vision “His Narcissus (metaphor for iris of eye) had the collyrium460 of  “Mazagh”461.462 Nizami’s 
repeated, emphatic insistence on the Prophet’s bodily ascension and encounter with God gives 
us hints about the audience of his poem. The insistence on Muhammad’s direct vision of God 
has some resonance with Sufi deployments of the ascension narrative. The importance of the 
ascension as a model for Sufis has been noted by a number of commentators, including by Dr. 
Colby in his translation and analysis of Sulami’s Lata’if al-Miraj. From Bayazid Bistami to Ibn 
Arabi, Sufis utilized the mir‘aj. as a model in a number of ways. First, they analogized the stages 
of Muhammad’s ascent to stages of the Sufi path itself. Second, they pointed to Muhammad’s 
direct face-to-face encounter with God, and the momentary loss of consciousness that 
Muhammad experiences in God’s presence, as the preferred goal of human existence. For 
example, Nizami notes that Muhammad was “bewildered [muttaḥīr]” as he knocked on the 
door to the court of heaven.463 This bewilderment is an angelic quality for it is compared to the 
state of the angels Muhammad has left behind at the Lote Tree. Finally, Sufis used 
                                                            
459 Ibid., 19. 
460 Surmah, an eye-treatment made with antimony. Based on hadith accounts, it plays a role in prophetic 
medicine. 
461 Or “not turning away”—a reference to Qur’an 53:17. 
462 Ibid., 17. 
463 Ibid. 
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Muhammad’s ascension to put an asterisk next to the assertion found in hadith literature that 
humans will not see their creator before the Day of Judgment. Muhammad did and he did 
because direct encounters with God happen along a different temporal axis than linear 
eschatological time. Nizami is emphatic on this point, stating: “God can be seen / may he who 
says otherwise be blind,” which is revealing of his goal in depicting a very embodied 
ascension.464 
Critical to our understanding of this aspect of Nizami’s ascension narrative are recent 
insights into the role of the body in medieval Sufism. Most relevant to this chapter is Shahzad 
Bashir’s Sufi Bodies, which notes a “high valorization of corporeal contact as a marker of social 
solidarity and transmission of authority in the literature and art” of the medieval period.465 
Bashir further states that the texts in his study seem to link “increasing intimacy with greater 
corporeal access.”466 HIs work alerts us to the importance of the physical transmission of 
authority in the texts and contexts of medieval Sufism. The significance of this relationship 
between physical contact, spiritual intimacy, and the transmission of mystical knowledge 
                                                            
464 Ibid., 19. 
465 Bashir, Sufi Bodies, 3. 
466 Bashir, Sufi Bodies, 5. 
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helps to shed light on Nizami’s repeated reference to the physicality of Muhammad’s 
ascension. 
 
Ascent Through the Zodiac 
In the long introduction to this work, Nizami dedicates 67 lines to describing 
Muhammad’s heavenly journey (67 lines in the Sarvatiyan edition. 68 in Dastgirdi).467 His Miʿraj 
narrative comes immediately after a discussion of God’s unity and a section praising the 
Prophet in more general terms. Of this introduction, a mere 9 lines specifically discuss the 12 
signs of the zodiac, though it takes 12 lines to complete the story cycle involving the 
astrological signs. Throughout this section, Nizami demonstrates not only his supreme poetic 
talent, but also his command of astronomy.  
Muhammad’s interaction with the zodiac begins in line 13 of the Miʿraj section of the 
Makhzan al-asrar, where he describes the prophet as “crown of the celestial realm” (sipihr). In 
the next line, Muhammad enters the Zodiac at the sign of Taurus (Gav-e felak), temporarily 
trading steeds to ride Taurus instead of Boraq. Far from a fanciful dance through the heavens, 
guided by the logic of rhyme and meter, in the next 8 lines Nizami walks the Prophet through 
each astrological sign in order. His only concession to poetic license is when he inverts Cancer 
                                                            
467 Nizami Ganjavi, Makhzan al-asrar. 
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and Gemini, and Leo and Virgo, though in both cases the two proximate signs, though 
mentioned out of order, appear in the same hemistitch. In both cases, the astrological figures 
interact with one another as well as Muhammad—Cancer and Gemini simultaneously bedeck 
the prophet with their crown and belt, and Virgo tosses a garland of flowers around Leo’s neck. 
The only other interaction between two astrological signs is when Sagittarius shoots his arrow 
into Capricorn—in this case both signs are mentioned in the correct order and in separate 
hemistiches. 
Indeed, Nizami’s recitation of the signs of the Zodiac is reminiscent of Thomas 
Bradwardine’s advice on building a memory palace. Bradwardine, a cleric and Oxford 
University scholar who died in 1349, penned a treatise entitled “On Acquiring a Trained 
Memory.”468 Basing his work on the writings of Albert Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, and 
through them, Aristotle and Cicero, Bradwardine demonstrates the practice of building a 
memory palace through the example of memorizing the symbols and order of the signs of the 
Zodiac. Though his interactions are slightly more gory or sexualized than Nizami’s, the 
principle of properly ordering and symbolizing the Zodiac through physical interactions 
                                                            
468 Mary Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski, eds., The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003) 205-214. 
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between the creatures that symbolize them is shared between the two texts, composed a little 
over a century apart. 
Nizami’s knowledge of the Zodiac extends beyond merely recognizing the star signs 
and their correct order. For example, he shows Libra interacting with Venus. In astrological 
terms, Libra is ruled over by Venus, which makes their interactions in the Makhzan far from 
incidental. Likewise, Nizami uses an Arabic term for Gemini (al-Jauza), which can also mean 
Orion—both Orion and Gemini occupy the same region of the night sky. By conflating them, 
Nizami is able to maintain the order of Muhammad’s journey through the night sky, while also 
having Orion donate the Prophet his signature belt. Finally, the Prophet’s journey through the 
zodiac ends with the Pleiades rising in Aries, a symbol of spring. Nizami immediately follows 
this hemistitch with one discussing flowers blooming in the wilderness (sahra). 
Given Nizami’s clear care with the ordering and characteristics of the signs of the 
Zodiac, his knowledge of the seasons of each sign, and their interaction with other 
constellations and planets, it is difficult to argue that such a passage is mere poetic flourish. 
Nizami is not only demonstrating his knowledge of rhyme and meter, and the creativity of his 
imagination, but also showing his thorough command of astrology. But to what end? One 
reason for ignoring this rich and unique addition to the Miʿraj is that it seems to be an 
unnecessary aside. Muhammad’s adventure through the Zodiac eventually leads him up to 
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heaven, where he resumes his ascension using the terms, images, and tropes already familiar 
in other Miʿraj narrative. The potential uses of such a passage, however, become clearer if we 
read it within the context of the rhetorical purposes to which Miʿraj narratives were put in the 
medieval period. 
 
Muhammad’s Conquest of the Zodiac Signs 
Nizami’s description of Muhammad’s ascent through the Zodiac is far too detailed and 
astrologically accurate to just be a rhetorical flourish. Such care makes one wonder what is at 
stake for him in such a depiction. It is in the context of ascension narratives as a contested 
space for negotiating competing claims of religious and political authority that we now turn to 
a close reading of Nizami’s account of Muhammad’s ascension through the Zodiac. The passage 
begins in line 13 of Nizami’s second encomium to the Prophet. Up until that line, the narrative 
describes Muhammad’s ascension in general terms and details the Prophet’s introduction to 
his steed, Boraq. Eliding numerous aspects of standard ascension narratives, such as 
Muhammad’s journey to Jerusalem, his failure to heed the calls of strangers along the way, or 
his leading prayer in the Farthest Mosque, Nizami launches Muhammad into the stars 
seemingly directly from his bed. This choice in and of itself indicates that Nizami is not 
deploying the Miʿraj for the standard rhetorical purposes. Instead, Muhammad is a pearl in the 
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mine of the world set to become the crown of heaven—his ontological pre-eminence is present 
before he even begins his ascent.      
In the next line, Muhammad trades Boraq out for Taurus as his temporary steed. Unlike 
Ibn Abbas accounts, in which Boraq shies away from Muhammad’s touch until scolded by 
Gabriel, in Nizami’s narrative this scene is not recounted, and Muhammad’s worth is so 
apparent that Taurus recognizes it immediately and allows Muhammad to mount. This trope of 
Muhammad as the instantly-recognized superior to the constellations is carried through the 
next distich, in which Cancer and Gemini (Orion) grant him their crown and belt as tribute 
(pesh-kash).469 Nizami’s choice of words for “gift” here is especially telling, as pesh-kash are 
lavish gifts heaped upon a superior, especially a king. The gifts themselves, however, are not 
simply extravagant, they are the very symbols of kingship and authority. Thus by turning over 
their crown and belt to Muhammad, Nizami depicts Cancer and Gemini turning over their 
dominion to him. 
The next line is particularly challenging, as it plays with the multiple layers of meaning 
behind the name for Virgo. Ultimately, it shows coy Virgo using her hyacinth to calm Leo on 
Muhammad’s behalf. The following line is yet more significant, as it shows Libra unable to 
                                                            
469 Orion inhabits the same region of the sky as Gemini and the Arabic word Nizami uses here, Jauza, can indicate 
either. He probably intends this double-meaning, since Gemini appropriately fits his tour of the Zodiac, but Orion 
makes more sense as donor of a belt. 
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measure Muhammad’s worth. Venus thus takes the weight off of Libra’s scales, as her powers 
of judgment are broken in the face of the Prophet.470  Such a scene is an interesting play on the 
trope of the Prophet as an intercessory figure which is so prevalent in other ascension 
narratives.  
Muhammad next visits Scorpio, whose poison he cures with his breath. The sweetness 
of Muhammad’s breath is a common trope in descriptions of the Prophet’s body, but this 
passage is interesting for the curative powers of that breath, which takes the danger out of 
Scorpios sting. In the next line, Sagittarius becomes a hunter on behalf of Muhammad, slaying 
Capricorn and laying the ram (though here described as a calf) out on the sky’s tablecloth for a 
repast.  Following this “meal,” Muhammad travels through the signs of Aquarius and Pisces. In 
both cases, he is compared to the sun moving through the Zodiac, while Nizami simultaneously 
references the stories of Joseph in the well and Jonah in the whale. Here the poet emphasizes 
Muhammad’s prophetic lineage and allows the reader’s knowledge of these previous prophets 
to explain Muhammad’s relationship to the two Zodiac signs. In the final line of this section, 
Nizami concludes by having Muhammad enter the sign of Aries with the Pleiades rising, a sign 
of the coming of spring—at which point flowers bloom in the wilderness at his arrival. 
                                                            
470 One individual who read this line with me argued for reading sanj as “hand symbol” in this context, rather than 
weight. Though may be a stretch, given the surrounding context, I do quite like the image of Venus turning 
Libra’s scales into castanets. 
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Given Nizami’s detailed knowledge of the Zodiac, the rhetorical use to which ascension 
narratives are so frequently put, and the relatively unique nature of his ascension account, 
what are we to make of this detailed description of Muhammad’s ascension through the 
heavens? Well before Nizami’s time, al-Ḥatīb al-Baghdādī (d. 1071 CE) had rehearsed debates 
over the usefulness of astrology for predicting events. There were two possible ways this could 
occur: the first is that the stars actually influence events on earth, the second is that God uses 
the stars as signs for those with eyes to see. Since there are hadith pointing to a correlation 
between celestial and human events, such a potential concordance cannot be rejected 
outright. A number of texts nevertheless reject reliance on the predictive power of astrology 
out of concern over human error.471 In spite of this anxiety over the possibility of calculation 
errors, Muslim astrologers continued to make star charts and predict the appearance of 
comets in the sky. Likewise, for centuries kings and emperors alike employed astrologers to 
advise them on propitious times to engage in battle or sire an heir.472  
Given the pervasiveness of astrology in Persianate court settings, what are we to make 
of Nizami’s ascension account, which clearly shows familiarity with the specifics of Zodiac 
                                                            
471 Anton Heinen and Suyūṭī, Islamic Cosmology: A Study of as-Suyūṭīʼs al-Hayʼa as-sanīya fī l-hayʼa as-sunnīya (Beirut: In 
Kommission bei F. Steiner Verlag, 1982), 24-34. 
472 A. Azfar Moin, The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam (Columbia University Press, 2012), 
66-70. 
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cycles and planetary movements, yet depicts Muhammad overcoming these one by one during 
his Miʿraj? Though patronized by royalty, Nizami spent his life avoiding the court, choosing to 
live in his small hometown rather than be surrounded by other courtiers. Julie Scott Meisami 
has argued that Layli o Majnun should be read not as a mystical text, but as a critique of courtly 
love’s excesses—specifically the ways in which courtly love objectifies women, turning them 
into tools of male emotional and spiritual development.473 If Meisami is correct in her 
assessment of Nizami’s inherent critique of courtly culture, then his ascension narrative 
becomes readable both within the context of his own work and within the genre of ascension 
narratives. Confronted with the primacy of astrological knowledge in a courtly setting, Nizami 
composes an ascension narrative that subordinates the powers of the Zodiac to Muhammad’s 
pre-eminence. The predictive and evaluative power of the stars become broken through their 
encounter with the Prophet, indicating that, after his Miʿraj, one can only rely on revealed 
knowledge obtained by Muhammad through direct contact with God. 
 
Muhammad as Paradigmatic Mystic and Ascetic 
 
                                                            
473 Meisami, “Kings and Lovers,”Meisami, Medieval Persian Court Poetry, 171. 
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After the ascension narrative, Nizami includes four sections praising the Prophet 
(naʿat), each framed around the Prophet’s body and bodily comportment. In the first naʿat, 
Nizami discusses at length the stone which broke Muhammad’s tooth at the Battle of Uhud. 
Nizami gives the stone’s contact with the Prophet’s body cosmic significance. The chipped 
tooth retroactively becomes the progenitor of all pearls, and the stone, once touched by the 
Prophet’s blood, gives rise to rubies in tribute to this moment of contact with Muhammad. 
Such attention to the spiritual power of physical contact is found throughout the medieval Sufi 
tradition and early hadith literature. Amir-Moezzi notes that the etymology of the word baraka 
contains traces of its embodied origins. He argues an affiliation between taḥnīk474 and 
baraka/tabarruk.475 Originally baraka meant abundant rain, or a place to water camels, or mother 
camels feeding children pre-chewed food at such a site, but "this latter meaning led to the 
interpretation of baraka as the spiritual energy that the father transmits to his newly born 
child by placing him upon his knees and putting saliva in his mouth, blessing him, and in this 
way according him his protection.”476  
                                                            
474 A custom of acknowledging paternity by chewing food and spitting it in an infant’s mouth. 
475 A complex term often translated, not unproblematically, as “blessing” or “grace.” For examples of how it 
functions in the lives of Muslims 
476 Amir-Moezzi, The Spirituality of Shi’i Islam, 37. Contemporary positivists have attempted to give this practice a 
scientific gloss by arguing that it passes antibodies on to the child, therefore “blessing” them with improved 
health. For the pop-scientific literature on this topic, see, for example, Rochman, “Mom’s Saliva Can Strengthen 
Babies’ Immune Systems,” Time, May 6, 2013. 
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Nizami explicitly makes this connection in his second section praising the Prophet. The 
second naʿat begins by immediately focusing on the Prophet’s body: “Your body [tan] is purer 
than pure soul [jan].”477 Clearly in this line, Nizami enjoys playing off the rhyme of body and 
soul. But as we have seen previously, this is not merely about a satisfying rhyme. Nizami is 
happy to contrast body with soul using a variety of homonyms, though he is keen to use 
pairings of near homophones to highlight the close proximity between body and soul, inner 
and outward form.  
A few lines later, Nizami picks up the thread of the relationship between baraka and 
bodily fluids, saying: “Open your mouth, so that all may eat of your sweet words478 / from the 
fountain of your mouth, feed us moist dates.479” Here Nizami is engaging with a long tradition 
of venerating the Prophet’s bodily fluids, where Muhammad uses saliva to cure epilepsy, 
transmit secret knowledge to Ibn Abbas, and convey blessings and virtues upon children and 
new converts.480  Exchanges of bodily fluid can transmit not just spiritual blessing, but also 
                                                            
477 Nizami Ganjavi, Makhzan al-asrar, 22. 
478 Here the word-play is quite ingenious, as shakkar can mean sweet words, the most literal usage here, but also 
sugar — a possible meaning which Nizami plays with in the second hemstitch. Likewise, shakkar is a homograph of 
shuker, which means “blessing” and is thus a synonym for baraka. 
479 The implication here is that the dates have been moistened because the Prophet has pre-chewed them for us. 
Nizami Ganjavi, Makhzan al-asrar, 22. 
480 Amir-Moezzi, The Spirituality of Shi’i Islam, 36-37. 
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knowledge or even religious authority. "We know that in a number of ancient belief systems, 
body fluids such as blood, sperm, saliva, milk, sweat, are considered agents for thaumaturgic 
transmission; they an bear and transmit beneficial or harmful elements, faculties, virtues or 
spiritual influences from the bearer to another, more specifically, by heredity, to their 
descendants.”481 Notably, this was a power specifically attributed to the kahin in pre-Islamic 
Arab culture.482 It also is a mode of transmitting spiritual authority, such that Muhammad’s 
contact with the divine during the ascension can be transmitted to others through bodily fluid 
transfers. 
In concluding his second praise poem to Muhammad, Nizami mourns his physical 
absence, saying “You of two worlds, why are you beneath the ground? You are not a treasure 
[to be buried], why are you clothed in dirt?”483 This absence of the Prophet’s physical presence, 
which denies the world of his light, perfume, and voice,484 is then turned to political and even 
apocalyptic ends. Nizami implores the Prophet to return in order to “renew [tāza kardan] the 
world” by deposing those who live in ease, and cleansing the minbar of the ritually impure.485 
                                                            
481 Ibid., 31. 
482 Ibid., 31. 
483 Nizami Ganjavi, Makhzan al-asrar, 24. 
484 Ibid., 25. 
485 Ibid., 25. 
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Nizami seems particularly interested in the corruption he witnesses in the Persianate world, 
calling Muhammad to leave the land of the Arabs and come to Persia to enact this purification. 
On the apocalyptic side, he calls for Muhammad to “Arise and command the Angel of 
Death[Israfil] to blow out these few candles”486 and then to intercede for those who call on him 
on the day of judgement.487 
In the fourth naʿat, Nizami compares Muhammad to prior prophets, arguing for his pre-
eminence and superiority to them. One running theme throughout the work is the role that 
wheat played in the corruption of humans. Here Nizami notes that Adam was defiled by that 
indigestible grain, wheat. All the other Prophets have their own worldly entanglements, most 
revolving around food and drink. In this section Muhammad alone amongst the prophets is 
framed as a ascetic whose worldly renunciation was sufficient to grant him a direct encounter 
with God. Nizami notes that Muhammad alone “discarded everything,”488 and calls on him to 
“annihilate  [fana’] annihilation”489 Thus in these introductory sections we see Nizami frame 
Muhammad as the perfect ascetic whose denial of worldly desire has granted him unique, 
embodied, access to God. Blessings from this encounter can be obtained through bodily contact 
                                                            
486 Ibid., 26. 
487 Ibid., 27. 
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with the Prophet, but he is no longer bodily present. Thus through emulating his example, 
practicing proper withdrawal from the world, Nizami argues one can obtain a direct, though 
disembodied, encounter with God for themselves.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The mir ‘aj becomes an important narrative in the development of the image of 
Muhammad as intercessor. This intercessory power can be characterized in a number of 
ways—but, as Bashir notes, sometimes intercession can be triggered by partaking in physical 
contact with God through touching one who has touched God…and in one hadith, this physical 
connection can be carried through up to seven degrees of remove. 490  
Perhaps most interesting about Nizami’s ascension narrative, however, is what it leaves 
out. Rick Colby and Christiane Gruber have highlighted how ascension narratives subordinate 
competing symbolic systems to Muhammad’s revelation for the purposes of negotiating 
sectarian debates, winning converts, and training the newly converted. Nizami’s mir‘aj is 
missing a number of hallmarks of those accounts—he doesn’t include a detailed descriptions of 
                                                            
490 Basher, Sufi Bodies, 5. 
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the isra, or the tests and challenges Muhammad faced. Likewise, his encounters with previous 
prophets, sightings of peculiar angels, as well as visions of heavenly rewards and the 
punishments of hell are all left out. What’s more, the common story about Muhammad 
negotiating for a reduction of Muslim prayer responsibilities, at the behest of Moses, is entirely 
absent.  
Speculating on the reasons for this configuration can be challenging, especially since 
relatively little biographical information is known about Nizami. Although his major 
collections of poetry were all commissioned by royal patrons, Nizami eschewed life at the 
court.491 Julie Scott Meisami argues for reading his poems through this biographical lens—she 
asserts that Nizami wrote his romances as a critique of the court and the trope of courtly love. 
In her reading of Layli and Majnun, Majnun is but a selfish boy who indulges in a fantasy to such 
a degree that it thwarts a real relationship with Layla.492 Though this provocative reading has 
few antecedents within the Persian and Arabic reception history of the tale, it does point us 
toward Nizami’s complex relationship with courtly norms. 
If we read the ascension narrative as a genre used to draw religious boundaries, assert 
the primacy of certain practices and traditions over others, and instruct Muslims in proper 
                                                            
491 Chelkowski, "Nizami Gand̲ja̲wī."  
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practice, what might Nizami’s account tell us? Nizami’s mir‘aj tale seems to subordinate 
symbols of worldly authority and knowledge to Muhammad—both astrological (i.e. scientific) 
knowledge and emblems of worldly kingship are broken before the Prophet’s ascent, or gifted 
to him during his journey. His pure inner state is emphasized by his fresh breath that cures 
poison, and musky scent that perfumes the sky. He wears a khirqa and pirahan, has a direct, 
embodied encounter with God, a claim which Nizami bolsters through reference to the Qur’an. 
Likewise, Muhammad is described using the familiar Sufi trope of the heart as a bird, and is 
granted garments in ceremonies that mark the transmission of authority.  
Such a reading of Nizami’s ascension narrative fits well with the topics covered in the 
rest of the poem, which focus on renouncing the world to seek proximity with God. It alerts us 
to the importance of the heart as a symbol throughout the work, helps lasso together tales of 
kingly hubris with later chapters about the values of asceticism. What is more, it helps to 
situate Nizami’s work within a larger body of Sufi texts from the era. As Jawid Mojaddedi and 
Ahmet Karamustafa have helpfully noted, Persian Sufi manuals and hagiographic collections 
were not attempts to negotiate a space for Sufism in a Sunni world dominated by Islamic law, 
as much scholarship claims. Rather, such texts instead boldly represent an attempt, among 
other things, to demonstrate the primacy of Sufi piety over other forms.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE PROBLEM OF POETRY—IMAGINATION, PROPHECY AND POETRY 
 
Introduction 
In his recent book, The Hatred of Poetry, American poet Ben Lerner discusses the origin story 
of the purported first English poet, Caedmon493. According to Bede’s Historia, Caedmon was an 
illiterate cowherd not prone to versification. On feast days, it was custom for revelers to 
contribute a song to the night’s celebration. Each time, before it was his turn to provide a song, 
Caedmon withdrew to the barn. On one of these nights, an mysterious figure, perhaps angelic 
or divine, appeared to Caedmon and ordered him to sing. Caedmon repeatedly refuses, arguing 
that he cannot sing. After insisting multiple times that Caedmon must sing, he finally asks 
“what shall I sing?” The mysterious figure asks him to sing “the beginning of created things,” 
and to his surprise he opens his mouth and produces the first recorded Anglo-Saxon hymn.494 
This tale bears a striking resemblance to the story of the Prophet Muhammad’s first 
revelation. Caedmon’s encounter occurred in the mid-seventh century. It was recorded by 
                                                            
493 Ben Lerner, The Hatred of Poetry (New York: FSG Originals, 2016), 6–8. 
494 The Venerable Bede, The Ecclesiastical History of the English People (Courier Corporation, 2012), 278. 
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Bede in the eighth century. Bede wrote disparagingly of Islam, and owned some Muslim-made 
goods.495 Could this be an echo from Muhammad’s still in-formation biographical literature? Or 
are both Muhammad’s revelation and Caedmon’s inspiration expressions of some universal 
human understanding of the nature of inspiration and the challenges of expressing it in 
language.  
For both Bede and Lerner, the answer is clearly the latter. Bede states “for verses, though 
never so well composed, cannot be literally translated out of one language into another 
without loss of their beauty and loftiness.”496 Lerner uses this to reflect on the nature of poetry, 
noting “the poet is a tragic figure…the poem is always a record of failure.”497 For Lerner, 
following the reading of Alan Grossman, the poet is tragic because their vision always exceeds 
their materials. Grossman notes, “poetic vocation is…both possible and impossible: possible in 
fact—there are, as I say, persons and poems—but strictly, logically, materially, as a matter of 
deliberation, impossible—destined to fail.”498 Grossman frames this in Nietzschean terms, 
                                                            
495 “Saint Bede the Venerable – Muslim Museum UK – Uncover the 1400 Year Relationship between Britain and 
Islam. Explore the History and Heritage of Muslims in Britain.” Accessed June 19, 2016. 
http://muslimmuseum.org.uk/saint-bede-the-venerable/. 
496 Bede, The Ecclesiastical History of the English People, 278. 
497 Lerner, The Hatred of Poetry, 8. 
498 Allen Grossman, The Long Schoolroom: Lessons in the Bitter Logic of the Poetic Principle (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1997), 15. Emphasis is the original. 
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arguing “Bitter is the sentiment of undecidable conflict, between the will to (re)build the 
human world, and the resistance to alternative (heterocosmic) making inherent in the 
materials of which any world must be composed. In this matter, poetics is the bitter (not the 
gay) science.”499 Poets are like world-makers aware of their own limitations, but poetics is the 
science of pointing out those very failures and the moments in which the poetic materials 
resist the poetic project. 
Bede, Grossman, and Lerner are each framing the limitations of language to capture the 
poetic vision, though for Grossman, there is more at stake than just words. The poet is a world 
builder, one who envisions and speaks different ways of being in the world. He likens the poet 
to a demiurge, who in the Book of Genesis works in language.500 For this reason, Grossman 
argues that “there is no strictly secular poiesis.”501 This tension between the actual and the 
possible becomes a source of anxiety for poets and non-poets alike, for “Most of us carry at 
least a weak sense of a correlation between poetry and human possibility that cannot be 
realized in poems. The poet…is both an embarrassment and an accusation.”502 An 
embarrassment because the poet is naive in their refusal to accept the reality of human 
                                                            
499 Ibid., 16. Emphasis is the original. 
500 Ibid., 14. 
501 Ibid., 15. 
502 Lerner, The Hatred of Poetry, 13. 
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limitations. An accusation in that the poet reminds us of our own ideals, relinquished in the 
face of the world’s material resistance to them.  
One solution, the most pristine solution, to the disconnect between the poetic vision and 
the source materials, is silence. We see such invocations of silence in the face of ineffability 
frequently in the history of Persian poetics, especially in the work of Jalal al-din Rumi.503 As 
Lerner points out, some of the most praised poets in the English language are those who fell 
silent or renounced poetry, from Rimbaud who gave up poetry to Keats who died young of 
tuberculosis.504 These poets are praised not only for the good poetry they produced, but also 
for the perfect poetry we imagine them capable of writing. We need not grapple with mediocre 
Keats poems, or a decline into self-parody. George Oppen wrote “Because I am not silent, the 
poems are bad.”505 Because Keats did not live to write them, his mature poems are not bad. As 
with Caedmon’s origin story, however, the poet cannot resort to silence. The poet is compelled 
to sing.  
But who or what is it that produces this compulsion? The question of authority often arises 
in relation to the figure of the poet. Who is the poet to put forth a vision of human possibility? 
                                                            
503 Keshavarz, Reading Mystical Lyric, 49-71. 
504 Lerner, The Hatred of Poetry, 23. 
505 Oren Izenberg, Being Numerous: Poetry and the Ground of Social Life (Princeton University Press, 2011), 104. 
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How can we trust this vision is correct? Anxieties over the ability of the poet to mislead and 
deceive,506 and questions of from whence they derive their authority,507 are key to Plato’s desire 
to exile them from the republic. We see similar anxieties expressed in accounts of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s revelation. As discussed in chapter 1, Qur’an and Hadith literature are keen to 
distinguish prophetic revelation from poetic inspiration. The poet’s vision cannot be trusted, 
for at best the poet is possessed by a jinn and getting second-hand information from the 
angels.  
Key to the debate over the valuation of poetry is the tension between the infinite and the 
finite, the immaterial and the material. The solution to this tension, proposed a number of 
Islamic philosophers, is to argue that God mediates this tension, providing the perfect material 
instantiation of the immaterial. Revelation, unlike poetry, is not “destined to fail,”508 as God has 
provided the Rosetta Stone with which to “literally [translate] out of one language into 
another without loss of their beauty and loftiness.”509 These philosophers are not as keen as 
Plato, however, to outright dismiss the value of poetry. Nizami builds off of these insights, 
aligning poetry and prophecy as siblings, noting that poetry can “seat you at the Lote Tree 
                                                            
506 Plato, The Republic of Plato: Second Edition, trans. Allan Bloom, 2 Sub edition (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 278–9. 
507 Ibid., 316. 
508 Grossman, The Long Schoolroom, 15. 
509 Bede, The Ecclesiastical History of the English People, 278. 
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[sidrat]” and give you a Sultanate in the Kingdom of Spiritual Meaning [ma’na].”510 For Nizami 
the need to write poetry derives from a mystical encounter, but the struggle to produce poetry 
is also akin to the challenge of the mystical path. Both revolve around a need to discipline the 
material world to receive something which exceeds it. For Nizami, the ability to produce 
poetry that can “penetrate the seven spheres,”511 and the ability to have a direct encounter 
with God are both reliant on properly bodily comportment. 
 
 
Variations on a Suitcase 
 
A peculiar difficulty arises when discussing poetry as a source for religious attitudes 
and mores. Contemporary scholars can be dismissive of poetry as a source for historical data or 
religious insight. This dismissal of poetry can come from one of two directions. The first 
approach is to impugn poetry’s ability to effectively or concisely convey religious meaning.512 
                                                            
510 Nizami Ganjavi, Makhzan al-asrar, 43. 
511 Ibid., 42-43. 
512 This is most prevalent in analysis of the works of Jalal al-Din Rumi, whose poetry if often read for its alignment 
with the theoretical insights at the expense of its aesthetic innovations. In her book Reading Mystical Lyric, 
Fatemeh Keshavarz concisely outlines the argument for reading “through” poetic form, made by Chittick, and 
dubs it the “suitcase theory.” She asserts that “[t]he poet whose vision revolutionized the Persian lyric has been 
portrayed as clumsy with poetry and disrespectful of it,” Keshavarz, 13. 
 
 
247 
Often this critique revolves around understandings of genre conventions. Poetry, with its 
metrical constraints and metaphorical conventions, is beholden to form first, and meaning 
second. Some of this devaluation comes from the poets themselves, such as Jalal al-Din Rumi, 
who says “Take this poetry and tear it up, like old cloth!”513 Rather than reading outbursts such 
as this as expression of frustration in the face of divine ineffability, some commenters instead 
take this to mean that poetry is an insufficient vehicle for expressing what can more easily be 
said in another idiom, such as kalam or falsafa.514 
The second approach is to question the relationship between religiously-inflected 
imagery and the poet’s own religious convictions. Both Iranian and Euro-american scholarship 
on Persian poetry has argued that Sufi metaphors so infuse the Persian poetic aesthetic that 
they should be read as a genre convention rather than expression of Sufi proclivities. A prime 
example of this approach can be found in Yarshater’s introduction to Hafez in the 
Encyclopedia Ironic: 
                                                            
8 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Love, 18. 
9 Ibid., 24. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
513 Divan, 2592, from Chittick, Sufi Path of Love, 271.  
514 Keshavarz, 14. 
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Attempts at finding a mystical interpretation for Hafez’s praise of wine and drunkenness are not 
supported by his Divān. Many lovers of Hafez have sought to find clues in his poetry to his 
mysticism or confirmation of his religious beliefs. As Sufi centers (ḵānaqāhs) multiplied and Sufi 
orders found more and more affiliates, a mystical view of life and the universe and the 
attainment of Truth by love rather than reason became prevalent and profoundly influenced the 
Persian world view. It was only natural that a Sufistic interpretation should be applied to the 
poems of Hafez, ignoring in the process many indications to the contrary. Some commentators 
and even some Western translators of Hafez, notably Wilberforce Clarke, a translator of the Divān 
(London, 1974), satisfied themselves, to the point of utter absurdity, that every single word 
written by Hafez had a mystical meaning and no line of Hafez actually meant what it said. The 
reading of Hafez as codified poetry implying an esoteric meaning for each line or word 
propounded the view that his ghazals can be read at two levels, one apparent, the other hidden—
the latter representing the intended meaning. Deciphering Hafez’s underlying meaning grew into 
an esoteric art, not dissimilar to the explanations offered by the addicts of “conspiracy theories” 
(q.v.) in political affairs.515 
In this case, the question of how to interpret a poet’s mystical imagery centers on how we 
come to understand the poet’s biography and authorial intention. If poets such as Hafez could 
become the object of Sufi “conspiracy theories,” these “conspiracies” could form in the other 
direction as well, with clear Sufi allusions read as solely the product of poetic flourish or genre 
convention. Chekowlski, in his entry on Nizami in the Encyclopedia of Islam, for example, 
presents Nizami’s mysticism as such: “If there is a mystic strain in Nizami, it is subtle and 
covert; it never destroys or blurs the sharp psychological and the physical identity of its 
protagonist. It is virtually impossible to draw a clear line in Nizami’s poetry between the 
mystical and the erotic, the sacred and the profane.”516 Thus Nizami, though his Layla & Majnun 
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tells a familiar Sufi tale of human love as a metaphor for love of the divine, is often valued 
primary as a poet rather than mystic, because the mystical content is harder to separate from 
the poetic form. This dismissal comes in spite of the fact that Nizami, in the introduction to the 
Makhzan al-asrar, claims to have had two separate mystical experiences during 40-day 
seclusions. This too can be attributed to genre convention, for “the mysticism with its 
symbolism is apparent only in the introduction, which is infused with the essence of Sufi 
thought. In the main body of the book one can detect scattered mystical overtones, but it is up 
to the reader to arrive at the final interpretation.”517 Nizami seems to disagree, however. His 
introduction is not merely a perfunctory proem, but a prolegomena providing the lens 
through which to interpret what follows. In the section that concludes the introduction to the 
Makhzan al-asrar, titled “The Second Seclusion,” he compares his mystical experience to a 
mir’aj.518 In the line immediately proceeding the first discourse, Nizami argues that one should 
strive to reach the experience of God’s light that Nizami did, implying that the poetry that 
follows will provide advice on just how to do so.519  
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Part of the difficulty in taking poetry seriously revolves around the relative lack of 
engagement with Muslim understandings of poetry as a genre for expressing religious truths. 
As another Nizami reminds us, ”poetry operates affectively, that is, through the agency of the 
imagination, which translates (as it were) poetic images into ethical exempla in the minds of 
the audience."520 The key term here is “imagination,” which carries important philosophical 
valences. Chittick notes, “there is generally something insubstantial and “unreal” about 
images perceived by the imagination. But this is not always the case, for when the image 
derives from the higher levels of the World of Imagination, it is more real than the mind 
itself.”521 Thus, in poetry, a mystic poet attempts to discuss something that is “more real” than 
the language with which he describes it. In such instances as this, language must necessarily 
fail. Poetry cannot express the ineffable in his poetry not because of the shortcomings of 
poetry but because of the very nature of the ineffable. In the following section we will explore 
the role of poetry in philosophy, especially in regards to prophecy. We will see why Nizami 
argues that poetry is uniquely suited for expressing mystical insight based on his 
understanding of Islamic philosophy. Though we do not know what was on Nizami’s bookshelf, 
we do know that "Wisdom (hikmat) is for Nizami a Greek legacy as well as a Qur'anic 
                                                            
520 Nizami Aruzi paraphrased in Meisami, “Kings and Lovers,” 2. 
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imposition" and that he is interested in the writings of Plato, though less so with 
Neoplatonists.522 This chapter will discuss the philosophical and theological underpinnings of 
Nizami’s attitude towards poetry as well as the challenges posed by his elevated view of poetry 
as a medium of mystical expression. We will discuss how poetry comes to be valued only if it 
adheres to logical principles, and the anxiety that Sufi claims to direct experience of God, and 
the poetic presentation of those experiences, caused in Islamic theology and philosophy. We 
will examine dismissive attitudes towards poetry as a source of knowledge about medieval 
Muslim religious practice, explore the theological difficulties of making religious claims in 
poetic idiom, and finally examine Nizami’s resolute assertion that poetry is in fact the ideal 
form for discussion mystical truth and advocating for proper religious praxis. 
 
 
Hadith & Qur’an on Poetry 
 
                                                            
522 Johann Christoph Burgel, “Nizami’s World Order,” in A Key to the Treasure of the Hakīm: Artistic and Humanistic 
Aspects of Nizāmī Ganjavī’s Khamsa, ed. Christine van Ruymbeke and Johann Christoph Burgel (Leiden: Leiden 
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In many tellings of the Prophet Muhammad’s life, his first revelation comes with an 
anxiety that it might indicate possession by jinn.523 In the pre-Islamic Arabian context, jinn 
possession was claimed a source of inspiration for poets and for soothsayers (kahin), who 
sometimes prophesied in verse. Muhammad was at pains to prove the veracity of his 
revelation and distinguish his revelations from those of the poets and kahin. Perhaps more 
important to the treatment of poetry in the Qur’an and hadith literature was its use by 
Muhammad’s opponents in Mecca to disparage him. Whether it be seen as dangerous, 
frivolous, or merely put to bad use, the Qur’an and hadith literature are generally skeptical of 
poetry and its usefulness. In this section, we will examine some key prophetic hadith and 
Qur’anic passages on the issue of poetry, and explore how the early scriptural tradition was at 
pains to distinguish between revelation and poetry.524 
 
 
Qur’an on Poetry 
                                                            
523 Stories of how Muhammad overcame this doubt vary. In one case, a Christian monk provides verification of the 
authenticity of Muhammad’s revelation, which links Muhammad to the lineage of monotheistic prophets. In one 
account, Muhammad’s first wife Khadijah confirms that Gabriel is an angel rather than a jinn through engaging in 
sexual intercourse with the Prophet. The implications of this incident for women’s piety and mystical potential 
are explored more fully in chapter 1. 
524 Extensive work has been done on the history and deployment of hadith literature. Needless to say, this chapter 
does not argue for taking hadith as transparent historical accounts of Muhammad’s sayings and deeds. Rather they 
reflect the interests and concerns of the generation of compilers in the 9th/2nd century. 
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The Qur’an is self-aware of the challenge of poetry as a medium for conveying religious 
meaning. Sura 26, known as “The Poets,” deals with this issue in a brief verse near the end of 
the chapter: “And as for the poets, the errant follow them.”525 This verse, however, is placed in 
the larger context of the story of Moses combatting the Pharaoh’s magicians and people being 
deceived or lead astray in the face of God’s message. The poets, then, are mentioned 
immediately after a verse discussing those upon whom devils descend—liars. The poets are 
thus not just a problem for their own sinfulness, but also because they lead others astray. 
The Qur’an quite emphatically rejects the accusation that it could be poetry: “And We 
have not taught him poetry; nor would it befit him”526 One of the largest concerns the Qur’an 
shows regarding poetry is that Muhammad himself might be accused of being a poet: “Yet they 
said, “Confused dreams! Nay, he has fabricated it! Nay, he is a poet!”527 or “Are we to forsake 
our gods for a poet possessed?”528 In Surat 52, al-Tur, an extended discussion of Muhammad’s 
                                                            
525 26:224 
526 36:69 
527 21:5 
528 The word translated here as “possessed,” majnun, literally means one possessed by a jinn. One understanding of 
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heaven and relay half-truths and misheard information to the poets. A jinn may not be purposefully deceptive, 
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status as a prophet is discussed in contrast to other potential interpretations: “So remind, for 
thou art not, by the Blessing of thy Lord, a soothsayer or one possessed. Or do they say, “A 
poet—let us await the vagaries of fate for him.”529 Soothsaying, possession and poetry are 
closely aligned in this verse in ways that, as we shall see later in this chapter, become 
significant in later Islamic philosophy and theology. A similar lassoing together of poetry and 
soothsaying occurs in Sura 69, al-Haqqah, where the Qur’an states: 
So I swear by what you see and by what you see not, truly it is the speech of a noble 
messenger, and not the speech of a poet. Little do you believe! Nor is it the speech of a 
soothsayer. Little do you reflect! It is a revelation from the Lord of the Worlds!530 
As these verses show, it is not just the linguistic attributes of the Qur’anic revelation 
that may cause it to be mistaken for poetry, but the fact that poetry is a genre some turn to for 
moral guidance and predictions about the future. This association is more explicitly outlined in 
Sura 72, al-Jinn, where the Qur’an discusses jinn listening at the gates of heaven to angelic 
discourse and misreporting its contents to humans.531 The close association of jinn possession 
with both poetry and fortune-telling is one explanation for the fact that these two are so 
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frequently mentioned together in the Qur’an. As we shall see later in this chapter, poetry’s 
ability to render esoteric truth into comprehensible metaphors will be one of the reasons 
Islamic philosophers struggle with poetry’s value, and potential danger. 
 
  
Hadith on Poetry 
 
In contrast to Qur’anic treatments of poetry, not all hadith accounts of poetry are 
negative. We see at least one account, verified through several different isnads, where the 
Prophet argues that there is wisdom (hikma) in poetry. In some versions of this hadith the 
affirmation of poetry’s wisdom comes unqualified, or with poetry compared favorably to 
knowledge (ilm).532 In others, the Prophet notes that “some” poetry contains wisdom, as if this 
is an exception to the general rule.533 In other cases, the condemnation of poetry is much more 
explicit, like when the Prophet says “It is better for a man to fill the inside of his body with pus 
than to fill it with poetry.”534 But such absolute condemnations are rare. Instead, hadith 
                                                            
532 I heard the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) say: In eloquence there is magic, in knowledge ignorance, in poetry 
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accounts often show an ambivalence toward poetry, affirming it when used in approved places 
and modes, and disapproving of it in others. Key to distinguishing acceptable poetry from 
unacceptable poetry seems to be the possibility for confusing poetry with revelation.  
As with the Qur’anic verses on poetry, some hadith are interested in whether or not 
Muhammad ever recited poetry. Some of this concern may relate to a growing consensus as to 
Muhammad’s status an illiterate blank slate through which God could best transmit revelation 
without corruption.535 The implication here is that if the Prophet always eschewed poetry, 
distinguishing between revelation and poetry becomes an easy task. Likewise, proscribing 
poetry becomes much easier. Several hadith transmitted by Aisha, however, seem to reveal 
that the Prophet had at least some knowledge of poetry. When asked about whether the 
Prophet ever recited poetry, she responds "He would say parables with the poetry of Ibn 
Rawahah, saying: 'News shall come to you from where you did not expect it.’”536 In some cases, 
it seems that it is the uses to which poetry is put that determine its acceptability. For example, 
one hadith recounts the Prophet wife Aisha defending Companion Hasan ibn Thabit’s recitation 
of poetry, saying “Don't abuse him, for he used to defend the Prophet (with his poetry).”537 
                                                            
535 See, for example, Rubin’s Eye of the Beholder, where he argues that the term ummi might have originally meant 
something closer to gentile than “illiterate” (24). As we shall discuss later in this chapter, this issue of 
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Aisha herself seems ambivalent toward poetry, arguing that “"Poetry is both good and bad. 
Take the good and leave the bad.”538 Other transmitters frame the permissibility of poetry as 
being related to its proximity to Islam. Abu Hurayra, for example, transmits the Prophet 
arguing “The truest word spoken by an Arab (pre-Islamic) in poetry is this verse of Labid: 
"Behold! apart from Allah everything is vain."539 Likewise, in another account, he is said to ask 
to hear more and more of Abu Salt’s poetry, compelled by how close the poet was to accepting 
Islam based on his verses.540 
Though in some cases the permissibility of pre-Islamic poetry is at times framed by its 
theological soundness, several other hadith discussing poetry are keen to separate it out from 
religious ritual and space. For example, recitation of poetry and the Qur’an are specifically 
compared in one hadith, where Ibn Mas’ud chastises a man for reciting a sura too quickly, as if 
it were poetry.541 Nasa’i collects two conflicting hadith on the permissibility of poetry recitation 
in a mosque. In one account, the Prophet explicitly banned poetry from the mosque.542 In the 
very next hadith, however, Nasa’i records a longer account of Hasan ibn Thabit chastising Umar 
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for giving him a dirty look for reciting poetry in the mosque, arguing that Muhammad had 
approved of such a practice.543  
As we have seen in this section, hadith accounts of poetry are more ambivalent toward 
it than the Qur’an, though they nevertheless reflect a concern over poetry’s subject matter and 
the proper time and place for its recitation. These concerns are picked up in the philosophical 
tradition which expresses a similar ambivalence toward poetry’s ability to express truth.  
 
 
Poetry and Prophecy in Islamic Philosophy 
 
As we have seen, in the early Islamic tradition, views on poetry are ambivalent at best. 
Nevertheless, poetry remained an important artistic form and cultural touchstone in Arab and 
Persiante societies. From the 9th/2nd century onward, however, the translation of and 
introduction of Greek philosophy into the Arabic language and Islamic discourse raised the 
stakes on attitudes toward poetry, especially in regards to its usefulness as a vehicle for 
conveying religious knowledge and mystical insight. According to Deborah Black, philosophies, 
since Aristotle, have generally rejected poetics as either non-syllogistic/non-rational or as 
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entirely false, even if rational in method. She notes that Islamic philosophy is notable for its 
unwillingness to reject poetry outright, and its desire to navigate a middle path between these 
two extremes. Thus “poetics becomes unique among the syllogistic arts in that it uses a 
discursive, syllogistic method, but not with a view to evoking the intellect’s assent to its 
conclusions.”544 For some authors, such as Salim Kemal, the importance of poetics in Islamic 
philosophy is nothing more than a concession to the status of poetry in Arab culture, as well as 
a component of political philosophy, since poetry can serve as a force for social cohesion.545 
While such an position is attractive in its simplicity and practicality, it does not explain why 
poetry must be construed as logical in order to serve such a function, and it also side-steps 
grappling with problematic clashes between poetry and prophecy that arise out of al-Farabi’s 
decision to affiliate both so closely with his uniquely robust imaginative faculty.  
The relationship between imagination, poetry, and prophecy is a particularly fraught 
one in Islam, due to the nature of the Qur’an and the cultural and literary context into which it 
arrived. The Qur’an and prophetic hadith are particularly careful to distinguish between poetic 
and prophetic utterance, so any philosophy that ties them to the same faculty of the soul and 
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gives them overlapping social functions must proceed carefully. In Jewish tradition, for 
example, a prophet be denied revelation for moral failures, one of which is reciting poetry. 
Building off this context, hadith literature records a story of Muhammad being denied 
revelation for reciting poetry, "implying that poetry and prophecy are mutually exclusive.”546 
In this section, we will explore the implications of al-Farabi’s enlargement of the functions of 
the imagination, his association of prophecy with the imaginative faculty, and his inclusion of 
poetic discourse in the category of logic. After examining the possible difficulties that arise 
from such a constellation of changes to Aristotelian philosophy, especially within an Islamic 
context, we will go on to examine the ways in which Ibn Sina overcomes or avoids some of 
these problems by fragmenting the imagination and introducing the “Holy Intellect,” thus 
allowing him to maintain al-Farabi’s status of poetic discourse as logic, keep it tied to the now 
fragmented imaginative faculties, while at the same time clarifying any confusion about the 
relative status and social function of poetry and prophecy. Finally, we will trace how these 
intellectual threads make their way into Nizami’s understanding of poetry as an ideal vehicle 
for articulating mystical truths. 
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The Problem: Poetry and Prophecy in Islam 
 
The revelation of the Qur’an entered into a society with a well-developed poetic 
tradition, and for this reason the Prophet is careful to distinguish his linguistic revelation from 
the words of the poets. The distinction between poetry and prophecy is an important one to 
make, because they seem to overlap in numerous ways. The situation is complicated by the 
Arabic term most often used for revelation in the Qur’an: wahy. This complex word has 
multiple levels of meaning, but is not used exclusively to refer to divine communication with 
prophets. In pre-Islamic poetry, the term referred to discerning traces of the beloved from an 
abandoned campsite, a common way of opening a qasida.547 In fact, of the 71 times wahy occurs 
in the Qur’an, only thrice does it refer specifically to the revelation of the Qur’an or 
scripture.548 In terms of communication between humans and the supernatural, poets, diviners, 
and madmen were sometimes thought to be recipients of wahy, which they could receive from 
Satan, jinn, or even by overhearing the conversations of angels.549  
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Prophecy and poetry do not simply overlap in that they both have their source in 
inspiration, but also share a form of outward expression in the case of the Qur’an. Though 
Qur’anic language is not poetic in a technical sense it does share with poetry a rhythmic line, 
high aesthetic quality, and, in the case of the Meccan Suras, a strong use of imagery. Such 
technical features of the works allowed both poetry and the Qur’an to be more easily 
memorized, which helped facilitate their dissemination through public recitation.  
Prophetic hadith and the Qur’an itself are careful to distinguish between prophecy, 
divination, and poetic inspiration, and to sequester the latter two from having access to the 
same level and accuracy of knowledge as the Prophet. For example, after the time of the 
Prophet, it is said that the jinn who used to listen at the gates of heaven and report their words 
through a kahin were barred from listening by angels.550 Furthermore, prophecy was 
distinguished from other forms of inspired speech through a series of distinguishing 
characteristics, some easier to identify than others, including the descent and social status of 
the speaker, the character and nature of the content of the message, and the ecstatic state of 
the prophet before receiving revelation, which distinguished it from poetry, though not 
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necessarily from divination.551 The Prophet further distinguished the Qur’an from poetic 
speech by emphasizing its inimitable beauty, challenging poets to produce that matched it in 
significance of content and aesthetic quality. Two other marks of prophecy would definitively 
set it above all other inspired speech so as to avoid any possible further confusion: its 
infallibility and accompaniment by miracles and marvels.552  
After so much work to separate prophecy from other forms of inspired speech, al-
Farabi complicates the matter by elevating the imaginative faculty and tying it closely to both 
prophecy and poetic discourse. Such a move calls into question the issue of the verifiability of 
infallibility, since the imaginative faculty operates outside of the realm of true/false 
dichotomies. Furthermore the social function of prophecy appears to overlap with the 
potential social function of poetry in al-Farabi. Clearly the status of prophecy relative to 
poetry and the question of distinguishing the Prophet from poets was not at stake in al-Farabi, 
nevertheless, the uncomfortable proximity of the two in both his theoretical and political 
philosophy seems to point to problems with his formulation of the imagination, which he both 
frees from necessary engagement with the rational faculty, ties closely with the prophetic 
function, and yet nevertheless brings into the sphere of logic through his writings on Poetics.  
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Imagination in Aristotle 
 
Aristotle divides the human faculties into five parts, in descending order: the rational, 
imaginative, desiderative, sensitive, and nutritive. He further divides the rational faculty into 
three functions: theoretical, practical, and productive.553 In De Anima, he notes that thought, 
imagination, and sensation are separate, but nevertheless dependent on one another, 
hierarchically.554 That is, we cannot imagine without first having sensations from which to 
build imaginative images, and we cannot think about objects without first having them as 
images in the imagination. Aristotle argues that even when we think of abstract concepts that 
have no associated sensation, such as in geometry, we still think in images.555 Though 
dependent on sensation, imagination is nevertheless capable of a “noetic distance” from 
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sensation. In other words, one does not need constant sensory input in order to think, but can 
utilize latent content of that which has been previously sensed—as with dreaming.556  
Among the powers that Aristotle attributes to the imagination are self-motion, arguing 
that syllogism and inference account for the motility of animals.557 Thus we see a tentative 
attribution of a syllogistic function to the imaginative faculty. In spite of this function, the 
imagination does not appear to be structured syllogistically in Aristotle, because he only gives 
the imagination the ability to store and recall images, not break them apart and combine them. 
This power he reserves for reason acting upon the imagination.  
 
 
Imagination in al-Farabi 
 
Al-Farabi, like Aristotle, attributes five faculties to human beings, though their names 
and functions do not completely overlap with Aristotle’s. In descending order, al-Farabi’s five 
faculties are: the rational, representative (imagination), appetitive, sensitive, and vegetative.558 
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In his characterization of the representative faculty, al-Farabi depends greatly on Aristotle, 
though with multiple additions and alterations.559 
In the Virtuous City, al-Farabi specifically posits imagination as the link between the 
senses and reason, which sounds very much like Aristotle’s position.560 Unlike Aristotle, al-
Farabi attributes an appetitive function to the imagination, and argues that this appetitive 
function is the source of animal self-motivation, not the syllogistic nature of imaginative 
processes.561 While taking away an argument for a syllogistic function of the imagination, al-
Farabi also frees it of reliance on the rational faculty. Unlike Aristotle, who gives the power of 
manipulating objects to the rational faculty, al-Farabi locates this ability within the 
imagination itself, thereby expanding its range of powers and reducing its dependence on the 
rational faculty.562 He also attributes to the imagination the ability to discriminate between 
various aspects of sensation, an important addition if one is to give it the power to manipulate 
and reassemble images. Furthermore, al-Farabi attributes the imagination with the ability to 
imitate, which restores syllogism to the imaginative faculty, as imitation works through a 
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process akin to analogy.563 These are critical moves in al-Farabi’s bid to link prophecy with 
imagination—the imagination’s ability to reorder and discriminate allows it to not only recall 
images of absent sensory objects, but even to represent Intelligibles and abstract concepts.564 
Thus, for al-Farabi, imagination is not simply imitative, but also has the ability to assign 
appropriate images to things that have not presented themselves to the senses.565  
 
 
Relationship between Imagination and Prophecy in al-Farabi 
 
According to the Encyclopedia of Religion prophecy differs from mysticism in that it is an 
oracular ecstasy—thus verbal expression and communication to a community are essential 
elements of prophecy as such.566 Revelation, indicating the self-unmasking of God, is not the 
best translation for the two primary words used to describe prophetic revelation wahy and 
tanzil. Taken together, these two words indicate a conception of revelation not as divine 
unveiling, which sounds much more like mysticism, but instead of a message or 
                                                            
563 Black, “Psychology: Soul and Intellect,” 313. 
564 Kemal, 93. 
565 Ibid. 
566 “Prophecy,” Encyclopedia of Religion, Ed. Lindsay Jones, (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 7427. 
 
 
268 
communication sent down.567 When encountering the phenomena of prophecy, Islamic 
philosophers must grapple first with the question of how the prophet receives such a 
revelation. In their attempts to show the commensurability of religion and philosophy, many 
philosophers opt to focus upon the intellect. Doing so resolves any apparent conflict between 
philosophy and religion, as both involve the same human faculty and deliver the same 
knowledge. However, if one locates the reception of revelation within the intellect in this way, 
the question arises as to whether or not the prophet must prepare him or herself by 
developing his or her rational faculty, as philosophers must. Furthermore, since the knowledge 
philosophers attain when the acquired intellect connects with the Active Intellect can only be 
taught to a select few through demonstration, the question of how one translates such 
knowledge into a form accessible to a mass audience arises. 
Al-Farabi solves such a problem by bifurcating prophecy and revelation into two 
separate movements in the process of divine communication, capitalizing on the rasul/nabi 
distinction.568 Thus one may receive revelation without being a prophet, without delivering a 
message to a people. In this case, it would seem that the revelation is received by the rational 
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faculty alone imparting wisdom to the individual who receives it.569 Thus the individual who 
receives revelation but who is not also a prophet will look much like a philosopher, though 
without the need for years of training and development of the rational faculty, for as Muhsin 
Mahdi points out, one of the meanings for the root w-h-y is “quickness.”570 
The imagination plays an especially important role in al-Farabi’s views on prophecy, as 
for him prophecy is the overflow of the divine mind into the imagination.571 According to 
Mushin Mahdi, prophecy does not bypass the rational faculty but rather begins as revelation, 
which overflows the rational faculty, spilling into the imagination.572 It also touches the senses 
which explains how prophets can speak of physically “seeing” angels and other non-material 
things.573 Because of the nature of the imagination in al-Farabi, however, it cannot receive 
Intelligibles themselves, as the rational faculty can. Instead, it imitates them by manipulating 
images of sensible things that it has stored.574 Thus al-Farabi’s attribution of the ability to 
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manipulate images and imitate non-material things analogically through such manipulation 
becomes central to his understanding of the mechanism by which prophecy occurs.  
The ability of the imagination to imitate Intelligibles in this method is what allows it to 
deliver the message of revelation to a mass audience. Thus prophecy becomes important for its 
communicative value, and for this reason has a political function in al-Farabi. He envisions the 
ideal political order as a city-state founded by a Philosopher-Prophet-King (though indeed for 
al-Farabi, any prophet is by default a philosopher as well) delivering philosophical truths to 
the masses. This formulation, however, leaves out an important question—because, in al-
Farabi’s formulation, the prophet is already a king, his prophecy is from-the-start invested 
with political authority, thus we need not ask what it is about prophecy that inspires someone 
to give his or her assent to its teachings. Such questions about how the imagination constructs 
arguments and inspires assent are left to his discussions of poetic logic, to which we will next 
turn. 
In this section we have outlined the ways in which al-Farabi reformulates the 
imagination and its association with prophecy. In altering Aristotle’s understanding of the 
imagination and by adding imaginative discourse (poetry) to logic, al-Farabi seems to be 
attempting to resolve one problem: the question of the relative truth of and relationship 
between religion and philosophy. In doing so, however, new problems arise regarding the 
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relationship between poetry and prophecy, because the nature of the imagination in relation 
to poetic discourse calls into question the philosophic verifiability of prophecy which al-Farabi 
hopes to achieve in his political writings. In the next section, we will examine the role and 
nature of poetics in Aristotle and al-Farabi, discuss how the nature of the imaginative faculty 
required for al-Farabi to classify Poetics as a logical discourse seems to create problems for its 
close association with prophecy, and then examine how Ibn Sina attempts to resolve these 
problems through the fragmentation of the imaginative faculty and the introduction of the 
“Holy Intellect.” 
 
 
Poetry and Prophecy in Ibn Sina 
 
The previous section discussed the proximities between poetry and prophecy in the 
Islamic tradition, how the Qur’an, hadith, and later thinkers are careful to distinguish between 
the two phenomena, and how al-Farabi’s focus on the role of the imaginative faculty in 
prophecy brought poetry and prophecy once again into dangerous proximity. This section will 
look more closely at al-Farabi’s understanding of poetry, specifically his location of poetics 
within the syllogistic arts (logic), and discuss the way this understanding of poetry further 
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compounds the problem of distinguishing between poetry and prophecy from a philosophical 
standpoint. It will then move on to discuss Ibn Sina’s refiguration of the imaginative faculty 
and his introduction of the “Holy Intellect,” which downgrades the importance of the 
imagination in the reception and dissemination of prophecy. The section will conclude with a 
brief discussion of the use of this triad—poetry, prophecy, and imagination—in the writings of 
contemporary thinkers such as Abdolkarim Soroush. Through this examination we will see 
that the linguistic nature of the Qur’an, in tandem with Islamic philosophy’s elevation of 
poetics to a logic and invocation of imagination as a mechanism of prophecy, continue to cause 
problems in distinguishing prophecy from other inspired, evocative speech acts. This difficulty 
leads thinkers to often identify the locus of difference between the two outside the specific 
mechanism of prophecy and poetry itself, in their source, effect, nature of the bearer, or some 
accompanying phenomena, such as miracles.  
 
 
Poetry in al-Farabi 
 
Unlike Aristotle, and his Greek disciples and followers, al-Farabi groups the Poetics and 
Rhetoric with the Organon in the body of Aristotle’s works on logic. The inclusion of poetics 
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within logic is directly a product of al-Farabi’s understanding of the analogic function of the 
imaginative faculty, which manifests itself in poetry, and further his assertion of the 
relationship between analogy and syllogism. Though it is its relationship with the imagination 
that makes poetics syllogistic, it goes without saying that the imagination is explicitly not the 
source of all syllogism. Rather, what divides the poetic syllogism from other forms of syllogism 
is it’s very imaginative nature.575 In his attribution of imitation to the imaginative faculty, Al-
Farabi makes substitution, thus analogy, one of the prime functions of imagination. Since al-
Farabi gives to the imaginative faculty the manipulative and discriminating functions that 
Aristotle reserves for the rational faculty, poetry, whose operations in language model those of 
the imaginative faculty, becomes the imaginative discourse par excellence. It is important to 
note that although all poetic discourse in imaginative, not all expressions of the imagination 
are poetry. Thus, though it’s imaginative property is what separates poetry from other forms 
of syllogism, it is not what distinguishes it from other imaginative arts, but rather the 
conjunction of imagination with the formal and thematic elements common to poetry.576 
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For al-Farabi, there are five kinds of syllogism: demonstrative, dialectical, sophistical, 
rhetorical, and, lastly, poetical.577 The reasoning for this grouping, however, is a bit complex 
and perplexing, as al-Farabi himself notes that in terms of logical status, poetic statements are 
completely false.578 Poetry is not, as sophistry, intentionally deceptive in service of achieving a 
given end. Rather poetry is false because “to imagine something is to exclude it from existence, 
and as poetry is imaginative speech, nothing imaginative can make a true or false claim about 
any existing state of affairs, even though the statement may be meaningful.”579 Though poetry 
may not be true or false, it can nevertheless be valid. This validity stems from two sources: 
first, poetry is meaningful for al-Farabi, and this meaningfulness is related to his view of the 
role of the imagination in poetry.580 Second, poetry is valid because it makes arguments by 
analogy. Its syllogistic structure is verifiable, even if its premises and middle term are not. It is 
this analogic structure that situates poetic discourse within the bounds of logic for al-Farabi.581  
Poetic logic works on a model of contagion, whereby neutral objects, when associated 
with something we dislike, become repellent to us through this association, not because of 
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anything within themselves: “The poetic syllogism succeeds by bringing the subject to see or 
acquiesce to the resemblance (on the basis of an imaginative conception of the premises) proposed 
in a simile or comparison.”582 The validity of poetic discourse rests in a feeling of aptness of 
association that gives rise to assent. In terms of the imagination, the standard for successful 
manipulation depends on the use to which the constructed image is put, not how well it 
reproduces some original experience.583 Thus Deborah Black asserts that al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, 
and Ibn Rushd all agree that “poetics does not seek to produce assent in the strict sense, since 
it is not concerned to provide true and accurate instruction about the subjects it represents. It 
does, however, seek to capture the audience’s imagination and in this way it can be evaluated 
as successful or ineffectual.”584 Since poetry attempts to produce action, it can be judged 
according to its results. However, unlike Sophistry, which is similarly goal-oriented, poetry 
obtains its validity outside of a truth/fiction binary. Sophistry aims at producing action 
through false gestures of truth, whereas imagination aims to produce action without the 
conviction of truth. Although it operates outside of the true/false binary, it is not irrational, 
for it still functions as a ractiocinative discourse because of its analogic structure.585  
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Problems that Arise in the Relationship between Poetry, Prophecy and the Imagination 
 
Al-Farabi’s understanding of the function of imagination, and its important role in both 
poetry and prophecy, gives rise to problems with distinguishing between the two in three 
primary arenas. First, poetry is primarily a communicative act and thus has social implications, 
which is also of course an important aspect of prophecy in al-Farabi’s political philosophy. 
Second, because it produces assent, which can bring about moral conviction, poetry’s content 
and result can often look much like that of prophecy. Finally, the above two issues are tied to 
an inherent epistemological problem with al-Farabi’s construction of the imagination: because 
of its imitative function, imagination inserts itself as a middle-man in all processes of knowing, 
making it difficult to distinguish between the various modes of knowing that al-Farabi wishes 
to keep distinct.586 
Poetry is primarily communicative, rather than an act of bringing something forth 
from one’s own mind. Thus it has social implications.587 Al-Farabi distinguished prophecy from 
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philosophy by reference to this communicative/social function. Philosophy, unlike prophecy, 
is meant for a small audience. It is taught through demonstration, which can only be 
understood by those few with specialized training. In his works on political philosophy, al-
Farabi notes that the primary distinction between philosophy and prophecy is the broader 
audience of prophecy. Prophecy is able to reach a broader audience because it is able to 
represent, through use of the imagination, demonstrative truths by analogy. Poetry, likewise, 
uses the imagination to represent through analogy. Furthermore, especially in an Islamic 
context, poetry creates and sustains community between individuals, which is another 
function al-Farabi attributes to prophecy.588 These dual social functions of poetry—instruction 
through analogy and community cohesion—clearly make it problematic in relation to 
prophecy in al-Farabi’s philosophical structure.  
Imagination becomes relevant to al-Farabi’s political philosophy because it can 
generate a conviction equal to cognitive conviction. Such conviction creates action in 
individuals because of the appetitive function that al-Farabi attributes to the imaginative 
faculty: “If imagination generates and appetition towards objects, this is because the faculty 
generates at a pre-reflective and emotional level where images lead us to or away from 
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objects.”589 Prophecy functions to instruct the masses because it is able to produce just such 
conviction without requiring the masses of people it seeks to reach to be philosophically 
trained or cognitively developed. Thus the masses can be moved toward accepting 
demonstrative truths without need to develop their faculties to the point where they can 
understand these truths demonstratively. Although it can produce conviction, and operates 
ratiocinatively, the imagination nevertheless cannot produce factual statements.590 This is 
because the claims made by imagination have no ontological commitment to existence.591 
Since poetry likewise operates through the imagination and likewise has social functions, it 
overlaps with prophecy in this regard. Poetry produces assent to achieve an end, and can 
therefore be used to achieve moral instruction, although the external validity of these moral 
judgments cannot be validated. For al-Farabi, assent derives from the wonder and pleasure 
that arise from utterance itself—a wonder that derives from the feeling of anticipation of full 
answers.592 Al-Farabi defines poetic discourse as “those [discourses] which consist of elements 
with the function of [generating imaginative assent] to a circumstance or characteristic, good 
or bad, of the object one speaks about, such as beauty, ugliness, loftiness, baseness, or any 
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other similar to these.”593 Thus, through analogy, poetry can make us feel that something is 
beautiful, ugly, good, or bad, and we can evaluate the aptness of the analogy and its success in 
giving rise to assent, but poetry does not provide a means by which we may decide if 
something is actually beautiful or ugly, good or bad. Al-Farabi leaves open the possibility that 
the imagination might be able to make true claims about objects that do not exist, but even so, 
this truth can only be verified outside of imaginative discourse. This difficulty is the primary 
reason that one must be careful to distinguish between poetic and prophetic statements—
though they both may involve the imagination, operate by analogy, and evoke imaginative 
assent in order to achieve a moral end, unlike poetry, the validity of prophetic statements 
must be verifiable on a true/false axis. How, then, are we to be able to distinguish between the 
poet who uses language to move us toward particular actions he claims are good, and the 
prophet who uses language to actually guide us towards the good? It would appear that an 
outside criterion is necessary.  
For al-Farabi, in terms of poetry, the outside criterion for the evaluation of poetry 
comes from philosophy. He notes 3 kinds of praiseworthy poetry: 1) that which is aimed at 
improving the rational faculty; 2) that which is aimed at the correction of accidents of the soul 
related to strength (i.e. anger, pride, cruelty, etc); 3) that which is aimed at correcting 
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accidents of the soul related to weakness (desire, pity, fear, etc).594 There are likewise 3 kinds 
blameworthy poetry: 1) that which devolves the rational faculty; 2) that which causes 
accidents in the soul related to strength; 3) that which causes accidents in the soul related to 
weakness.595 This outside criterion of evaluation does little to separate poetry from prophecy, 
however, since in chapter 10 of the Book of Religion al-Farabi also notes that the ideal 
relationship between religion and philosophy is a situation in which the theology of a revealed 
religion corresponds with or can be explained by philosophical demonstration. In this way, 
just as poetic truth is subordinated to demonstrative philosophy, so to is prophecy. The above 
two problems both point to a more deeply seated problem with al-Farabi’s construction of the 
imagination and his understanding of its role in prophecy. In terms of epistemology, Deborah 
Black notes: 
Making imagination essentially imitative threatens its universal role in all intellectual 
cognition. For if the intellect must always depend on imagination as a locus in which to think 
its intelligible forms, intellectual cognition seems to become removed from direct contact with 
its objects, and able to access them only through their imitations. We are left wondering how 
the imitation of intelligibles for the masses via the imaginative activities of poets and prophets 
                                                            
594 Ibid., 88. 
595 Ibid. 
 
 
281 
differs from the philosopher’s own activity of contemplating the intelligibles known to him 
with certitude in some corresponding image.”596 
Thus the importance of the imaginative faculty in al-Farabi’s philosophy makes it 
impossible to differentiate between prophetic and philosophic knowing, distinguishing 
between the two only in terms of social function. Unfortunately, many of the social functions 
of prophecy are also shared by poetry, so such a distinction between prophecy and philosophy 
only compounds the problem of asserting how exactly prophecy differs from other forms of 
human knowing and social leadership.  
A final epistemological problem that al-Farabi’s construction of the imagination gives 
rise to involves the question of how, and by whom, the content of prophecy is produced. The 
connection between poetry and the imaginative faculty in al-Farabi means that poetry is 
reflective of the poet’s mental operations. This is true in two ways: first, because poetry “being 
constituted of imaginative representations, cannot be true of the world…but does reveal 
something of the minds that construct those representations.”597 As Kemal notes, poetry 
relates to the other syllogistic arts in the same way that chess relates to war—it shows the 
rules by which they function by displaying them explicitly. Since the syllogistic arts reflect the 
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operation of human rational and emotive powers, poetry’s structure is thus reflective of the 
structure of human thought itself.598 Secondly, since poetry is constituted of imaginative 
representations, its content is dependent upon the retained content of the poet’s imaginative 
faculty, for although imitation allows for near infinite recombination of stored images, its is 
nevertheless still dependent upon sensory data.599 Is this also the case for prophecy? To what 
degree does the prophet’s “imitation of intelligibles for the masses”600 also reflect the 
prophet’s own mental operations, and how dependent is the content of prophecy on the 
sensory data at hand? This problem becomes especially important for the modernist thinkers 
we will discuss at the end of this chapter.  
 
 
Ibn Sina on Imagination 
 
Ibn Sina must have clearly recognized many of the problems inherent in al-Farabi’s 
Imaginative Faculty, and its vital role in prophecy. He attempts to solve these problems in two 
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different ways: by breaking up the functions of the imagination into different faculties, and by 
reducing the importance of the imagination as the distinguishing characteristic of prophecy. 
Rather than seeing the Imaginative Faculty as a single unified set of functions, Ibn Sina instead 
viewed them as a collection of powers bearing a family resemblance.601 Instead, Ibn Sina 
creates the “Sacred” or “Holy” Intellect, which seems to exist outside the normal schema of 
human intellects, is only available to prophets, and clearly distinguishes prophetic knowing 
from other forms of knowledge. 
For Ibn Sina, the imaginative faculty is located within the animal soul.602 Unlike 
Aristotle and al-Farabi, he does not locate the functions of the imagination in a single 
Imaginative Faculty, but instead distributes them among five faculties: 1) common sense, 
which receives forms from the five senses; 2) representative faculty, which stores the forms 
received by common sense; 3) imaginative faculty proper, which can compose and divide those 
stored forms; 4) estimative faculty, which perceives non-sensible aspects of perceived objects; 
5) retentive faculty, which stores estimative intentions.603 While it would seem that the third of 
these faculties retains most of the key characteristics and properties of al-Farabi’s imagination, 
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Ibn Sina’s imaginative faculty is not autonomous and cannot function without necessary 
support from the other 4 faculties. This further division is also necessary in order to 
accommodate Ibn Sina’s addition of non-material objects, “intentions,” to the kinds of 
perceptual objects available to the mind.604 Furthermore, one of the consequences of locating 
the imagination in the animal soul is to assure that prophecy, working through and upon the 
imaginations of the masses, cannot provide for the eternity of the soul without also acting 
upon and developing the rational faculties. This is because “the function of the agent intellect 
in the production of human knowledge exactly parallels its function in the creation of human 
souls”—that is to say, immaterial human souls are only generated out of material human 
bodies through the activity of the active intellect.605 For this reason, “the simple-minded soul 
experiencing the promises of popular religion through its imaginative faculty will at the 
moment of death, experience death,” as that soul has not developed its intellect to a sufficient 
degree to assure its freedom from materiality.606 So not only does Ibn Sina demote imagination 
from its critical role in the reception and dissemination of prophecy, he also assures that the 
work of imagination itself is not sufficient for successful prophecy.  
                                                            
604 Black, “Psychology: Soul and Intellect,” 314. 
605 Black, “Psychology: Soul and Intellect,” Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, 319. 
606 Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect, 113. 
 
 
285 
 
 
Ibn Sina on Prophecy 
 
It would be inaccurate to say that the imagination plays no role in prophecy for Ibn 
Sina. Though he fragments the imagination and seems to reduce its importance in relation to 
prophecy, it is only reduced in that it no longer serves as the mechanism by which the prophet 
receives prophecy, and thus also no longer serves as the distinguishing factor between 
prophetic knowing and philosophical knowing. The imagination nevertheless continues to 
play a critical role in the prophet’s execution of his public mission as prophet, even if it plays 
no distinguishing role in how he comes to that knowledge. Thus a prerequisite for prophecy in 
Ibn Sina is an exceptional imaginative faculty.607 
Ibn Sina replaces imagination with intuition, which he uses to describe the internal 
mechanism of prophecy and also to distinguish prophetic from philosophical knowing. For Ibn 
Sina, insight, or intuition, as opposed to cogitation or imagination, is defined as the ability to 
bring forth the middle term and syllogism’s conclusion instantaneously.608 Furthermore, 
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because it brings forth the middle term and conclusion simultaneously, insight exempts one 
from error609 since for Ibn Sina error cannot occur in the reception of concepts but only in 
their combination in the cogitative faculty.610 In prophets, the “Holy Intellect” is the faculty 
that accounts for this reception of knowledge through intuition. Unlike al-Farabi, who assigns 
prophecy to the imaginative faculty, with the “Holy Intellect,” Ibn Sina locates prophecy 
within the category of reason.611  
Though the imaginative faculty is not essential for the reception of prophecy, for Ibn 
Sina, prophets nevertheless need to use the imaginative faculty to compose images to aid the 
masses.612 This public function is a primary aspect of prophecy, as “scientific proofs may guide 
a Zarathustra up the mountain, but when he comes down again to interact with his fellow 
humans, he must have mastered dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics as well, or else his descent will 
be in vain.”613 This public aspect of prophecy is integral to his proof of prophecy, so without 
the imagination to create similitudes for the masses, he cannot demonstrate the necessity of 
prophecy. Ibn Sina’s proof, in rough outline, states that humans are communal animals, and as 
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such cannot reach their full human-ness outside of collectives, which he calls “cities.” Since 
such collectives require humans to interact with one another through a process of reciprocal 
transactions, these transactions must be governed by law and justice. In order to have law and 
justice, there must be a figure who dispenses both, and this figure must be a human. Such a 
figure is known as a prophet. Since a prophet is necessary for human existence to occur as 
human existence, and since we can observe law and justice monitoring interpersonal 
transactions in our own life, there must be such a thing as a prophet.614 Imagination is integral 
to Ibn Sina’s proof of prophecy because the prophet can only interact with the masses through 
similitudes, because not all people are capable of engaging in demonstration and it is improper 
for a prophet to indicate that he or she has knowledge or understanding hidden from the rest. 
Therefore this figure must attempt to put these difficult concepts in terms the masses can 
better understand.615  
 
 
Ibn Sina on Poetry 
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Like Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, in his commentary on Artistotle’s Poetics, located poetics in the 
context of the Organon, making it a part of logic.616 Al-Farabi’s reasoning for grouping poetics 
among the syllogistic arts proved problematic, however, and a new explanation was needed. 
For al-Farabi, “poetic discourse is syllogistic because it uses representations or images in a 
deductive but analogical form.”617 This is not syllogism proper, however, because “it lacks a 
universal middle premise,” but it is nonetheless easy to mistake for syllogism since “it has the 
same force because its particular middle premise is acceptable.”618 Ibn Sina is able to salvage 
poetic discourse as a syllogism, however, by showing that poems use “premises inspired by 
emotion.”619 The primary emotion that concerns him in this context is wonder. Ibn Sina 
differentiates between demonstrative and poetic discourses not based on their structure 
(which is shared) but the roles of wonder and pleasure in poetic discourse.620 Wonder in Ibn 
Sina, unlike al-Farabi, is not simply pleasurable awe but also includes distress.621 We are lead to 
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assent due to the aptness of the comparison made by poetic discourse, and wonder arises 
because we assent to the comparison in spite of the fact that it seems illogical or untrue.622  
For Ibn Sina, imagination has a peripheral place among the fields of knowledge, and 
poetry’s concern with feelings rather than truth suggests that, within the imagination, it is 
rather distant from the aspects of imagination that traffic in rationality.623 While denigrating 
poetry in respect to the logical arts (while nevertheless retaining its position in the Organon) 
Ibn Sina produces a stronger defense of poetry’s potential moral uses than al-Farabi. He notes 
that “the ability to appreciate harmony in poetry may indicate a potential for virtue,” since 
morality is about grasping wholeness and balance of our characteristics and finding ways of 
living harmoniously with others.624 Thus, in contrast to al-Farabi who thinks that poetry can 
both serve to promote virtue and vice, Ibn Sina argues that “evil or immorality may not be 
poetically beautiful because evil cannot garner that pleasurable awe which is part of the 
formal character of poems, and so would preclude poetic validity.”625 Though stated 
tentatively, this proposition would mean that poetry’s moral teachings might be verifiable 
without reference to anything outside poetic discourse—a successful poem in and of itself 
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could be counted upon to provide correct moral guidance because of the very nature poetry 
itself.  
 
 
Modernist Takes on Poetry, Imagination and Revelation 
 
It would seem that Ibn Sina’s reformulation of the relationship between poetry, 
prophecy, and revelation was satisfying for most thinkers who followed him up until the 
modern period. In modernist thinkers, however, the troubling proximity of poetry and 
prophecy again arises. This problem becomes apparent in the writings of Fazlur Rahman who, 
in seeking to allow room for the influence of historical context in revelation, revisits the role 
of the prophet and prophetic imagination. While Rahman and other recent thinkers do not 
revisit debates on the internal structure of the human soul and how knowledge is received, 
they do re-examine the Prophet’s public function and the way in which prophecy is aimed at 
helping the prophet succeed in his public mission.626 Such discussions lead us back to the 
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question of the difference between poet and prophet, and the Qur’anic attempts to distinguish 
verbal prophecy from divination and poetry. 
Rahman’s writings on prophecy attempt to reinvigorate Mu’tazali notions of the 
createdness of the Qur’an in order to open the text up for contemporary reinterpretation in 
order to strengthen its relevance for new contexts.627 He critiques theories of revelation that 
exclude the possibility of prophetic involvement in the shaping of the message, noting the 
centrality of the Prophet and his life to the content of the Qur’an.628 In his summation of the 
position of Islamic philosophy on the issue of revelation, Rahman revisits much of Ibn Sina’s 
positions discussed above. Since, however, Rahman wishes to highlight the “psychological and 
contextual place of the prophet himself [in prophecy] vis-à-vis his community, concerns and 
aspirations,” he especially highlights the role imagination plays in the formation of the 
prophetic message.629 In a departure from Ibn Sina, which hearkens back to al-Farabi, Rahman 
states “if at the intellectual level the prophet, the philosopher and the mystic are identical, the 
prophet is distinguished from the others by a strong imaginative faculty.”630 What 
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distinguishes prophetic imagination from imaginations of others is its strength, which allows 
him to “recapture the intellectual truth by figurization in visual and acoustic symbols in 
waking life.”631 Thus, along with poetry and mysticism, Rahman has added dreaming to the list 
of human mental states that resemble revelation. Without interrogating the implications of 
this statement for the structure of the soul or the reception of prophecy as distinguished from 
other kinds of knowledge, Rahman quickly pivots to the question of the prophet’s social role. 
Though Rahman’s writings on prophecy are sparse and he therefore does not explore them to 
their fullest extent, the question of the relationship between mysticism, poetry, and prophecy 
will continue to arise among other Muslim intellectuals.  
Perhaps the most evocative recent discussion of the issue of the relationship between 
poetry and prophecy in Islam occurs between Abdolkarim Soroush and Ayatollah Ja’far 
Sobhani in a series of letters exchanged in 2008. Like Rahman, Soroush is at pains to assert a 
notion of prophecy that recognizes the importance of the Prophet in providing the particulars 
of the Qur’anic message—particulars which are both personal and contextual, the recognition 
of which opens the text up to an expanded range of interpretations. Like Rahman before him, 
Soroush lassos together the three figures—Prophet, mystic, and poet—in order to, through 
differentiating between the three, gain a better understanding of the role of a prophet in 
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prophecy. He notes that all three involve inspiration, which we will remember is a key term 
for Ibn Sina in relation to prophecy. Soroush, like Ibn Sina, notes that while the mechanism of 
prophetic inspiration is the same as that which takes place in poetry and prophecy (and 
presumable dreams as well), the quality of inspiration differs—the prophet’s inspiration is of a 
greater kind.632 Sobhani challenges Soroush on this point, and rather than responding to his 
critique by referencing Ibn Sina, Soroush points toward al-Ghazali, who argues that satanic 
temptation is a useful analog to prophetic inspiration.633 Such a position indicates that 
inspiration constitutes a sliding scale based on quality and source, and that prophetic 
inspiration is not radically different, in kind, from other forms of inspiration.  
Since one cannot clearly distinguish between poet, prophet, and mystic based on their 
mode of knowing, he must employ other means. In the main body of the book, outside of his 
exchange with Sobhani, Soroush asserts the prophetic ‘mission’ as central to distinguishing 
between prophets and mystics. He cites Abd al-Quddus of Gangoh who, in distinguishing 
between prophetic revelation and mystical ecstasy, says “‘the Prophet ascended to the heavens 
and returned; had I been in his place, I would not have returned.’”634 It is in this return that the 
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imagination comes into play, for at this point the prophet must translate ineffable experience 
into similitudes that can be shared with a broader audience through the analogic powers of the 
imagination. Soroush himself does not assert that this is how the process functions, we must 
instead extrapolate this process based on Soroush’s source materials and based on the fact that 
it is through the imagination that Soroush see’s the prophet’s context entering into 
revelation.635 Such contextual influence could only occur if the imagination functions in the 
ways we have seen described by both al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. In this formulation, however, one 
is left to wonder about the difference between prophecy and mystical poets—if mystics, such 
as Rumi, have both experienced divine union, and returned, and written about it effectively 
using the imaginative faculty, what must one look to next in order to distinguish between 
them? In Soroush’s formulation this point is elided over—the Prophet receives pride of place 
because of historical primacy and scope of the community affected by his message, but it 
seems that Soroush sees Rumi’s contribution as equivalent to Muhammad’s in all other ways. 
Soroush later explains the contextual elements of revelation by referring to the 
Prophet as an instructor, who has lecture notes and a syllabus at the beginning of each 
semester, but must alter the structure of the course based on his student’s needs or interests. 
It should be noted that while this solution to the problem seems elegant, for it helps 
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distinguish between prophets who have a comprehensive revelation in contrast to the partial 
revelation of mystics, it conflicts with Ibn Sina’s notion that revelation is not received all at 
once, but piecemeal. If the instructor does not in fact have complete lecture notes or a full 
syllabus at the beginning of the semester, this leaves him likewise constantly returning to God 
with specific questions as they arise from the students—a situation which Soroush finds to be 
problematic.636 Sobhani notes a further problem with this metaphor, which is that if we were 
to permit that the Prophet had received the entire revelation at once and was doling it out 
piecemeal over the course of his life in response to particular situations, why do we have 
reports of the Prophet having to retire and wait for revelation to come before answering a 
question, rather than being able to answer immediately?637 Thus it is unclear that this 
metaphor, persuasive as it may be, helps clarify the role of the imagination in prophecy in 
light of Islamic Philosophy, or that it clearly allows us to distinguish between prophecy and the 
linguistic teachings of mystics.   
While Soroush’s understanding of the public role of the prophet and the role of the 
imagination in relation to the formation of the Qur’anic message is compelling, we must 
ultimately see his work as a break with the philosophic tradition of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. 
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Soroush notes that “all Islamic philosophers, ranging from al-Farabi to Ibn Sina (Avicenna), 
from Nasir al-din Tusi to Sadr al-din Shirazi, have considered it impossible for the prophet to 
grasp revelation without the involvement of his faculty of imagination.”638 While such 
statement might be considered true based on an incautious reading of al-Farabi, this section 
has shown that such an assertion is not true of Ibn Sina. First of all, it seems likely, given all 
that he attributes to it, that Soroush’s concept of the imagination is much more robust and 
unified than Ibn Sina’s and looks much more like al-Farabi’s single faculty. More importantly, 
however, is the fact that both al-Farabi and Ibn Sina are careful to distinguish between the 
reception of revelation and the dissemination of prophecy. Thus one can ‘grasp’ revelation 
without the imaginative faculty coming into play in Ibn Sina. It seems as if al-Farabi wished to 
take a similar position, but the epistemological problems inherent in his conception of the 
imagination mean that this faculty seems to insert itself necessarily into the process of all 
forms of human knowing. As this section has shown, Ibn Sina’s resolution of the problems with 
al-Farabi’s notion of the imaginative faculty make it much easier to distinguish between the 
reception of revelation and the dissemination of prophecy, with imagination playing a central 
role only in the latter process. Modern and contemporary thinkers, however, are revisiting the 
role of the imagination in prophecy for the purpose of opening up new possibilities in Qur’anic 
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exegesis. In doing so, however, they find themselves caught in debates as old as Islam itself 
about the differences between prophetic inspiration and other forms of knowing, and between 
prophecy and other forms of inspired speech. Closer attention to the evolution of these 
debates in the early period and in the writings of the major figures of Islamic Philosophy might 
help contemporary thinkers avoid rehashing the same arguments as they attempt to devise a 
theory of revelation and prophecy that allows them to distinguish prophecy from other 
human activities while simultaneously permitting them to assert the importance of historical 
context and prophetic personality in the formation of the Qur’an.  
 
 
Nizami on Poetry 
 
It is within this context of the anxiety over poetry’s truth value and its (potentially) 
dangerous proximity to prophecy that Nizami enters. He is clearly aware of the need to defend 
poetry as a genre for discussing mystical experience. As a poet, Nizami is upfront about his 
high valuation of poetry, including an introductory section on the superiority of poetry to 
prose. What he adds to the conversation, however, is that he values poetry not just as a human 
art, but as an apt medium for religious discourse: “The key to the treasure [of the two worlds] 
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lies under the tongue of the poet.”639 He notes, for example, “The poets are the nightingales of 
heaven.”640 This is not just poetic flourish, however, Nizami clearly thinks that poetry has a 
special connection to religious insight. He is in fact troubled that poetry has been devalued by 
unscrupulous poets who versify solely for bread.641 
Though he highly values poetry for religious discourse, Nizami is clear to distinguish 
between poetry and prophecy while nevertheless elevating poetry to a status just below that of 
prophecy. He explicitly places poets immediately after the prophets in rank: “Poetry, the veil 
of intimate secrets, is a shadow of the Prophetic veil / Two ranks stand before God; in front are 
the prophets, and the poets are behind.”642 This is because “When they are agitated by the fire 
of thought [fikr], they become one family with the angels.”643 This seems to be a nod to the 
notion that poets can access the Active Intellect through the imaginative faculty. Nizami 
argues that such a poet can only be trusted if he overcomes his base needs, and that such a 
poet can “pierce heaven’s ear,” “penetrate the seven spheres,” and press the dome of heaven 
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to servitude.644 Thus, when one finds a worthy poet, one should “attach oneself to his words, 
because he is a poet.”645  
But he hedges a bit on this, since not all poets are worthy of such rank, rather one must 
distinguish between true poetry and debased poets, who versify only for monetary gain.646 
What might distinguish true poets from the debased? In part it seems to center on the subject 
matter, since Nizami claims to be producing a “new poetry” freed from the tavern, which will 
earn him reward on Judgment Day.647 He also argues that one should be wary of delving into 
poetry before first becoming are familiar with Shariah, but once one is sufficiently versed in 
the exoteric religious obligations, poetry can “seat you at the Lote Tree [sidrat]” and give you a 
Sultanate in the Kingdom of Spiritual Meaning [ma’na].”648 It seems clear that part of the issue 
of poetry for Nizami revolves around around the proper comportment of the body. One can’t 
be prepared for receiving its spiritual insights until one has mastered the external 
requirements of religion and relinquished desire for worldly things. 
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This entire introductory section could certainly be disregarded as mere poetic 
flourish—a craftsman bolstering his own product by denigrating the creations of others. 
Certainly there is a long history of such poetic boasting.649 But to disregard Nizami’s writing on 
poetry as mere boasting fails to see how critically it frames the rest of the project. As we shall 
see, for Nizami a true poet is defined by his renunciation of worldly attachments, which gives 
the poet mystical insight. This is a theme that runs throughout the Makhzan al-asrar, such that 
Nizami is not merely making an argument for the value of his poetry, but the value of poetry in 
general for revealing mystical insight and conveying religious teachings. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
Recently rumors have circulated about a Jalal al-Din Rumi biopic, purportedly with 
Leonardo DiCaprio playing Mawlana and Robert Downey Jr slated to play Shams al-Din 
Tabrizi.650 The film’s stated goal is to combat Islamophobia by providing a positive portrayal of 
a Muslim historical figure. It makes sense that Rumi would be chosen for such a task: he has 
been on and off the Bestseller list and has certainly sold more copies that any contemporary 
American poet. He is also a safe choice because of the ways his poetry has been translated into 
English. Often stripped of historical context, overt religious references, and religious 
vocabulary, Rumi is presented as a generic Eastern Mystic. When I ask students about Rumi, 
many have the impression that he is Buddhist. Such a presentation of Sufi poetry, stripped of 
its religious and cultural specificity, is attractive to American audiences looking to construct 
their own private religion by mixing and matching from non-Christian sources. It rests on a 
presumption that Sufis are antinomian pluralists mainly interested internalized, personal 
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encounters with God, stripped of any exoteric religious trappings. It is notable that such a 
presentation of Sufism aligns well with Protestant notions of religion, and dovetails with 
historical attempts to present a “good” Islam, in contrast to a perceived overly dogmatic and 
ritualistic “bad” Islam.651 
Such a presentation of Sufism, and Sufi poetry, does harm in a number of ways. First, 
what is the value for combatting Islamophobia in constructing a vision of Islam that only exists 
in Yoga studios in Brooklyn? Readers of pop-Rumi might be shocked or even angered by more 
nuanced presentations of his work, or Muslims who disagree with Coleman Barks’ 
interpretation of the master.652  Second, it devalues the particular form of the poetry Sufis 
wrote. Translators and “versioners”653 attempt to capture the “essence” of the Sufi message, 
but do so by changing extended, impeded narratives into short aphorisms, and divorcing those 
narratives from their explication. Finally, such approached to Sufism reinforce problematic 
assumptions about mysticism as a primarily male, disembodied, mind-focused practice, 
ignoring the long history of bodily techniques and practices that invite and allow a fleeting 
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encounter with God. It is in these embodied practices, often explicitly referenced and praised 
in Sufi poetry, that cultural and religious specificity can be most acute.  
 
Sufism and the Body 
 
This dissertation investigates the role of the body in medieval Sufism through an 
analysis of the portrayals of the body found in the first poem of Nizami’s Quintet, the Makhzan 
al-asrar. The Quintet provides a comprehensive vision for the structure and regulation of 
Islamic civilization, advocating models of courtly love, mystical experience, and religious 
ritual, setting forth the requirements for a properly regulated society and outlining the 
contours of divine kingship. The size and scope of his project was essayed by a host of later 
poets, who mimicked the subject matter, meter, and structure of Nizami’s opus. Nizami’s 
Quintet also perpetuated the practice of beginning these epics with a fixed series of 
introductory remarks, covering topics such as God’s unity, praise of the Prophet, and the 
Prophet’s ascension. Though the nature of Nizami as poet, mystic, ethicist, and scientist has 
been a topic of debate for several decades, barely discussed in this ongoing conversation is the 
first poem in his Quintet, the Treasury of Mysteries. A mystico-ethical text, it serves as a 
prolegomenon to his Quintet, outlining the major contours of his poetic vision, and was 
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emulated in both meter and structure by a vast number of Persian poets after him, most 
notably Amir Khosrow Dehlavi (d. 1325) and ‘Abd al-Rahman Nur al-Din Jami (d. 1492). These 
poems were enormously popular—they circulated in lavishly illuminated manuscripts, were 
displayed in imperial libraries, passed down along Sufi lineages, and were turned into popular 
songs performed at saints’ shrines. Ownership of and command over Nizami’s Quintet, among 
other texts, was one way that medieval Muslim kings and saints constructed their religious 
and political legitimacy.654 
In spite of their immense popularity and importance, the Makhzan al-asrar is often 
overlooked in contemporary scholarship. This is in part because they challenge long-held but 
problematic definitions of Sufism as a private, interiorizing tendency within Islam that is 
primarily interested in human love as a metaphor for divine proximity. I argue that these texts 
can, as Scott Kugle and Shahzad Bashir have pointed out, become sources for learning about 
medieval Sufi habitus—as sedimented sources of religious mores, bodily comportments, social 
relations, history, science, and meaning.655 As such, this dissertation will challenge previous 
characterizations of medieval Sufism by investigating the importance of bodily practice in a 
prominent medieval poem.  
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Recent works, such as Ahmet Karamustafa’s God’s Unruly Friends, Scott Kugle’s Sufis and 
Saints Bodies, and Shazad Bashir’s Sufi Bodies, have cleared a space for the body as a subject of 
study in medieval Sufism. Most relevant to this study, Bashir notes a “high valorization of 
corporeal contact as a marker of social solidarity and transmission of authority in the 
literature and art” of the medieval period.656 He further states that the texts in his study link 
“increasing intimacy with greater corporeal access.”657 Bashir’s work alerts us to the 
importance of the physical transmission of authority in the texts and contexts of medieval 
Sufism. The significance of this relationship between physical contact, spiritual intimacy, and 
the transmission of mystical knowledge helps to shed light on Nizami’s repeated reference to 
the physicality of Muhammad’s ascension. 
In his 2011 book, Sufi Aesthetics, Cyrus Ali Zargar identifies the thirteenth century as a 
particularly important moment for the development of poetic metaphors to describe God in 
Sufism. Zargar shows how poets, such as Fakhr al-Din ‘Iraqi (d. 1289), attempted to resolve 
multiple intellectual and philosophical strands of mysticism in their writings. In attempting to 
resolve a practical and ecstatic love mysticism that calls for direct encounters with God with a 
philosophically rigorous theoretical mysticism which problematizes the possibility of such an 
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unmediated encounter, ‘Iraqi settles on the male human form as the ideal symbolic medium 
through which divine-human encounters can take place.658 My own work will expand on and 
complicate this insight, showing how the ontological pre-eminence of the Prophet Muhammad 
underlies the notion that the male human form is the closest creation comes to approximating 
the nature of God. Likewise, my research shows how one Sufi poet uses the Miʿraj to thread the 
needle between various philosophical, theological, and mystical discourses, preserving the 
uniqueness of the Prophet’s encounter with God while also clearing a space for others to attain 
mystical proximity to the divine.  
Colby and Gruber have already highlighted how ascension narratives subordinate 
competing symbolic systems to Muhammad’s revelation for the purposes of negotiating 
sectarian debates, winning converts, and training the newly converted. Though aimed at a 
courtly audience rather than potential converts, Nizami’s ascension narrative nevertheless fits 
this paradigm, because it subordinates competing discourses of knowledge and authority (such 
as astrology) to the direct encounter with God. This study argues that Nizami utilizes familiar 
Sufi tropes of bodily contact and bestowal of clothing to portray Muhammad as a Sufi initiate 
who is symbolically granted divine knowledge and authority over the cosmos during his 
ascension. 
                                                            
658 Zargar, Sufi Aesthetics. 
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Such a relationship between Sufism, the body, and literary assertions of spiritual 
authority would have been difficult to think just a few decades ago. Scholars of Sufism who 
studied the two centuries preceding Nizami’s lifetime have tended to read the textual 
production of this era as primarily apologetic in nature. Sufi manuals and hagiographic 
collections were viewed as attempts to negotiate a space for an antinomian Sufism in a world 
dominated by Islamic law. In the past decade, however, Jawid Mojaddedi and Ahmet 
Karamustafa, among others, have pointed to the flaws in this argument. In Sufism: The 
Formative Period, Karamustafa, for example, argues that such texts instead represent an 
attempt, among other things, to demonstrate the primacy of Sufi piety over other forms in 
Islam. 
This dissertation thus situates itself at the conjunction of discourses on 1) the ascension 
narrative as a genre commonly used for asserting the primacy of one religious identity over 
another, 2) the importance of the body in medieval Sufism, and 3) the centrality of Persian 
poetry to the development and dissemination of Sufism. By examining how Nizami positions 
Muhammad as the paradigmatic mystic, I then use the Miʿraj as an interpretive lens through 
which to understand the role of the body in the rest of their work. In doing so, this dissertation 
reveals how Nizami deploys familiar bodily tropes to argue for the supremacy of Sufism over 
other forms of knowledge and authority. 
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 Public perception of Sufism continues to be shaped by 18th and 19th century discourses on 
Islam. These explicitly colonial and racialized understandings of Islam framed (and frame) 
Sufism as Persianate659, intellectual, mystical, antinomian, and suitable for Western 
consumption, in contrast to the Arab660 strands of Islam, which were legalistic and incapable of 
philosophical thinking.661 On this construal, Sufi poets such as Rumi or Hafiz can be extracted 
from their Islamic religious and cultural context and presented as generic Eastern mystics. One 
can recite Daniel Ladinsky’s “translations” of Hafiz662 while meditating before a statue of the 
Buddha before attending yoga class. While such contemporary recombinations of religious 
source materials are worthy of study in their own right, one must wonder how an American 
Hafiz aficionado might respond to translations of his poetry more fully embedded in their 
historical and religious context.663 Would a Rumi who advocated practice of daily prayer and 
fasting have become the best selling poet in America? 
                                                            
659 And therefore “Aryan.” 
660 In Renan’s terms: Semitic. 
661 Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of 
Pluralism (University of Chicago Press, 2012), 173–174. 
662 Usually pronounced “Hafeeeez” by American readers, an unintentional but not insignificant sonic distancing of 
his name from the Arabic honorific. 
663 Often market forces and editorial decisions act to protect such readers from acquiring this uncomfortable 
knowledge. See, for example, Ernst, Following Muhammad, xiv. 
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 In contrast to the public perception of Sufism, the academic study of Sufism has 
transformed itself over the past two decades. Once focused on the intellectual, 
philosophical,and mystical strands of the tradition, recent works accented the role of the body 
in both contemporary and historical manifestations of Sufism. According to Rudolph Ware, in 
The Walking Qur’an, this helpful correction to the scholarly study of Sufism may have been an 
overcorrection. He argues that recent studies of Sufism and the body have posited Sufism as 
the sole repository for embodied practice, in contrast to an intellectual, textual, Arab Islamic 
modernism.664 In some ways, this is the inverse of Renan’s argument. What this approach 
misses, according to Ware, is that “Sufism draws its bodily approach to knowledge from the 
broader Islamic ethic, not the other way around.”665 Central to Ware’s argument is that “the 
human being as a material reality and practices of corporeal remolding are essential for the 
classical epistemology of Islam to work.”666 For Ware this is true not simply of Sufi orders, but 
also Qur’an schools, among other sites of knowledge transmission in Islamic history. In 
contrast to these prior approaches, Ware argues that his work will “focus on the human body 
                                                            
664 He specifically points to Scott Kugle’s Sufis & Saint’s Bodies on this matter. 
665 Rudolph T. Ware, The Walking Qur’an: Islamic Education, Embodied Knowledge, and History in West Africa, 1 edition 
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 6. 
666 Ibid., 7. 
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and the ways Muslims have used it to archive, transmit, decode, and actualize religious 
knowledge.”667  
 It is with these caveats in mind that my own work proceeds. Nizami, as a figure, is both 
inside and outside of Sufism proper. He clearly argues for his own spiritual authority and 
poetic authenticity based on a mystical experience. His poetry is filled with metaphors for the 
Sufi path and uses imagery that would be familiar to any Sufi. His work, especially the 
romances, are leaned on by later Sufis and mystical poets as a source of inspiration. In spite of 
this, Nizami himself was never part of a Sufi order and contemporary scholarship is uneasy 
about his relationship to the broader Sufi tradition. In the Makhzan al-asrar, he argues for a 
spiritual authority derived from embodied knowledge of God transmitted through the example 
of the Prophet Muhammad. As Ware points out, “the relationship between the spiritual guide 
(murshid) and the aspirant (murid) is but one face of a broader master/disciple relationship in 
Islamic schooling.”668 In Nizami’s poetry, he posits Muhammad as the master par excellence who 
points the way towards an embodied spirituality that allows for a direct encounter with God. 
Likewise, he marks himself, due to his own bodily discipline, as a vessel for transmitting such 
knowledge to others through poetry.  
                                                            
667 Ibid., 4. 
668 Ibid., 6. 
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